Hakeem v. Denver Pub. Sch.
| Decision Date | 07 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 20-cv-00083-PAB-KLM |
| Parties | AHMED A. HAKEEM, Plaintiff, v. DENVER PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KRISTEN L. MIX
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [#15]1 (the "Motion").2 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se,3 filed a Response [#24], and Defendant filed a Reply [#28]. The Court has reviewed the Motion, the Response, the Reply, the entire case file, and the applicable law, and is sufficiently advised in the premises. For the reasons set forth below, the Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion [#15] be GRANTED.
At the outset, the Court notes that the Amended Complaint [#6] is exceedingly thin on allegations.5 Plaintiff is a 62-year-old African American male. Am. Compl. [#6] at 2. Defendant is a public school district in Denver, Colorado. Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiff was employed as a paraprofessional at Defendant's George Washington High School (the "School") from February 10, 1996 to July 17, 2018. Id. ¶¶ 8, 9; Termination Letter [#15-1] at 1.6 As a paraprofessional, Plaintiff worked with at-risk students in the anger management program. Id. ¶ 9. Having received his last job evaluation of 4.8 out of 5, Plaintiff asserts that he is actually overqualified for his job position. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant discriminated against him on the basis of his race and age. See generally Am. Compl. [#6]. The claims arise from Plaintiff's interaction with a student at the School. Id.
Plaintiff thus alleges that, while performing his teaching duties, he "was attacked by a very violent student with a background in gang activity and gang violence" on at least two separate occasions. Am. Compl. [#6] ¶ 10. On January 17, 2018, the student directed a vulgar comment toward Plaintiff and then attacked him in the School's hallway. Id. Plaintiff responded by fending off the attack with his briefcase. Id.
Thereafter, on January 26, 2018, the Assistant Principal of the School, Gideon Geisel ("Geisel"), interviewed Plaintiff regarding the challenges Plaintiff had been having with the student. Am. Compl. [#6] at 9 (Letter of Warning). That same day, Geisel issued the Letter of Warning to Plaintiff, indicating that Plaintiff had been experiencing challenges with the student "for over three months." Id. The Letter of Warning further states that Plaintiff had "admitted to responding to [the student]" and that Plaintiff "felt threatened and used [his briefcase] to push [the student] away . . . to remove [himself] from the situation." Id. In the letter, Geisel wrote that Plaintiff acknowledged that he should not have responded to the student's vulgar comment and that he should have removed himself from the situation earlier. Id.
Furthermore, Geisel directed Plaintiff that, going forward, he was to "not engage negatively, escalate students or respond with inappropriate language toward students." Am. Compl. [#6] at 9 (Letter of Warning). Geisel further told Plaintiff that he would no longer "have any contact with [the student]." Id. Moreover, Geisel told Plaintiff that "if [he] fail[ed] to implement [his] de-escalation techniques or fail[ed] to walk away from an escalated situation in which there is no immediate danger to school occupants, [he would] be subjected to progressive discipline." Id.
As a result of the situation on January 17, 2018, Defendant placed Plaintiff on administrative leave and allegedly told Plaintiff to "stay away from this [student] because she had it out for him." Am. Compl. [#6] ¶ 10. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant did not penalize the student for the January 17th attack. Id.
After returning from his administrative leave, Plaintiff was attacked a second time on February 6, 2018 by the same student. Am. Compl. [#6] ¶ 10. Plaintiff asserts that the student "attacked [him] with her fist and a belt" as Plaintiff was leaving a classroom. Id. Plaintiff further asserts that he "did not engage in violent conduct" and was justified in "defend[ing] himself with defensive blocks and by pushing her away" three times. Id. At some point during the altercation, Plaintiff asserts that he unintentionally kicked the student while she was on the ground. Id.; see Termination Letter [#15-1] at 1.
On July 17, 2018, Defendant sent Plaintiff a Termination Letter [#15-1] to notify Plaintiff that his employment with Defendant was terminated, effective as of the date of the letter, and that he would be considered ineligible for re-employment with the school district. See Am. Compl. [#6] ¶ 14; Termination Letter [#15-1] at 1. Defendant's termination of Plaintiff's employment was predicated on the Letter of Warning dated January 26, 2018—directing Plaintiff to "not engage negatively, escalate students or respond with inappropriate language toward students"—combined with the subsequent physical altercation Plaintiff had with the student on February 6, 2018. Termination Letter [#15-1] at 1 (emphasis in original). Specifically, the Termination Letter [#15-1] states that Plaintiff had "neglected [his] duties, been insubordinate when [he] violated the directives in the [L]etter of [W]arning, and [Defendant] no longer [had] confidence in [Plaintiff's] judgment or professionalism." Id.; see Am. Compl. [#6] ¶ 14. The Termination Letter[#15-1] further states that Plaintiff had until July 20, 2018 to request a Post-Termination Hearing; otherwise, Plaintiff's termination would be final. Termination Letter [#15-1] at 1.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant created a hostile work environment by "order[ing] Plaintiff back into the classroom with the violent student." Am. Compl. [#6] ¶ 12. According to Plaintiff, complying with Defendant's directive placed him in a hostile situation.7 Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant terminated Plaintiff in an attempt to "cover [ ] up" the attacks "by a very violent and gang related student." Id. at 4. As a result, Plaintiff states that he "has suffered immensely," including: "lost earnings," "past and future emotional distress, non-economic pain and suffering[,] phycological [sic] treatment, [and] damages that [P]laintiff alleges arise from [D]efendant's wrongful conduct." Id. ¶ 11.
Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant was aware, or reasonably should have been aware, that Plaintiff's refusal to comply with Defendant's directive—to "not engage negatively . . . toward students"—was based on Plaintiff's reasonable belief that the directive violated Plaintiff's rights as a worker. Id. ¶ 15.
On January 10, 2020, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint [#6] against Defendant. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated Plaintiff's rights pursuant to Title VII, the ADEA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in regard to: and (6) hostile work environment. See Am. Compl. [#6] ¶ 3, pp. 2, 4. For the purpose of this Motion [#15], the Court construesPlaintiff's claims as the following: (1) Title VII discrimination; (2) Title VII retaliation; (3) Title VII hostile work environment; (4) age discrimination in violation of the ADEA; (5) retaliation in violation of the ADEA; and (6) denial of equal rights under the law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.8 The Motion [#15] seeks dismissal of all the claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Motion [#15] at 3.9
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests "the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint after taking those allegations as true." Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "[t]he complaint must plead sufficient facts, taken as true, to provide 'plausible grounds' that discovery will reveal evidence to support plaintiff's allegations." Shero v. City of Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "[P]lausibility refers to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, Id. (citation omitted). That said, "[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1192.
"The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). As the Tenth Circuit has explained, "the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the [C]ourt reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims." Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line...
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