Haldas v. Commissioners of Charlestown

• Decision Date: 16 May 1955
• Docket Number: No. 139,139
• Citation: 113 A.2d 886,207 Md. 255
• Parties: Thomas HALDAS v. COMMISSIONERS OF CHARLESTOWN, a municipal corporation of the State of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 255

207 Md. 255

113 A.2d 886

Thomas HALDAS v. COMMISSIONERS OF CHARLESTOWN, a municipal corporation of the

State of Maryland.

No. 139.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 16, 1955.

J. Edgar Harvey, Salisbury (Harvey & Cropper, Salisbury, and Edward D. E. Rollins, Elkton, on the brief), for appellant.

G. Reynolds Ash, Elkton, (J. Albert Roney, Jr., Elkton, on the brief), for appellee.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, HENDERSON and HAMMOND, JJ.,

DELAPLAINE, Judge.

In this suit in equity, Thomas Haldas, an owner of real estate in Charlestown, Cecil County, asked the Circuit Court for Cecil County to declare unconstitutional Chapter 706 of the Laws of 1953, which adopts a plat of the lots in that town, and to enjoin the Commissioners of Charlestown, its agents, servants, and employees, from entering upon his property and exercising any rights or privileges under that Act.

The preamble of the Act recites that Charlestown was created by Chapter 23 of the Laws of 1742, and in pursuance of that Act John Veazy made a survey by which the town was laid out; that one plat of the survey was delivered to the Governor of the Province, and another to the Clerk of the County, but the plat filed in the county records was lost or destroyed; that in 1836 John Janney made a copy of the plat, copies of which are still in use; that over the years owners of lots failed to confine their properties within the bounds as shown on the plat and have encroached upon the streets; that in 1952 the town engaged Price and Price, a firm of civil engineers, to make a survey of the town establishing the original lines; and that the Act of 1953 adopts the plat made by them.

The bill of complaint alleged that complainant is the owner of certain lots on both sides of Water Street and both sides of Frederick Street, designated as lots 9, 10, 11, 19, 20 and 30, and the lot known as the Sunken Lot; and certain lots located on the northwest side of Calvert Street, and on the northeast side of Louisa Lane, designated as lots 42 and 49; and also a leasehold interest in lots 18 and 29 on the plat of Charlestown. The bill then alleged that from time immemorial complainant and his predecessors in title have used and occupied this land continuously 'up to and abutting upon the lines of the streets as they now exist and are actually laid out.' It alleged that the Legislature of Maryland has attempted to deprive him of his property by an Act which, by adopting a revised plat of Charlestown, purports to increase the width of the streets from 15 to 50 feet and to claim title in the beds of the streets as thus widened, although the streets have never been laid out as shown on the revised plat.

The bill charged that the Act is unconstitutional for five reasons: (1) it violates Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights because it exercises judicial power by declaring the municipal corporation to be the owner of the land beyond the lines of the streets as they are actually laid out and as they now exist; (2) it violates Article 19 of the Declaration of Rights because it deprives him of 'remedy by the course of the Law of the Land' and substitutes a mere fiat; (3) it violates Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights because it attempts to disseize him of his freehold and deprives him of his property without 'the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the Land'; (4) it violates Article 3, Section 40, of the Constitution of Maryland because it takes private property for public use without just compensation; and (5) it deprives him of his property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

The bill finally alleged that complainant will suffer irreparable loss and damage unless the Court intervenes in his behalf, since defendant has threatened to take his property without compensation under the authority of a statute which is utterly void, and he does not have an adequate remedy in a court of law.

Defendant, in its answer to the bill, denied that the Act takes any property to which complainant has legal title, and asserted that the Act is not unconstitutional, as it merely requires complainant to vacate property which belongs to defendant, and to remove any improvements which complainant has wrongfully erected thereon, so that defendant may improve the streets in accordance with a street improvement plan which will be for the welfare of the residents of the town.

Complainant demurred to the answer. He assigned as the reasons for the demurrer that the answer did not disclose any defense, and that the Act of 1953 is unconstitutional.

On July 13, 1954, the chancellor filed an opinion in which he said that it was unnecessary to pass upon the constitutionality of the Act, as it appeared from its preamble that it takes nothing from the lot owners but grants them the ground between the old street lines and the new street lines. He said that he would dismiss the bill for two reasons: (1) because of complainant's failure to file necessary exhibits, and (2) because the bill and answer raised a question of title to real estate, which is not cognizable in a court of equity.

On October 28, 1954, the chancellor passed a decree dismissing the bill. Complainant thereupon entered an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

First, we consider the chancellor's objection that complainant failed to file the plats and deeds as exhibits with his bill of complaint. General Equity Rule 4, upon which the chancellor relied, provides as follows:

'No order or process shall be made or issued upon any bill, petition, or other paper, until such bill, petition, or other paper, together with all the exhibits referred to as parts thereof, be actually filed with the Clerk of the Court. Nor shall any injunction or restraining order, or order appointing a receiver issue until the originals or duly certified copies of all deeds, or other instruments of record, and verified copies of all documents, papers or writings not of record, necessary to show the character and extent of the complainant's interest in the suit shall have been filed, if said instruments of writing be in possession of the plaintiff or accessible to him; if not, that fact shall be stated in the bill or petition.'

The purpose of the first part of Rule 4 is to prevent the passage of any order or decree upon a bill or petition until all its parts are filed, so that any order or decree will relate to a complete document, all parts of which are on record for the inspection of any persons interested in the matter. Sears v. Barker, 155 Md. 323, 141 A. 908; Becker v. Minber Corporation, 177 Md. 583, 586, 10 A.2d 707. If copies of written instruments upon which the right to equitable relief depends are not filed with the bill, the defendants may demur. Beachey v. Heiple, 130 Md. 683, 693, 101 A. 553; Kahn v. Janowski, 191 Md. 279, 284, 60 A.2d 519.

The second part of Rule 4 requires that all exhibits shall be verified before the court issues a writ of injunction...