Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp.

• Decision Date: 31 January 1992
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 74-1345.
• Citation: 784 F. Supp. 215
• Parties: Terri Lee HALDERMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL AND HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

784 F. Supp. 215

Terri Lee HALDERMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL AND HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 74-1345.

United States District Court, E.D. of Pennsylvania.

January 31, 1992.

David Ferleger, Philadelphia, Pa., for Halderman.

Judith A. Gran, Frank J. Laski, Public Interest Law Center, Philadelphia, Pa., for Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Citizens (now ARC/PA).

Howard Ulan, Com. of Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare, Harrisburg, Pa., Arthur E. Peabody, Jr., Robert H. Stern, Pamela K. Chen, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendants.

RAYMOND J. BRODERICK, District Judge.

Again, as the Third Circuit stated in its 1990 decision, "we revisit the seemingly endless litigation over the closing of Pennhurst State School and Hospital ("Pennhurst")." Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 901 F.2d 311, 314 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 140, 112 L.Ed.2d 107 (1990). Now before this Court is defendant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's motion pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) and (6) seeking to modify the Final Settlement Agreement ("FSA") that was approved and entered as a consent decree and order of this Court on April 5, 1985. Asserting developments in both constitutional and statutory law, defendant's motion seeks to modify the FSA by vacating Appendix A of the FSA. Having determined, pursuant to the recent Supreme Court decision, Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Co. Jail, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992), that the Commonwealth has not carried its burden of establishing a significant change in factual circumstances or in law, this Court will deny defendant's motion.

The history of proceedings in this case is lengthy and will not be set out except as is pertinent to defendant Commonwealth's present motion. At the outset, however, this Court must express its dismay that, after having determined that there has been no change in law or fact that could support defendant Commonwealth's present motion, this Court must conclude that this motion is yet another attempt by the Commonwealth to avoid, or at least to delay, full compliance with the legal obligations the Commonwealth knowingly and willingly assumed as a result of its acceptance of the FSA that was approved and entered as an order of this Court in 1985. While the FSA propelled the Commonwealth into recognition as a leader in habilitation for its retarded citizens, this Court must note that as of 1989, some members of the Pennhurst class remained institutionalized, contrary to the obligations the Commonwealth undertook under the FSA. In November, 1991, further, this Court was notified in the course of another matter that fifteen of the 191 members of the plaintiff class who reside in Delaware County have yet to be placed into community living arrangements. Finally, this Court must note that Appendix A is the "heart and soul" of the FSA, in that Appendix A sets out the affirmative obligations owed to the Pennhurst class members. Indeed, without Appendix A, the FSA would be a nullity. Although the services and safeguards of Appendix A are generally the joint responsibility of the Commonwealth and county defendants, no county defendant has joined the Commonwealth's present motion to vacate Appendix A.

This case spans back to May of 1974, when suit was brought as a class action on behalf of former and present residents of Pennhurst School and Hospital, a state institution for persons with retardation in Spring City, Pennsylvania, against officials of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. In 1975, the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (now ARC/PA), among others, intervened as plaintiffs, adding as defendants the Mental Health/Mental Retardation Administrators of Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery and Philadelphia Counties. Also in 1975, the United States of America intervened as a party plaintiff. In November of 1976, the class was certified as consisting of all present and future residents of Pennhurst, those who were on a waiting list for placement at Pennhurst, and those who, because of the unavailability of alternate services in their community, may be placed at Pennhurst.

In 1977, the case went to trial. After 32 days of testimony limited solely to the issue of liability, this Court made findings of fact and conclusions of law which are detailed in Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F.Supp. 1295 (1977). Summarizing, this Court found, based on the evidence presented, that Pennhurst in 1977 was overcrowded, understaffed and without the programs which experts considered necessary for minimally adequate habilitation. ("Habilitation" is the term of art used to refer to that education, training and care required by retarded individuals to reach their maximum development.) Not only was habilitation inadequate, with no plans for improving the programming available, but the evidence clearly showed that a large number of the Pennhurst residents had experienced marked regression in basic living skills as a result of their confinement at Pennhurst and that the residents of Pennhurst were regularly subjected to a number of dehumanizing practices. Specifically, this Court found that restraints were used in lieu of adequate staffing as control measures, that psychotropic drugs were used not for treatment but for control, and that the rate of drug use on some of the units was extraordinarily high. The Court also found that Pennhurst was a dangerous place to live, with injuries to residents commonplace from other residents and through self-abuse, and sometimes from staff. Many residents suffered loss of teeth, broken bones, and physical deterioration as a result of this abuse. Moreover, because routine housekeeping services were not available during evenings and on weekends, it was common to find urine and feces on ward floors over these periods. The average age of the residents was 36, and the average stay at Pennhurst was 21 years.

In 1984, following eleven years of active litigation, approximately 500 court orders, 28 published opinions and three arguments before the United States Supreme Court, a summary of which is found in this Court's opinion, Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 610 F.Supp. 1221 (E.D.Pa. 1985), the parties reached a settlement under the guidance of Judge Rosenn of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The parties executed the FSA, pursuant to which the definition of the plaintiff class was limited to those persons who were residents of Pennhurst on or after May 30, 1974.

In determining whether to approve the FSA, this Court held a hearing on September 25, 1984. Among those testifying was Dr. James Conroy, the director of research at the Developmental Disabilities Center at Temple University, who summarized the final results of a five-year longitudinal study that had systematically tracked and monitored the progress of the Pennhurst residents who had been transferred to community living arrangements pursuant to orders of this Court. The purpose of the study was to measure each person's relative growth and development in the institution and in the community, and to assess the impact of deinstitutionalization. The study found that the former Pennhurst residents showed significantly faster development growth in the community than they had at Pennhurst. They received more services and more program time at less cost in public dollars. Prior to the transfer of residents from Pennhurst, over 60 percent of the families surveyed had opposed the transfer, of which 52 percent were strongly opposed. Six months later, the same families overwhelmingly approved of the decision: 81 percent agreed with the decision to transfer, of which 64 percent strongly agreed, while only 4 percent continued their strong disagreement. Measured by a variety of standards, the families generally perceived the happiness of their retarded relatives to be much greater in the CLAs than at Pennhurst. Id. at 1233; Conroy, J.W. and Bradley, V.J., The Pennhurst Longitudinal Study: A Report of Five Years of Research and Analysis, Temple University Developmental Disabilities Center (Philadelphia 1985).

The FSA was approved and entered as a consent decree and order of this Court on April 5, 1985. Under the terms of the proposed settlement, the Commonwealth and County defendants, agreed, among other things, to provide community living arrangements to those members of the plaintiff class for whom such placement is deemed appropriate, as determined by professional judgment through the individual planning process, together with such community services as are necessary to provide each person with minimally adequate habilitation until such time as the retarded individual no longer is in need of such living arrangements and/or community services.

The FSA has four components: the main body of the Agreement, which consists of 22 paragraphs and a glossary of terms; Appendix A, which sets forth the substantive services, safeguards and monitoring which the Commonwealth and County defendants agreed to provide each class member; Appendix B, which sets forth the Commonwealth's obligations with respect to allocation of the funds made available by the closure of Pennhurst; and Appendix C, which concerns approval of the Agreement and notice to members of the plaintiff class.

Appendix A, in full, states:

A1. Plans and services shall be provided by Commonwealth and County Defendants to class members as determined in accordance with this Final Settlement Agreement by a professional judgment, expressed through the interdisciplinary team process, and approved or disapproved by the County Mental Health and Mental Retardation Administrator or his or her designee.

A2. Commonwealth and County Defendants shall provide community living arrangements to the members of the Plaintiff class for whom such placement is called for by the individual planning process, together with such community services as are

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