Hale v. Cuyahoga Co. Welfare Dept., 88-3839

• Decision Date: 19 December 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-3839,88-3839
• Citation: 891 F.2d 604
• Parties: 51 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1264, 52 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,527 Lillian O. HALE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CUYAHOGA CO. WELFARE DEPT., et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 604

891 F.2d 604

51 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1264,

52 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,527

Lillian O. HALE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CUYAHOGA CO. WELFARE DEPT., et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 88-3839.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Submitted July 31, 1989.

Decided Dec. 19, 1989.

Joseph M. Lhota, Carl I. Utrata, Lakewood, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellee.

Patrick J. Murphy, Michael D. Pokorny, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendants-appellants.

Before WELLFORD and NELSON, Circuit Judges; and TAYLOR, District Judge. ^*

WELLFORD, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff, a black-female employee of the Cuyahoga County Welfare Department (the Department) from May 1961 until her retirement in June 1987, sued for a failure to promote her. For seventeen years, Hale had worked in the position known as Social Services Supervisor I in the Department. She was employed in the Separate Administrative Unit-Work Incentive Program division of the Department. This unit was supervised by an Administrator, the Coordinator (a Social Services Supervisor II), and the Assistant Coordinator (a Social Services Supervisor I). The unit had six supervisors (all of supervisor I classification), each of whom supervised five to six social service workers, the people who actually assisted and counseled public assistance recipients.

In August of 1981, Hale applied to fill the position of Coordinator when the previous holder of that position, Ronald Smith, also a defendant, was promoted to Administrator. Her application was rejected at the time, allegedly due to a county-wide hiring freeze. An Assistant Coordinator, Edmund Hanna, however, was designated to be the "acting" Coordinator. When Hale was not named to this position she filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The complaint was settled; the Department agreed that it would follow its written personnel policies when the time came to fill the Coordinator position and that it would review all candidates without regard to sex, race, religion, or national origin. Defendant further agreed that it would notify the Commission and all those in the position of Supervisor when the coordinator's position opening was permanently filled.

In February 1983, the Department posted the position of Social Services Supervisor II (Coordinator), the position left vacant after Smith's promotion. Approximately twenty individuals applied. After an initial screening for minimal initial qualifications, ten applicants, including both Hale and Hanna, were deemed preliminarily qualified. These ten were interviewed by defendant Smith and Havericak, the other defendant, the prospective direct supervisors of the individual to be selected as Coordinator. Following the interviews, Hanna was selected to fill the position of Coordinator.

Hale then filed a second charge with the EEOC, alleging that she was denied the promotion for discriminatory reasons, and in retaliation for the earlier charges she had filed against the Department. On December 6, 1983, the EEOC determined that no reasonable cause existed to believe Hale's charges, and issued her a right to sue letter. She filed this timely lawsuit. Hale requested the EEOC to investigate again its findings, which it proceeded to do. On June 19, 1986, the EEOC confirmed its finding of no reasonable cause after further investigation, and this case proceeded to trial.

Hale claimed that she was denied the promotion in question on the basis of her sex, race, and as retaliation for her earlier filing of a discrimination charge against the Department.

The case proceeded to trial before the district court on the Title VII claim and before a jury on the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. The district court, 722 F.Supp. 349, entered judgment, however, in favor of the defendants on the issue of race discrimination only, having accepted plaintiff's withdrawal of another claim based upon breach of contract. The court withdrew the remaining 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims from consideration of the jury. The district court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on her claims of sex discrimination, and entered judgment in favor of the defendants on the claim of retaliation. The plaintiff was granted monetary damages in the amount of $20,123.96, representing back pay and interest thereon. The court further awarded the plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Defendant Welfare Department appealed from the adverse judgment. Plaintiff did not cross-appeal.

The plaintiff's claims are based on the concept of "disparate treatment" that resulted from sex discrimination. Plaintiff also claims that the defendants retaliated against her because she had previously filed a charge of discrimination against them with the EEOC. The Title VII claim and the § 1983 claims are essentially similar and based on the same course of conduct.

The district court properly followed a three-step process in analyzing and reviewing the claim of discrimination based on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The first step requires plaintiff to prove a prima facie case of discrimination. The plaintiff need only demonstrate that she is a member of a protected class, that she applied for and was qualified for a position for which the employer sought applicants, that she did not receive the position, and that there exists a causal connection between her sex and the treatment she received in respect to defendant's choice of a person of another sex. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093. The "causal connection" step generally is met simply by showing that the position in question was awarded to a member of the opposite sex, in this case a white male.

After the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the defendants to show evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action in hiring the male. The court below found that the defendants did produce evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, and we find ourselves in agreement with...