Hale v. Hale
Decision Date | 31 October 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 2020637 and 2020638.,2020637 and 2020638. |
Citation | 878 So.2d 313 |
Parties | DeLeisseline H. HALE v. Douglas V. HALE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Amy A. Slayden, Huntsville, for appellant.
Gary C. Huckaby and Scott Burnett Smith of Bradley Arant Rose & White, LLP, Huntsville, for appellee.
DeLeisseline H. Hale ("the wife") and Douglas V. Hale ("the husband") were married on December 20, 1996. On September 21, 1999, the husband filed a complaint seeking a divorce from the wife based on incompatibility of temperament and irreconcilable differences; the husband attached a copy of the antenuptial agreement executed by the parties the day before they were married.
Regarding alimony in gross and moving expenses, the antenuptial agreement states, in pertinent part:
On November 9, 1999, the husband filed a motion for a summary judgment; in support of his motion, the husband submitted the pleadings and his own affidavit. On December 15, 1999, the wife filed a motion consenting to the trial court's granting of the husband's motion for a summary judgment. Before the entry of the summary judgment, the husband's attorney advised the trial court, by letter dated December 29, 1999, that the parties were attempting to reconcile and requested that the trial court withhold entering a judgment of divorce until January 5, 2000. The husband's attorney advised the trial court, by letter dated January 4, 2000, that the attempted reconciliation had failed and requested that the trial court enter a judgment of divorce. However, before the trial court entered a judgment of divorce, the husband's attorney advised the trial court, by letter dated January 13, 2000, that the parties were once again attempting to reconcile. The husband's attorney again requested that the trial court withhold entry of a judgment of divorce based on his understanding from the husband that both the husband and the wife desired that the court withhold entering the judgment "for the time-being and... place the case on the Administrative Docket while they attempt to save the marriage." The letter further stated that "[i]t is understood that either party could request the case be removed from the Administrative Docket and restored to the Active Docket."1
Neither party moved to dismiss the pending divorce action or to restore it to the trial court's active docket until March 13, 2002, at which time the husband filed a "Motion for Filing of Final Judgment or in the alternative for Restoration to the Active Docket." In his motion, the husband alleged that the trial court had signed a divorce judgment on January 3, 2000, but that that judgment had never been filed with the clerk of the court; the husband requested that the trial court file that judgment with the clerk of the court. Alternatively, the husband requested that the pending action be restored to the trial court's active docket. The husband also purported to amend his September 21, 1999, complaint, by filing a "Conditional Amended Complaint," seeking a divorce from the wife based on incompatibility of temperament and irreconcilable differences; the husband attached a copy of the antenuptial agreement to his "Conditional Amended Complaint."
On March 15, 2002, the wife filed a motion to dismiss the pending divorce action, alleging as the sole grounds for dismissal that the parties had reconciled and reconciliation of the parties to a pending divorce action abrogates the cause of action, and, therefore, she argued, the trial court had lost subject-matter jurisdiction over the proceedings, citing McNutt v. Beaty, 370 So.2d 998 (Ala.1979); Rikard v. Rikard, 387 So.2d 842 (Ala.Civ.App.1980); and James v. James, 369 So.2d 811 (Ala.Civ.App.1979).2 Regarding the issue of reconciliation, the husband argued that the parties had only attempted to reconcile and therefore, he argued, the pending divorce action should be restored to the trial court's active docket. In a brief submitted to the trial court, the husband conceded that "[i]f the current action is dismissed and the [h]usband is required to file it again, the alimony [in gross] would be $295,000."
On April 11, 2002, the trial court heard oral arguments and considered the affidavits and exhibits submitted by the parties. On April 18, 2002, the trial court entered a judgment dismissing the action without prejudice; implicit in its judgment was a factual finding that the parties had reconciled. See Grund v. Jefferson County, 291 Ala. 29, 277 So.2d 334 (1973) ( ). The husband did not appeal the April 18, 2002, judgment.
On April 23, 2002, the husband filed a new complaint, seeking a divorce from the wife based on incompatibility of temperament and irreconcilable differences; the husband attached a copy of the antenuptial agreement to his complaint. On May 16, 2002, the husband filed a motion for a summary judgment; in support of his motion, the husband submitted the pleadings and his own affidavit. The husband's affidavit states, in part:
The wife filed a motion consenting to the trial court's granting of the husband's motion for a summary judgment. On August 9, 2002, the trial court entered a judgment divorcing the parties and incorporating by reference the antenuptial agreement.3
On September 6, 2002, the husband filed a petition for a declaratory judgment, alleging, among other things, that a justiciable controversy existed as to the amounts the wife was entitled to receive as alimony in gross and moving expenses under the terms of the antenuptial agreement that had been incorporated into the final judgment of divorce. The husband further alleged that the wife had "failed and refused to vacate the ... [marital] residence in which [the husband] has sole ownership interest and the wife has no interest." The husband requested, among other things, that the trial court enter a judgment finding that the wife was entitled to $150,000 as alimony in gross, that the wife was not entitled to moving expenses, and that the wife be ordered to vacate the marital residence.
On October 4, 2002, the wife filed a motion to dismiss the husband's petition for a declaratory judgment and a "Petition for Injunctive Relief, Enforcement of Order and Rule Nisi." In her motion to dismiss, the wife alleged that a justiciable controversy did not exist because, she claimed, among other reasons, that under the express terms of the antenuptial agreement incorporated in the divorce judgment, she was entitled to $295,000 as alimony in gross and the payment of her moving expenses. In her petition, the wife requested that the trial court enjoin the husband from requiring her to move from the marital residence until the husband paid her certain sums she claimed he owed her under the terms of the antenuptial agreement; the wife attached a copy of a letter from the husband, dated September 23, 2002, demanding that the wife vacate the...
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