Hale v. Iancu

• Decision Date: 23 February 2021
• Docket Number: No. 3:19-cv-1963 (VLB),3:19-cv-1963 (VLB)
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: TIMOTHY HALE Plaintiff, v. ANDREI IANCU, Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Defendant.

TIMOTHY HALE Plaintiff, v. ANDREI IANCU, Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Defendant.

No. 3:19-cv-1963 (VLB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

February 23, 2021

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, [ECF 12]

This is an employment discrimination and retaliation case brought under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq., by Timothy Hall ("Plaintiff"), a former patent examiner, against Andrei Iancu ("Defendant"), the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") in the Director's official capacity. Before the Court is Iancu's motion to transfer venue to the Eastern District of Virginia, where the USPTO is headquartered. [Dkt. 12]. The motion poses an important issue which, in the Court's estimation, will present with increased frequency as a larger segment of the workforce works remotely.

For reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to transfer venue. The Court finds the parties' motion for a stay pending this ruling as moot.

Background

The following facts are taken from the Plaintiff's Complaint [Dkt. 1] and the affidavits and accompanying documents filed by the parties in support of and in opposition to the motion to transfer venue.

The USPTO is an agency within the U.S. Department of Commerce responsible for granting and issuing patents, registering trademarks, and disseminating information concerning patents and trademarks to the public. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2(a)(1)-(2). In accordance with Congress's direction, the USPTO maintains its headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia. [Dkt. 12, Ex. A. (Cedar Aff.) ¶ 7]; see also 35 U.S.C. § 1(b)(providing that the USPTO shall be headquartered in the Washington, D.C. area and may establish satellite offices to the degree necessary and appropriate). The Patent Office is segmented into "Technology Centers," focused on broad scientific and engineering areas, which are further organized into more specialized "Art Units." [Dkt. 12 (Def. Mem. in Supp.) at 2]; see also [Dkt. 15, Ex. B (Patel Aff.) ¶¶ 1-2](explaining duties of Supervisory Patent Examiner to oversee patent examiners within the Art Unit).

Plaintiff was hired by the USPTO as a patent examiner in 2012. [Dkt. 1 (Compl.) ¶ 9]. Plaintiff worked remotely for the USPTO pursuant to the Telework Enhancement Act Pilot Program and continued working remotely after relocating from Alexandria, Virginia to Connecticut in May 2014. [Dkt. 13-1 (Pl. Aff.) ¶¶ 9, 15]. The USPTO shipped all the necessary equipment for Plaintiff to perform his job remotely to his address in Connecticut. Id. ¶ 11. Meetings and trainings wereconducted remotely through a secure internet connection using USPTO equipment. Id. ¶ 12.

Although Plaintiff was working remotely, his official duty station remained in Virginia. [Dkt. 12 (Gov. Mem. in Supp.) at 3]. Neither party argues Plaintiff's duty station is significant to the Court's analysis or that there is a relevant telework agreement. See Telework Enhancement Act of 2010, 5 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(2) (requiring that executive agencies' teleworking policies contain a written agreement that "(A) is entered into between an agency manager and an employee authorized to telework, that outlines the specific work arrangement that is agreed to; and (B) is mandatory in order for any employee to participate in telework.").

After receiving performance awards, Plaintiff was selected to participate in a promotion program to obtain signatory authority, starting in May of 2017. [Compl. ¶¶ 11-12]. Plaintiff alleges that, beginning in November 2017, he was discriminated against by his then-supervisor John Hayes because Plaintiff is a Buddhist. See generally id. ¶¶ 12-27. Mr. Hayes essentially set a deadline to rebut deficiencies in a letter of concern at the conclusion of Plaintiff's participation in the promotion program when he knew that Plaintiff was away at a religious retreat. Id. Plaintiff filed an informal EEO complaint in January 2018, after which, Mr. Hayes and other managers subjected him to scrutiny and conflicting or nebulous work instructions. Id. ¶¶ 28-41. Plaintiff filed a formal complaint in April 2018. Id. ¶ 42.

Later that month, Neha Patel was assigned as Plaintiff's new supervisor. Id. ¶ 43. During the pendency of the EEOC investigation, Ms. Patel disciplined Plaintiff,although the disciplines arose from issues that are allegedly related to his discrimination and retaliation complaints and resulted from contradictory instructions. Id. ¶¶ 45-74. Plaintiff filed another EEOC complaint during this period, as he learned that the EEOC had not received an earlier complaint filed with an investigator. Id. ¶¶ 82-83. Ms. Patel suspended Plaintiff for three days and removed a case from his docket, while Plaintiff was on another religious retreat. Id. ¶¶ 85, 87. Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Patel continued to retaliate against him, which made it impossible for him to meet his production goals. Id. ¶ 90.

On April 9, 2019, Plaintiff attended a meeting with Ms. Patel and the group director, James Tramell, and Plaintiff was emailed a Notice of Proposed Removal. Id. ¶ 92. The Notice of Proposed Removal provided Plaintiff with 15 days to respond, but the deadline to respond again fell when Plaintiff would be away on a religious retreat. Id. ¶¶ 92-97. Mr. Trammell refused to re-send the Notice of Proposed Removal, which would have extended Plaintiff's deadline to respond. Id. Plaintiff argues that the Notice of Proposed Removal was defective. Id. ¶ 100. In June 2019, Plaintiff met with Remy Yucel to submit an Oral and Written Reply to the Notice of Proposed Removal. Id. ¶ 102 Plaintiff requested Ms. Yucel to stay her decision until the EEO investigation was concluded so that Plaintiff could access documents from management utilized in the EEO investigation. Id. Ms. Yucel refused, and Plaintiff was terminated from federal service on July 26, 2019 for poor performance. Id. ¶ 103. The record does not indicate whether these meetings occurred virtually or in person.

The parties dispute where Plaintiff resided during the events in question. The Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not move to Connecticut until May 2019, after Ms. Patel proposed his termination. [Dkt. 12 (Def. Mem. in Supp.) at 5]. Defendant argues that, although his "duty station" remained in Alexandria, Virginia, Plaintiff worked at seven different remote locations of his choosing through the Telework Enhancement Act Pilot Program:

• Woodbridge, Connecticut from February 2014 to May 2016;

• Kingston, New York from May 2016 to August 2016;

• Woodstock, New York from August 2016 to October 2018;

• Roxbury, New York from October 2018 to January 2019;

• Margaretville, New York from January 2019 to May 2019; and

• Woodbridge, Connecticut from May 2019 to July 2019.

Id. at 3.

Plaintiff disputes this claim through an affidavit stating that he originally relocated to Connecticut in 2014, lived in New York from July 22, 2016 until March 2018, when he returned to Connecticut to care for his ailing mother. [Dkt. 13-1 (Pl. Aff.) ¶¶ 15-18]. Plaintiff stayed in Connecticut until January 9, 2019 and then returned in April 2019, where he remains. Id. ¶¶ 19-22. Plaintiff's affidavit states that he was residing and paying taxes in Connecticut during the entire time that Defendant asserts he was living and working in Roxbury, New York. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. In reply, Defendant filed copies of emails from Plaintiff to Ms. Patel dated October 15, 2018 and October 28, 2018 in which Plaintiff provided Ms. Patel new addresses in New York. [Dkt. 15 Ex. A]. For purposes of resolving the venue issue, it suffices to say that Plaintiff worked remotely, at times in either Connecticut or New York. He did not physically work in Virginia at any time relevant to the case. At the time theUSPTO made the final decision to terminate his employment, he was working and residing in Connecticut.

According to the affidavit of Brian Cedar, Branch Chief, Patents Team, Investigations and Adjudication Division in the Office of Human Resources for the USPTO, all of Plaintiff's supervisors and line managers work in Virginia. [Dkt. 12, Ex. A. (Cedar Aff.) ¶ 5]. Messrs. Hafiz, Trammel, Hayes, and Ms. Patel remain USPTO employees. Id. Mr. Cedar's affidavit states that, "the employment records related to Plaintiff's employment have been maintained and administered in Alexandria, VA," including records related to the progressive discipline and termination. Id. ¶ 8. Mr. Cedar's affidavit also states that "[s]ome records concerning former employees are stored at the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri or at a storage facility in Boyers, Pennsylvania." Id. ¶ 10. Defendant does not specify whether the records are electronically or physically stored.

Discussion

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that, "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented."

"District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis." D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006). In exercising this discretion, district courts consider: (1) theplaintiff's choice of forum, (2) the convenience of witnesses, (3) the location of relevant documents and relative ease of access to sources of proof, (4) the convenience of parties, (5) the locus of operative facts, (6) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses, [and] (7) the relative means of the parties. Id. at 106-07 (citation omitted). "Courts also routinely consider judicial economy, the interest of justice, and 'the comparative familiarity of each district with the governing law.'" Synca Direct Inc. v. SCIL Animal Care Co., No. 15-cv-2332 ...