Hale v. Lincoln County, No. M2004-01963-COA-R3-CV (TN 12/9/2005)

• Decision Date: 09 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. M2004-01963-COA-R3-CV.,M2004-01963-COA-R3-CV.
• Citation: Hale v. Lincoln County, No. M2004-01963-COA-R3-CV (TN 12/9/2005), No. M2004-01963-COA-R3-CV. (Tenn. Dec 09, 2005)
• Parties: ANNETTE HALE v. LINCOLN COUNTY, TENNESSEE, ET AL.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 1

Unpublished Opinion

ANNETTE HALE v. LINCOLN COUNTY, TENNESSEE, ET AL.

No. M2004-01963-COA-R3-CV.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, at Nashville.

July 14, 2005 Session.

Filed December 9, 2005.

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lincoln County; No. C0200298; Franklin L. Russell, Judge.

Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed and Remanded.

Melanie Lepp, Murfreesboro, TN, for Appellant

Jeffrey M. Beemer, John Paul Nefflen, Nashville, TN, for Appellees

Alan E. Highers, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which David R. Farmer, J., and Holly M. Kirby, J., joined.

OPINION

ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE.

In this appeal we are called upon to review a trial court's grant of summary judgment to a county in a lawsuit filed by an injured motorist pursuant to section 29-20-203 of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff was unable to prove, as a matter of law, that the county had actual and/or constructive notice of the condition of the roadway at the time of the plaintiff's accident. The plaintiff appealed to this Court. We hold that the plaintiff established that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the condition of the roadway constituted a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition, and whether the county had actual and/or constructive notice of such condition. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

During the early morning hours of December 25, 2001, Annette Hale ("Hale" or "Appellant") was a passenger in her own vehicle being driven by a friend. Hale and her friend were traveling along Brighton Road in Lincoln County, Tennessee ("County" or "Appellee") when they encountered a patch of "black ice." The driver lost control of the vehicle, left the roadway, and struck a tree. As a result of the accident, Hale suffered injuries to her arm, knee, and ankle, which required surgery to repair.

At the time of the accident, the temperature had dropped to below freezing. Sergeant Johnny Sanders ("Sergeant Sanders") of the Lincoln County Sheriff's Department was the first emergency responder to arrive at the scene of the accident. He noted the existence of the "black ice," describing it as "the same color as the pavement." Sergeant Sanders had his dispatcher summon a representative of the Lincoln County Highway Department to the scene to erect barricades to prevent another accident. Deputy Anthony Nichols ("Deputy Nichols") of the Lincoln County Sheriff's Department joined Sergeant Sanders at the scene a short time later, and he also noted the existence of ice on the roadway. Trooper Jerry King ("Trooper King") of the Tennessee Highway Patrol subsequently joined Sergeant Sanders and Deputy Nichols at the accident scene. He too noted that the surface of the roadway was covered with ice. During the course of his investigation, Trooper King determined that a nearby privately owned pond overflowed causing water to enter the roadway where it froze.

Donny Ray Hudson ("Mr. Hudson"), Superintendent of the Lincoln County Highway Department, responded to the scene pursuant to Sergeant Sanders's request. According to Mr. Hudson, the area received a "big rain" around Christmas of 2001. He determined that the water, which gathered in the pond during the "big rain," broke through the side of the pond and flowed onto the roadway where it froze. According to Hale, Mr. Hudson introduced himself to her at the accident scene and told her that he was aware of a problem with water flowing across the road, that a work order had been issued to fix the road, and that the road should have been repaired a long time before the accident. Hale went back to the scene of the accident the following day and noted that the County had "repaired the roadway."

On December 23, 2002, Hale filed a complaint against the County in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, codified at section 29-20-101 et seq. of the Tennessee Code. Specifically, she alleged that the County was subject to suit pursuant to section 29-20-203 of the Tennessee Code for the injuries she sustained as the result of an allegedly defective, unsafe, or dangerous street. On March 15, 2004, after the parties conducted discovery in this case, the County filed a motion for summary judgment. Therein, the County primarily argued that Hale was unable to prove that the County had actual and/or constructive knowledge that "black ice" had formed on Brighton Road prior to the accident and that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the water escaping from the privately owned pond and freezing on the roadway. In support of its motion, the County submitted the deposition testimony of Hale, Mr. Hudson, Trooper King, Deputy Nichols, and Sergeant Sanders. The County also submitted Mr. Hudson's affidavit, wherein he stated that he has never received a complaint of water overflowing from a privately owned pond and freezing on Brighton Road.

Hale responded to the County's motion by submitting the affidavits of several individuals. First, she submitted the affidavit of James A. Hillis ("Mr. Hillis"), the owner of the property where her vehicle came to rest on the morning of the accident. Mr. Hillis made the following statements in his affidavit:

3. For an extended period of time there had been a dangerous problem related to standing water in the roadway that is the subject of this accident. Water would often times stand in the roadway due to an overflowing of a pond nearby.

4. It had not rained the day of the accident.

5. Since water would stand in the roadway, when it was cold enough to freeze, there would be an extended stay of a patch of ice in the subject area.

6. In my opinion, Ms. Hale would not have been able to avoid the accident due to these conditions.

7. It was my understanding that the problem was to be remedied long before Ms. Hale's accident.

8. It was my understanding that the County of Lincoln was aware of this dangerous problem.

9. The problem was addressed and remedied the day following Ms. Hale's accident.

Hale also submitted her own affidavit recounting Mr. Hudson's statements to her following the accident, and she noted the County's actions in fixing the road the day after her accident. Further, Hale submitted the affidavit of Noel Evans, an employee of the Tennessee Department of Transportation, to demonstrate that the County was responsible for operating and maintaining Brighton Road. Finally, Hale submitted a copy of the County's responses to her requests for admissions, wherein the County stated as follows: "The Defendants admit that water flowed over the subject road on rare occasions after heavy rains. The Defendants deny that there was any defective unsafe, or dangerous condition where the Plaintiff's accident occurred."

On June 4, 2004, the trial court entered an order granting the County's motion for summary judgment, finding as follows:

1. The opinion of James A. Hillis that there is a dangerous condition on Brighton Road . . . is inadmissible as Mr. Hillis is not an expert and is incompetent to provide expert testimony;

2. Mr. Hillis' statement that it was his understanding that a problem on Brighton Road was to be remedied long before the Plaintiff's accident . . . is inadmissible hearsay;

3. Mr. Hillis' statement that it is his understanding that the County of Lincoln was aware of a dangerous problem on Brighton Road . . . is inadmissible hearsay;

4. Evidence of steps taken by Lincoln County following the Plaintiff's accident in an attempt to prevent future accidents is inadmissible under Tenn.R.Evid. 407 because such acts constitute subsequent remedial measures;

5. There is no evidence that the Defendant, Lincoln County, had actual or constructive notice that on or anytime before the night of December 25, 2001, water had broken through the side of the privately owned pond, flowed over Brighton Road, and, due to the extreme weather conditions, formed black ice on Brighton Road;

6. There is no evidence that the Defendant, Lincoln County, had actual or constructive notice that on or anytime before the night of December 25, 2001, black ice had formed on Brighton Road and created a defective, dangerous, or unsafe condition;

7. The Defendant, Lincoln County's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED . . .

Thereafter, Hale filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court presenting the following issue for review: whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the County based on a finding that the County did not have actual and/or constructive notice of the defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of the roadway in question.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"[T]he summary judgment process is designed to provide a quick, inexpensive means of concluding cases, in whole or in part, upon issues as to which there is no genuine dispute regarding material facts." Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993) (citations omitted). A motion for summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 (2005). "The moving party has the burden of proving that its motion satisfies these requirements." Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Downen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 811 S.W.2d 523, 524 (Tenn. 1991)). "Once it is shown by the moving party that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must then demonstrate, by affidavits or discovery materials, that there is a genuine, material fact dispute to warrant a trial." Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 211 (citations omitted). In that regard, the party opposing the motion "may not rest upon the mere...