Hale v. State
| Decision Date | 14 October 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 80242,80242 |
| Citation | 630 So.2d 521 |
| Parties | 18 Fla. L. Weekly S535 Willie Frank HALE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender and P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Asst. Public Defender, Chief, Appellate Div. and Glen P. Gifford, Asst. Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and James W. Rogers, Bureau Chief, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Charlie McCoy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
We have for review Hale v. State, 600 So.2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), in which the district court certified the following questions as being of great public importance:
1. Does it violate a defendant's substantive due process rights when he is classified as a violent felony offender pursuant to section 775.084, and thereby subjected to an extended term of imprisonment, if he has been convicted of an enumerated violent felony within the previous five years, even though his present offense is a nonviolent felony?
2. Does section 775.084(1)(b) violate the constitutional protection against double jeopardy by increasing a defendant's punishment due to the nature of a prior offense?
Id. at 1228. 1 There are three sets of issues presented in this case: (1) the certified questions; (2) whether Hale was improperly sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment; and (3) whether the sentences imposed constitute cruel or unusual punishment. We answer the certified questions in the negative in accordance with our decision in Tillman v. State, 609 So.2d 1295 (Fla.1992). We also find that the district court erred in upholding the imposition of consecutive sentences and order that the sentences run concurrently. Finally, we hold that the concurrent sentences that we herein order be imposed do not constitute cruel or unusual punishment.
The relevant facts show that Hale was charged with: (1) the sale of cocaine, and (2) the possession of cocaine with intent to sell after he sold a small quantity of cocaine to a confidential informant. The case went to trial and the jury found Hale guilty on both counts. The State filed a notice of intent to have Hale sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender under section 775.084(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), 2 asserting that Hale had been convicted of aggravated assault in 1989, as well as other felonies. The aggravated assault judgment, as well as the other judgments, were entered into evidence without objection. The court found Hale to be a habitual violent felony offender under section 775.084(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1991). The sentencing scoresheet provided a recommended range of four-and-one-half to five-and-one-half years; however, because Hale was found to be a habitual violent felony offender, the trial judge had the discretion to sentence Hale to a maximum of thirty years per count, with each count carrying a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence. See Sec. 775.084(4)(b), Fla.Stat. (1991). The court sentenced Hale to two consecutive twenty-five year habitual violent felony offender terms, one term for the conviction on the charge of sale of cocaine and another term for the conviction on the charge of possession of the same cocaine, with each sentence carrying a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence. Accordingly, Hale would serve a minimum of twenty years before being eligible for parole.
On appeal to the First District Court of Appeal, Hale argued that: (1) enhancing his sentence under section 775.084 violates due process, double jeopardy, and equal protection; and (2) imposing consecutive twenty-five year sentences, with the resulting twenty-year minimum mandatory sentence, constitutes cruel or unusual punishment as prohibited by article I, section 17, of the Florida Constitution. The district court held that Hale's sentence as a habitual violent felony offender did not violate Hale's substantive due process rights, nor did it constitute double jeopardy. The district court then certified the same questions it had previously certified in Tillman.
The district court in this case also rejected Hale's argument that his consecutive sentences constituted cruel or unusual punishment under the Florida Constitution. The district court concluded that there was "no authority for [Hale's] assertion that the 'cruel or unusual' punishment clause in the Florida Constitution requires (or allows) proportionality review in non-death penalty cases." Hale, 600 So.2d at 1229.
We examine each of these issues in turn.
In Tillman, we rejected the due process claim, finding that the legislature could constitutionally "provide longer sentences for criminals who commit felonies and have previously been convicted of a violent felony." 609 So.2d at 1297. We also rejected the double jeopardy claim, citing our decision in Eutsey v. State, 383 So.2d 219 (Fla.1980), and the First District's decision in Henderson v. State, 569 So.2d 925 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). In rejecting these claims in Tillman, we stated that
the sentence imposed for a subsequent offense is enhanced on the theory that the defendant's prior conviction of a violent felony indicates the
609 So.2d at 1298 (quoting Henderson, 569 So.2d at 927) (alteration in original). For the reasons expressed in Tillman, we answer the certified questions in the negative.
The next issue is whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive rather than concurrent sentences. Hale did not raise this issue before the district court because the law in the First District at the time allowed consecutive habitual offender minimum mandatory sentences. See Daniels v. State, 577 So.2d 725 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), quashed, 595 So.2d 952 (Fla.1992). Because we quashed the district court's decision in Daniels, Hale is entitled to raise the issue in these proceedings.
Hale asserts that our decision in Daniels requires a reversal of the trial court's imposition of consecutive minimum mandatory sentences. We agree. Daniels is persuasive authority although that case involved a different enhancement statute. In Daniels, the defendant was convicted of three separate crimes, all of which arose from the same criminal episode. Daniels, 595 So.2d at 953. The statutes which prescribed the sentence for each crime did not provide for minimum mandatory sentences; however, because Daniels was found to be a habitual violent felony offender, the sentences were enhanced by the trial judge under section 775.084, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988) to include minimum mandatory sentences of fifteen years on each conviction. Id. The court thereafter ordered that the sentences, including the minimum mandatory sentences, run consecutively. Id.
On review in this Court, we quashed the district court's decision affirming the imposition of consecutive minimum mandatory sentences and ordered that the sentences run concurrently. Id. at 954. In so doing we distinguished statutory sentences in which the legislature had included a minimum mandatory sentence, such as the sentences for capital crimes, from sentences in which there is no minimum mandatory penalty although one may be provided as an enhancement through the habitual violent offender statute. Id. We stated: "Because the statute prescribing the penalty for Daniels' offenses does not contain a provision for a minimum mandatory sentence, we hold that his minimum mandatory sentences imposed for the crimes he committed arising out of the same criminal episode may only be imposed concurrently and not consecutively." Id. We find that the same principle applies in the instant case. None of the statutes under which Hale was sentenced contain a provision for a minimum mandatory sentence.
For the same rationale set out in Daniels we find that Hale's enhanced maximum sentences must run concurrently. In Daniels we recognized that
by enacting sections 775.084 and 775.0841, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), the legislature intended to provide for the incarceration of repeat felony offenders for longer periods of time. However, this is accomplished by enlargement of the maximum sentences that can be imposed when a defendant is found to be an habitual felon or an habitual violent felon.
Id. Thus, the legislative intent is satisfied when the maximum sentence for each offense is increased. We find nothing in the language of the habitual offender statute which suggests that the legislature also intended that, once the sentences from multiple crimes committed during a single criminal episode have been enhanced through the habitual offender statutes, the total penalty should then be further increased by ordering that the sentences run consecutively.
The State argues that section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1991), which authorizes the trial court to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences, applies to habitual offender sentences because section 775.021(2) states that "[t]he provisions of this chapter are applicable to offenses defined by other statutes, unless the code otherwise provides." In Daniels, we expressly rejected this argument and stated: "The subsequent addition of subsection (b) to section 775.021(4) was designed to overrule this Court's decision in Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161 (Fla.1987), pertaining to consecutive sentences for separate offenses committed at the same time, and had nothing to do with minimum mandatory sentences." 595 So.2d at 954 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
We conclude that, under the statutory penalty for each offense, the trial court may sentence this defendant separately for possession, and sentence him separately for the sale, and make each sentence consecutive to the other. Howe...
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