Hales v. First Nat. Bank of Mobile
Decision Date | 22 February 1980 |
Citation | 380 So.2d 797 |
Parties | Philip HALES et al. v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MOBILE. 78-673. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Roger Killian, Fort Payne, for appellants.
F. Michael Haney, of Inzer, Suttle, Swann & Stivender, Gadsden, for appellee.
This action was initiated by plaintiff First National Bank of Mobile (the Bank) filing a two count complaint alleging a deficiency arising from a foreclosure sale and the right to possession of certain personal property under a security agreement. Defendants Philip and Dorothy Hales appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Bank on their amended counterclaim which alleged, inter alia, fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty by the Bank. We reverse.
Whether the trial court erred to reversal in converting, sua sponte, the Bank's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), ARCP, to a motion for summary judgment when the trial court gave no notice of the changed status of the motion to the Haleses prior to entry of summary judgment.
As mentioned earlier, this suit was initiated by the Bank. When it filed its complaint, the Bank also filed a motion for writ of seizure of certain equipment; the motion was granted after a hearing at which testimony and other evidence was taken. The only evidence contained in the record resulted from this hearing. At the hearing, the evidence was limited to the issue of whether the writ should be granted.
On 9 January 1979 the Haleses filed an answer and counterclaim to the Bank's complaint. The Bank filed a Rule 12(b)(6), ARCP, motion to dismiss the counterclaim which was apparently granted. On 4 April 1979 the Haleses filed an amended counterclaim that alleged: (1) false representations were made by the Bank to the Haleses on 5 April 1978; (2) the Bank breached an agreement entered into on 5 April 1978 with the Haleses by permitting certain assigned contract rights to go in default; and (3) a breach of fiduciary duty owed by the Bank to the Haleses. The Bank filed a second motion to dismiss this amended counterclaim alleging Rule 12(b)(6) grounds together with the ground that the subject of the counterclaim was res judicata. 1
On 29 May 1979 a hearing was held concerning the Bank's motion to dismiss the Haleses' amended counterclaim. A notation dated 29 May 1979 was made by the trial court on the Bank's motion which stated:
"May 29, 1979
Motion granted.
Counterclaim is dismissed.
W. G. Hawkins
Judge"
On 5 June 1979, without prior notice to the Haleses, a judgment was entered which reads as follows:
This appeal followed.
The Haleses contend the trial court committed reversible error by converting, on its own initiative, the Bank's motion for dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds 2 to a motion for summary judgment, after the hearing on the motion had already been conducted, because it deprived them of an opportunity to present affidavits and other evidence in opposition.
Rule 12(b), ARCP, states in pertinent part:
" * * * If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." (Emphasis added.)
Rule 56(c), ARCP, states in pertinent part:
* * * "
It is clear from the above quoted portions of Rules 12 and 56 that: if a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is converted into a motion for summary judgment, both parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to submit affidavits and other extraneous proofs to avoid a party being taken by surprise through conversion of the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. Davis v. Howard, 561 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1977); Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 2A, P 12.09(3), N. 25. It is also clear that the spirit of Rule 56 requires the same notice and hearing where the court contemplates summary judgment on its own initiative as it does when a party moves for summary judgment; i. e., ten days notice. See Davis v. Howard, supra; Georgia Southern & F. Ry. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 373 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1967); Bowdidge v. Lehman, 252 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1958). The entry of summary judgment by a trial court, sua sponte, without giving to the party against whom such judgment is entered adequate and reasonable notice, as well as an opportunity to present evidence in opposition, is prejudicial error requiring reversal. Id.
We agree with the following statement made by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in its per curiam opinion of Davis v. Howard, supra:
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...Examiners, 802 So.2d 200 (Ala.2001); Garris v. Federal Land Bank of Jackson, 584 So.2d 791 (Ala.1991); Hales v. First Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 380 So.2d 797 (Ala.1980). "`Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ, to be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to......
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