Haley v. Barbour County

Decision Date30 January 2004
Citation885 So.2d 783
PartiesMichael W. HALEY, as commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections v. BARBOUR COUNTY et al. Michael W. Haley, as commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections v. Barbour County et al. Donal Campbell, as commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections v. Barbour County et al. Donal Campbell, as commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections v. Barbour County et al.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen.; Nathan A. Forrester, deputy atty. gen.; Scott L. Rouse, asst. atty. gen.; and Albert S. Butler, asst. gen. counsel and asst. atty. gen., for appellants Department of Corrections.

Kendrick E. Webb and Bart Harmon of Webb & Eley, P.C., Montgomery, for appellees.

BROWN, Justice.

In these four consolidated appeals, Donal Campbell, the commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections,1 appeals from orders of the Montgomery Circuit Court imposing contempt sanctions and ordering commissioner Campbell to receive certain prisoners, who were being held in county jails, into the state penal system.

Facts and Procedural History

In 1991, numerous Alabama counties and sheriffs (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the counties"), filed an action in the Barbour Circuit Court against Morris Thigpen, then commissioner of the Department of Corrections; Joe Todd, then warden of the Ventress Correctional Facility; and Leslie Thompson, then warden of the Easterling Correctional Facility.2 The counties claimed, among other things, that the commissioner had failed to accept certain prisoners (hereinafter referred to as "state inmates") into state correctional facilities after the prisoners had been sentenced, thus resulting in overcrowding in jails operated by the counties. This, the counties claim, violated Ala.Code 1975, § 14-3-30(a).3 The counties thus sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions requiring the commissioner to accept state inmates into prison facilities operated by the Department of Corrections ("DOC"). On February 25, 1992, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the commissioner to accept a convicted state inmate within 30 days of receiving an inmate's transcript.

The commissioner claimed that state facilities could not accept additional prisoners because they were already overcrowded and because of a lack of adequate funding for the state prison system. After several years of hearings and discovery, the parties entered into a settlement agreement pursuant to which the commissioner agreed, among other things, to accept state inmates into state facilities within 30 days of receiving an inmate's transcript. The trial court approved and adopted the settlement agreement in an order issued on September 9, 1998.4

In May 2001, the commissioner filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, alleging that the counties had begun delivering too many prisoners to the state prisons. The commissioner also filed a Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion alleging changed circumstances and requesting relief from the settlement agreement. The counties, on the other hand, filed a motion for an order to show cause, alleging that the commissioner had violated the settlement agreement and the trial court's injunction. On May 18, 2001, the trial court issued an order holding that the commissioner had, in violation of the settlement agreement, failed to timely accept state inmates into state facilities. The trial court ordered the commissioner to bring DOC into compliance with the court's earlier orders.

On July 20, 2001, the trial court found that the commissioner had violated the February 25, 1992, preliminary injunction, the consent order, and its May 18, 2001, order. The trial court thus held the commissioner in civil contempt. The court also found that the counties had suffered actual harm, and it ordered the commissioner to pay "coercive" sanctions in the amount of $26 per day for every state inmate held in jails operated by the counties in violation of the court's orders. The purpose of the sanctions, the trial court stated, was to "effectuate compliance" with state law and the court's orders. The sanctions would be paid to the court and would then be paid directly to the counties harmed by the commissioner's contempt. The trial court also appointed a special master to monitor the commissioner's compliance and to make any recommendations to the trial court concerning sanctions and their payment.

After several hearings and much discovery, the special master reported his findings and recommendations to the trial court. On June 14, 2002, the trial court issued an order finding that the commissioner had again failed to comply with the trial court's orders. Thus, the trial court purported to assess DOC and "the State of Alabama" coercive monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,161,276, and ordered the commissioner and the state comptroller to issue warrants to each of the counties in amounts specified by the trial court. It also ordered the commissioner to pay the counties' attorney fees in the amount of $153,824.39.

Subsequently, on September 12, 2002, the commissioner submitted a plan to the trial court outlining certain proposals intended to bring DOC into compliance with the trial court's orders. Additionally, on December 3, 2002, the commissioner filed a motion entitled "Motion for Order of Emergency Relief." In his motion, the commissioner claimed that the counties were planning to deliver large numbers of state inmates to DOC facilities and that DOC could not handle such an influx.

On December 6, 2002, the trial court issued an order again holding the commissioner in contempt of court for failing to follow the trial court's previous orders and for failing to implement the settlement agreement and the plans for bringing DOC into compliance. The trial court thus ordered the commissioner to pay monetary sanctions of $50 per day per inmate. Specifically, the trial court ordered that of that $50 the counties would be awarded $26 per inmate and $24 would be paid to the circuit court clerk. The funds paid to the clerk would then be used "to relieve the overcrowding of the County jails" and to implement the plans submitted by the commissioner and the Governor. This is the order the commissioner appeals from in case no. 1020533.

On December 12, 2002, the court issued an order in response to the commissioner's December 3, 2002 "Motion for Order of Emergency Relief." In that order, the trial court found that it would be dangerous for all of the counties to deliver the state inmates then in their county jails to Kilby Correctional Facility5 at one time. The trial court's order provided that the counties could increase the total average number of state inmates they were to deliver to Kilby each week by 100, but in no event could they deliver more than 25 additional inmates per day, and they must give DOC 72 hours' notice before they could deliver the additional state inmates. This is the order the commissioner appeals from in case no. 1020534.

Later, on February 14, 2003, the trial court ordered that $2,417,000 in proceeds generated by DOC from the sale of certain land it owned be paid to the circuit court. Those funds, the court ordered, would be given to certain agencies to alleviate prison overcrowding and to pay "expenses and fees" for the counties. This is the order the commissioner appeals from in case no. 1021048. In response to a postjudgment motion related to the February 14 order, the trial court issued another order on March 13, 2003, which required DOC to pay the entire $2,417,000 generated by the land sale to the trial court as a coercive sanction. This is the order the commissioner appeals from in case no. 1021049.6

Discussion
I. Cases No. 1021048 & No. 1021049

The counties claim that the commissioner's appeals of the trial court's February 14, 2003, and March 13, 2003, orders have been rendered moot by an act of the Legislature. Specifically, the counties claim that the Legislature, in Act No. 2003-55, effective April 9, 2003, removed $1,875,000 from the land-sale proceeds and appropriated that amount to pay for certain DOC programs. Moreover, the counties claim that the Legislature, in Act No. 2003-299, effective June 18, 2003, appropriated the remaining land-sale funds to be expended in a manner to help bring DOC into full compliance with the trial court's February 14, 2003, order. The counties further allege that, in compliance with the February 14 order, a check was delivered to the counties for payment of their attorney fees. The commissioner acknowledges that no controversy exists concerning the disposition of the funds subject to the trial court's orders.

"The general rule is that if, pending an appeal, an event occurs that makes determination of the case unnecessary, the appeal will be dismissed...." In re Involuntary Commitment of Skelton, 777 So.2d 148, 149 (Ala.Civ.App.2000). Because all of the moneys subject to the trial court's February 14 and March 13 orders have been expended in compliance with those orders, any controversy concerning those orders of the trial court no longer exists; therefore, cases no. 1021048 and no. 1021049 are dismissed as moot. See State ex rel. Eagerton v. Corwin, 359 So.2d 767, 769 (Ala.1977) ("A case is moot when there is no real controversy and it seeks to determine an abstract question which does not rest on existing facts or rights.").

II. Case No. 1020533

In case no. 1020533, the commissioner appeals from the trial court's December 6, 2002, order, which requires the commissioner to pay monetary sanctions. The sanctions, the commissioner argues, violate Ala. Const.1901, § 14.

Section 14, Ala. Const.1901, provides "[t]hat the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." This section affords the State and its agencies an "absolu...

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