Haley v. Bd. of Review

• Decision Date: 17 March 2021
• Docket Number: 084123,A-71 September Term 2019
• Citation: 246 A.3d 1255,245 N.J. 511
• Parties: Clarence HALEY, Appellant-Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Respondent-Respondent, and Garden State Laboratories, Inc., Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

245 N.J. 511

246 A.3d 1255

Clarence HALEY, Appellant-Appellant,

v.BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Respondent-Respondent,andGarden State Laboratories, Inc., Respondent.

A-71 September Term 2019

084123

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued January 5, 2021

Decided March 17, 2021

Jennifer B. Condon argued the cause for appellant (Seton Hall University School of Law, Center for Social Justice, attorneys; Jennifer B. Condon, on the briefs).

Christopher J. Hamner, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and Andy Jong, Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs).

Tess Borden argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Tess Borden, Alexander Shalom, Newark, and Jeanne LoCicero on the brief).

Alan H. Schorr argued the cause for amicus curiae National Employment Lawyers Association-New Jersey (Schorr & Associates, attorneys; Alan H. Schorr, Cherry Hill, on the brief).

JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the Unemployment Compensation Law, N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 to -71 (UCL or Act), an individual who "has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work" is "disqualified for benefits" until certain conditions are met. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). And, under the regulations promulgated pursuant to the UCL, separation from work due to incarceration is "reviewed as a voluntarily leaving work issue." See N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e)(10). In this case, the Court considers whether pretrial detention premised on charges that are later dismissed is, automatically, a disqualifying separation from work within the meaning of the Act.

Authorities arrested Clarence Haley for serious offenses and ordered that he be detained pretrial. One week later, Haley's mother contacted his employer, Garden State Laboratories (Garden State), requesting on Haley's behalf that his job be preserved. Eight weeks after that, a grand jury declined to indict Haley and the prosecutor dismissed all charges against him. In the interim, Garden State terminated Haley's employment.

Following his release from detention, Haley filed an application for unemployment benefits. The Department of Labor and Workforce Development (Department) denied Haley's application on the ground that Haley voluntarily left his job with Garden State without good cause attributable to work. The Appeal Tribunal, Board of Review, and Appellate Division affirmed the Department's decision.

We conclude that pretrial detention is not an absolute bar to receiving unemployment compensation benefits for the time following dismissal of the charges and release from detention because N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e)(10) specifically provides that "[i]ncarceration" shall be "reviewed as a voluntarily leaving work issue" (emphasis added). Based on the specific facts presented by this appeal, the UCL and N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e)(10) required the Department to review the totality of the circumstances surrounding Haley's detention and release to determine whether he "left work voluntarily." Because that review did not occur, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand to the Department for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The appellate record reveals the following undisputed facts.

Between May and December 2017, Garden State employed Haley as a maintenance worker. In December, authorities arrested Haley on a complaint-warrant charging him with kidnapping, robbery, burglary, unlawful possession of a weapon, and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. A Superior Court Judge conducted a detention hearing, found probable cause, and ordered that Haley be detained pretrial. One week after Haley's arrest, Haley's mother telephoned Garden State and requested that Haley's position remain open while he contested the charges. Despite the request of Haley's mother that his job be held, Garden State hired a replacement and terminated Haley's employment because of his pretrial detention.

In February 2018, two months after Haley's arrest, a grand jury found the evidence presented to indict Haley insufficient to establish probable cause that he committed the offenses charged. The prosecutor dismissed all charges and permitted Haley's release from detention. Haley filed an application for unemployment benefits about a week later.

The Department denied the application, finding that Haley left his job voluntarily for personal reasons. Haley appealed. Following a hearing before an appeals examiner, the Appeal Tribunal affirmed the Department's decision, finding no evidence that Haley was "falsely imprisoned" or "involved in a case of mistaken identity." The Appeal Tribunal concluded therefore that Haley left his employment voluntarily for personal reasons, without good cause attributable to work. Haley's subsequent appeals to the Board of Review and Appellate Division were likewise unsuccessful.

The Appellate Division, citing Fennell v. Board of Review, 297 N.J. Super. 319, 688 A.2d 113 (App. Div. 1997), affirmed, concluding that the UCL was amended in 1961 to disqualify applicants who leave work for purely personal reasons, and that incarceration is a purely personal reason. The court acknowledged that, under the UCL amendments, individuals "who have quit or been terminated for personal reasons not connected to work" are not automatically disqualified from receiving benefits. But the Appellate Division reasoned that the Legislature would not have created explicit exemptions from disqualification -- for those who leave work after being subjected to domestic violence, N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(j), and those who leave work to travel with a spouse who is an active member of the United States Armed Forces, id. at (k) -- if benefits were payable for "any non-work-related reason an employee is terminated from employment."

We granted Haley's petition for certification. 242 N.J. 123, 230 A.3d 983 (2020). We maintained the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey's (ACLU) status as amicus curiae, and we granted the National Employment Lawyers Association of New Jersey's (NELA) motion to appear as amicus curiae.

II.

Haley argues the Appellate Division erred by concluding that his pretrial incarceration was a voluntary departure from employment. First, Haley argues the Appellate Division conflated the question of voluntariness with the question of whether an employee who quit did so for reasons "attributable to work." Next, Haley argues it would be plainly unreasonable if incarceration were construed to be, automatically, a voluntary departure not attributable to work -- and thus a per se bar to benefits -- in N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e). In so doing, Haley argues the Appellate Division's opinion in Fennell should be overruled.

The ACLU agrees with Haley that, under the UCL, the threshold inquiry focuses on the reason the person becomes unemployed. Thus, the ACLU maintains that the initial question is whether the departure was voluntary, and only after that question is answered should a court determine if the voluntary departure was related to work. The ACLU adds that N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e) should not be applied mechanically, but requires a case-specific, fact-intensive analysis, and that the failure to conduct such an analysis here is contrary to the UCL's remedial and beneficial purposes.

NELA agrees that N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e) does not suggest that imprisonment is always voluntary, but merely lists it as a reason that may be "reviewed" as voluntary. NELA further contends that, unlike the applicants in cases cited by the Appellate Division, Haley did not engage in any voluntary act resulting in his absence from work and he actively tried to keep his job.

The Board emphasizes that the Department's interpretation of N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e)(10) is entitled to a presumption of validity and is consistent with case law.¹ Additionally, the Board argues the Legislature amended the UCL to allow some categories of claimants who left work for personal reasons to qualify for benefits, but chose not to amend the statute in response to Fennell, where the director denied benefits to a claimant who was arrested, detained, and terminated from employment before the charges against him were dropped.

Finally, the Board distinguishes this case from others where benefits were awarded, noting that the employer in this case had no way of knowing how long Haley's incarceration would last. The Board further argues that the Appellate Division decision does not conflict with DeLorenzo v. Board of Review, 100 N.J. Super. 473, 476, 242 A.2d 640 (App. Div. 1968), where the court explained that the word "voluntarily" within the statutory phrase "voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work," is not "a separate and additionally requisite criterion of disqualification, but rather a legislative characterization of the action of a worker who leaves work without just cause attributable to the work." The Board also claims that even though in DeLorenzo we held that, notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e), leave from work because of illness not attributable to work is not itself voluntary, 54 N.J. 361, 364, 255 A.2d 248 (1969), there is no indication that DeLorenzo extends beyond health-related issues, and that decision thus does not affect Haley's case.

III.

A.

Because this appeal requires that we examine the decision of the Department, we begin with the applicable standard of review in such cases: we will "defer to an agency's interpretation of both a statute and implementing regulation, within the sphere of the agency's authority, unless the interpretation is plainly unreasonable." Ardan v. Bd. of Review, 231 N.J. 589, 604, 177 A.3d 768 (2018) (quoting In re Election Law Enf't Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262, 989 A.2d 1254 (2010) ). "To apply the ‘plainly unreasonable’ standa...