Haley v. Bd. of Review
| Decision Date | 24 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. A-4973-17T2 |
| Citation | 462 N.J.Super. 222,225 A.3d 786 |
| Parties | Clarence HALEY, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, and Garden State Laboratories, Inc., Respondents. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
Jennifer B. Condon argued the cause for appellant (Seton Hall University School of Law, Center for Social Justice, attorneys; Jennifer B. Condon, of counsel and on the briefs; Jenna Passerino, Jennifer A. Cacchioli, and Andrew N. Koske, on the briefs).
Andy Jong, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent Board of Review (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa Dutton Schaffer and Donna Sue Arons, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel; Andy Jong, on the briefs).
Tess Meiling Borden argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Tess Meiling Borden and Jeanne M. LoCicero, on the brief).
Respondent Garden State Laboratories, Inc., has not filed a brief.
Before Judges Alvarez, Nugent and Suter.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SUTER, J.A.D.
Clarence Haley appeals the May 24, 2018 final decision of the Board of Review (Board), affirming the decision of the Appeal Tribunal that denied his claim for unemployment compensation. We affirm.
Haley was employed as a maintenance worker from May 2, 2017, until he was arrested on December 14, 2017, and charged with kidnapping, robbery, burglary, unlawful possession of a weapon and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. His request for pretrial release was not granted.1 His mother contacted his employer because he wanted to keep his job, but the position was filled after December 21, 2017. Haley was released from custody on February 7, 2018, after a grand jury returned a "[no-b]ill," meaning it "did not find sufficient evidence to sustain the return of an [i]ndictment." The prosecutor dismissed all the criminal warrants against Haley.
Haley applied for unemployment compensation shortly thereafter. The Deputy Director denied the claim. Haley appealed to the Appeal Tribunal. Following a hearing, it denied his claim on April 13, 2018. Haley was disqualified for unemployment benefits because he was "separated due to his absence from work, which was a direct result of his incarceration." Haley was "considered to have left the job voluntarily in accordance with N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1." The Appeal Tribunal noted there was "no evidence that the claimant was falsely imprisoned nor was he involved in a case of mistaken identity." Although Haley had a "compelling reason for leaving work," the Appeals Tribunal found his "reason is personal." He was "considered to have left voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work and is disqualified for benefits." Haley appealed to the Board. On May 24, 2018, it affirmed the decision of the Appeal Tribunal.
On appeal, Haley argues he should have been granted unemployment compensation because the criminal charges were dismissed. He contends it was an error to treat pretrial incarceration, where all the charges were dismissed, as a "voluntary" separation from employment under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). He asserts this is inconsistent with the remedial purpose of the unemployment laws, is unreasonable, wrongly disregards the "vital role" of the grand jury and is out-of-step with a majority of other states. Haley argues the Board relied on legally irrelevant factual assumptions not supported by the record.
Amicus curiae, the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (the ACLU), argues Haley cannot be said to have voluntarily quit his employment in these circumstances. The "threshold question" should be whether the departure from work was voluntary, not whether it was work-related. The ACLU asks us to set aside N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e)(10).2 It contends the remedial purpose of the unemployment legislation is disserved, and that by denying benefits, persons of color are disproportionately impacted.3
Review of an administrative agency's final decision is limited. Kadonsky v. Lee, 452 N.J. Super. 198, 201-02, 172 A.3d 1090 (App. Div. 2017). "We will not reverse an agency's judgment unless we find the decision to be ‘arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or [ ] not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.’ " Id. at 202, 172 A.3d 1090 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194, 26 A.3d 1059 (2011) ). We "defer to an agency's interpretation of both a statute and implementing regulation, within the sphere of the agency's authority, unless the interpretation is plainly unreasonable." Ardan v. Bd. of Review, 231 N.J. 589, 604, 177 A.3d 768 (2018) (quoting In re Election Law Enf't Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 01–2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262, 989 A.2d 1254 (2010) ). The court is not "bound by an unreasonable or mistaken interpretation of that scheme, particularly one that is contrary to legislative objectives." McClain v. Bd. of Review, 237 N.J. 445, 456, 206 A.3d 353 (2019) (citing Russo v. Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27, 17 A.3d 801 (2011) ).
The Unemployment Compensation Law (the UCL), N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 to - 24.30, is remedial in purpose. McClain, 237 N.J. at 457, 206 A.3d 353. "The essential objective of the Act ‘is to provide some income for the worker earning nothing, because [that worker] is out of work through no fault or act of [the employee].’ " Ibid. (quoting Utley v. Bd. of Review, 194 N.J. 534, 543, 946 A.2d 1039 (2008) ). Although the UCL is to be liberally construed to allow for benefits, at the same time "the unemployment insurance trust fund must be protected against the payment of claims to those ineligible for [unemployment insurance] benefits." Ibid. (citing Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 212, 704 A.2d 547 (1997) ). "The basic policy of the law is advanced as well when benefits are denied in improper cases as when they are allowed in proper cases." Ardan, 231 N.J. at 602, 177 A.3d 768 (quoting Brady, 152 N.J. at 212, 704 A.2d 547 ).
The UCL "protects not only workers who are involuntarily unemployed—those who are laid-off or terminated from their jobs by their employers—but also those who voluntarily quit their jobs for good cause attributable to their work." Utley, 194 N.J. at 543-44, 946 A.2d 1039. Under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), a claimant is disqualified from unemployment compensation "[f]or the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work." In applying the UCL, "a court must ‘differentiate between (1) a voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the work and (2) a voluntary quit without good cause attributable to the work.’ " Ardan, 231 N.J. at 602, 177 A.3d 768 (quoting Brady, 152 N.J. at 213-14, 704 A.2d 547 ).
A person seeking benefits under the UCL bears the burden of proving entitlement. Brady, 152 N.J. at 218, 704 A.2d 547. The claimant who "leaves work voluntarily, [also] ... bears the burden to prove [the person] did so with good cause attributable to work." Ibid. (citing Zielenski v. Bd. of Review, 85 N.J. Super. 46, 52, 203 A.2d 635 (App. Div. 1964) ). "[A]ll relevant factors" are to be considered in this analysis. Utley, 194 N.J. at 548, 946 A.2d 1039.
Haley contends that because his termination from employment was involuntary, there is no need to consider whether the cause was attributable to his work. We do not agree. This construction is not consistent with the 1961 amendment of the statute. See DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005) () (quoting In re Closing of Jamesburg High Sch., 83 N.J. 540, 548, 416 A.2d 896 (1980) ).
The original UCL "disqualified an employee from receiving unemployment benefits if [the worker] ‘ha[d] left work voluntarily without good cause.’ " Utley, 194 N.J. at 544, 946 A.2d 1039 (quoting L. 1936, c. 270, § 5). Quitting "for a personal reason that constituted ‘good cause’ entitled a worker to unemployment benefits." Ibid. The statute was amended in 1961 to "disqualify claimants who left work for purely personal reasons." Brady, 152 N.J. at 213, 704 A.2d 547. Thus, under the UCL, an individual now is disqualified for unemployment benefits "[f]or the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work" until reemployed as set forth in the statute. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).
We considered the same issue presented here in Fennell v. Board of Review, 297 N.J. Super. 319, 688 A.2d 113 (App. Div. 1997). Fennell was arrested in September and was not able to post bail. Id. at 320-21, 688 A.2d 113. Although he made reasonable efforts to keep his job, he was terminated from employment in January. Id. at 321, 688 A.2d 113. He was not rehired after his release from incarceration in June. Ibid. On appeal, we affirmed the denial of his unemployment benefits claim because the Id. at 324, 688 A.2d 113. We noted disqualification was consistent with the 1961 change in our unemployment statute "to eliminate the eligibility of persons who leave work for good but personal reasons." Id. at 321, 688 A.2d 113 (citing Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 457, 453 A.2d 170 (1982) ). Thus "[n]o matter how sympathetic the facts, [the loss of his job] ... bore no relationship to his work." Id. at 325, 688 A.2d 113.
White v. Board of Review, 146 N.J. Super. 268, 369 A.2d 937 (App. Div. 1977), reached a similar result. White left her work release employment because she was required as a condition of her parole to reside with her mother, who lived thirty-eight miles away from her job. Id. at 269, 369 A.2d 937. White did not have a vehicle. Ibid. Any...
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