Haley v. Board of Review, Division of Employment Sec., Dept. of Labor and Industry
| Decision Date | 24 July 1969 |
| Citation | 106 N.J.Super. 420,256 A.2d 71 |
| Parties | Patrick H. HALEY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY, State of New Jersey, and Armstrong Cork Co., Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
Vincent J. Pancari, Vineland, for appellants (Halpin & Bailey, Vineland, attorneys).
Edward A. Kaplan, Jersey City, for respondents.
Before Judges GOLDMANN, KOLOVSKY and CARTON.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CARTON, J.A.D.
Claimants appeal from a decision of the Board of Review holding them disqualified for unemployment benefits because of a labor dispute due to a work stoppage at the Armstrong Cork Company plant at Millville.
Pertinent portions of the 'labor dispute' disqualification provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Act (N.J.S.A. 43:21--5) provide:
'An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
(d) If it is found that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment or other premises at which he is or was last employed. No disqualification under this subsection shall apply if it is shown that:
(1) He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work; and
(2) He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, they were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute * * *.'
The Board of Review, as had the Appeals Tribunal, held that although claimants had satisfied the conditions of subparagraph (1), they had not done so as to subparagraph (2). The Board found that claimants neither participated in the labor dispute which caused the work stoppage, nor financed it, nor were directly interested in it. Nevertheless, it concluded that since claimants were employees of a plant 'with a continuous and coordinate manufacturing process' in which 'each function is dependent upon the completion of the preceding one,' they belonged to the same grade or class as the striking employees and were therefore likewise barred from receiving unemployment compensation.
The issue posed is whether that determination justifies the invocation of the statutory disqualification.
There is no dispute as to the facts. Armstrong's Millville plant is what is commonly referred to as a 'flow glass container plant,' where food and beverage glass containers are manufactured. The plant operates on a 3-shift, 24-hour, 7-day basis. The manufacturing process is a 'continuous' one, with each function being dependent upon the completion of the preceding one. When one part of the manufacturing process is stopped the entire operation must necessarily be suspended.
On February 1, 1968 there were employed at the plant about 1235 employees working on an hourly basis. Of these some 95 were mold makers and machinists, members of Locals 7 and 97, American Flint Glass Workers Union (AFGWU). The 80 claimants were members of these locals. Some 900 employees were production and maintenance workers, members of Local 257 of the Glass Bottle Blowers Association (GBBA), and 100 were warehousemen, shippers and yard truck drivers, who were members of Teamsters Local 676.
The mold makers make new molds for the forming department. These molds are used in the automatic bottle machines to make various shapes and forms of bottles, depending upon the type of mold. The mold makers also make repairs to molds in the machines. The jobs of making new molds and repairs are intermingled according to which of the mold makers are available at the time. There is no differentiation as to who works on new work and who works on repairs.
The machinists, members of Local 97 AFGWU, maintain all machines that produce the bottles, and also the feeders that feed the glass. The machines run 24 hours a day and require constant maintenance and repair work because of constant breaking of parts, all being air operated.
Claimants became unemployed on February 1, 1968 when the Armstrong plant was forced to close down due to a strike of the production and maintenance workers, members of Local 257 GBBA. The strike was part of an industry-wide strike by members of the production and maintenance workers unions initially affecting some 64 glass container plants operated by 22 glass manufacturing companies east of the Rocky Mountains.
The plant remained closed until March 23, 1968. During the strike the nonstriking claimants attempted to cross the picket lines but were prevented from doing so. Their union shop committee made unsuccessful efforts to negotiate an agreement with the production and maintenance union officers to get through the picket lines. They also endeavored to induce the employer to make a separate plant agreement with the striking union (GBBA) rather than to continue to negotiate on a multi-employer, multi-union basis.
The narrow question presented is whether claimants belonged to a 'grade or class' of workers, any of whom participated in, financed or was directly interested in the labor dispute. As already noted, the Board predicated its determination that they fell into the same category as the striking production and maintenance union employees solely for the reason that they were employed in a 'continuous flow plant.'
We do not agree that the statutory term 'grade or class of workers' may properly be defined solely in relation to the continuity of the manufacturing process in which the workers are engaged or gauged solely by the similarity of their duties to others employed in that process. The statute does not in terms mandate, and we perceive nothing in it which suggests, a legislative intention to deny such non- striking workers the benefits which the statute confers simply because of the adventitious circumstance that they were employed in a 'continuous flow' manufacturing process. The disqualification should not be expanded beyond its literal phrasing. See Amico v. Board of Review, 49 N.J. 159, 168, 228 A.2d 865 (1967).
As Chief Justice Weintraub observed in Amico (at page 167, 228 A.2d at page 869), the statute 'is obscure as to the basis of this vicarious disqualification' and the proviso in question 'turns the labor-dispute disqualification upon whether the employee belongs 'to a grade or class' of workers any of whom is participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute. But the statute does not say what is meant by 'grade or class."
The word 'grade' has been interpreted to refer generally to the type of work being performed, skills or expertness, or to such skills in relative position, rank or standing to those of other employees engaged in common employment. See Members of Iron Workers Union of Provo v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 242, 139...
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