Haley v. Celebrezze

• Decision Date: 06 October 1965
• Docket Number: No. 8154.,8154.
• Citation: 351 F.2d 516
• Parties: Edward E. HALEY, Appellant, v. Anthony J. CELEBREZZE, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

351 F.2d 516 (1965)

Edward E. HALEY, Appellant, v. Anthony J. CELEBREZZE, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Appellee.

No. 8154.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

October 6, 1965.

Ronald G. Raynolds, Tulsa, Okl., for appellant.

Hugh V. Schaefer, Tulsa, Okl., for appellee.

Before PICKETT and SETH, Circuit Judges, and DOYLE, District Judge.

WILLIAM E. DOYLE, District Judge.

The action herein was instituted in the district court pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act to review the ruling of the Secretary denying petitioner's application for a period of disability. The district court affirmed without comment the Secretary's decision which in turn was based on elaborate findings and conclusions issued by the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration. The latter body had upheld the conclusions of the trial examiner that appellant was not entitled to disability benefits or the establishment of a disability period under Sections 216(i) and 223 of the Act.¹ The applicant has appealed from the final judgment of the district court. He seeks review of the proceedings before the trial examiner and the Appeals Council.

The scope of review in this court is, of course, limited. Our inquiry is whether the decision of the Appeals Council, which in legal effect is the decision of the Secretary, is supported by substantial evidence.² The review here is not, however, restricted to whether the district court misapprehended the substantial evidence test.³ On the other hand, a trial de novo in which our findings would be substituted for those of the Council supported by substantial evidence is impermissible.⁴ Substantial evidence means evidence sufficient to justify a refusal to direct a verdict in a jury case against the party having the burden of proof.⁵

Prior to the disability complained of applicant had worked for thirty-two years as a bricklayer, a trade which he had learned from his brother at the age of sixteen. At the time of the filing of his application on March 12, 1962, he was fifty-five years of age. He claimed disability because of severe hemorrhage of the nose and tumors on his back. He fixed the date of onset as April, 1961. He has had no training other than that of bricklayer and has had little education. He did not finish the second grade and although able to print his name, his ability to read is limited.

Claimant suffered a severe nosebleed on April 1, 1961, following which he was hospitalized for fourteen days. There were recurrences of nose bleeding and loss of weight, and on March 9, 1962, applicant stopped work altogether. The evidence showed that he performed light household chores up to the time of the hearing. The medical evidence presented to the referee consisted of some hospital reports and a report of a visit from a representative of the Secretary, together with the reports of three physicians. None of this evidence was remarkable except that one of the doctors reported a left ventricular enlargement and one of the physicians to whom the applicant was referred found that there was no evidence of cardiac disease but there was some indication of infection in the urinary tract. The trial examiner's findings recognized all of the conditions diagnosed by the several doctors, including chronic prostatitis and a possible arteriosclerotic heart condition. The trial examiner concluded that existing impairments did not constitute a sufficiently substantial disability to preclude gainful employment within the meaning of the Act. On the other hand, the examiner's opinion was devoid of conclusion as to the type of work which the applicant might perform.

While the matter was pending before the Appeals Council additional evidence consisting of six medical reports was submitted. In two of these there was a diagnosis of angina pectoris, although there had been no electrocardiogram confirmation. It also appeared in these additional reports that the applicant was taking nitroglycerin pills to alleviate periodic chest pain.

In upholding the referee's decision the Appeals Council first found that the applicant was an "unreliable historian" and found generally that the complaints regarding chest pains were too unreliable to support a medical diagnosis of angina pectoris.⁶ Apparently, the Appeals Council was dissatisfied with the several medical reports because in reaching its negative conclusion on the presence of angina pectoris it made its own diagnosis. It did this by consulting two medical text books. From the symptoms disclosed it concluded that applicant did not have cardiac disease. Its diagnosis reads in part as follows:

"Indeed the weight of the medical evidence does not disclose any objective evidence of cardiac disease. While claimant has early arteriosclerotic changes of the aorta, Grade 11 (i. e., moderate) retinopathy (i. e., arteriosclerotic changes in the fundi), and mild cerebral of arteriosclerosis, this does not denote cardiac disease. `The finding of arteriosclerotic radial arteries or of atherosclerosis of the aorta, lower extremities, or of the retinal vessels does not denote that coronary heart disease is also present. The mere existence of "arteriosclerosis", a normal degenerative condition characteristic of the process of growing older is not disabling, especially where it is only mild or moderate in degree, as in the instant case, and does not imply that claimant cannot work."

After concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion that the applicant had a cardiac disease, the Appeals Council nevertheless assumed "arguendo" that there was a cardiac impairment, but held that notwithstanding its existence the...