Haley v. Childers

• Decision Date: 03 April 1963
• Docket Number: No. 17149.,17149.
• Citation: 314 F.2d 610
• Parties: John M. HALEY and Lodge 732, Brothererhood of Railroad Trainmen, Appellants, v. R. J. CHILDERS, Individually, and as General Chairman of the Switchmen's Union of North America, a Voluntary Association, the Switchmen's Union of North America, a Voluntary Association, and the Kansas City Terminal Railway Company, a Corporation, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

314 F.2d 610 (1963)

John M. HALEY and Lodge 732, Brothererhood of Railroad Trainmen, Appellants, v. R. J. CHILDERS, Individually, and as General Chairman of the Switchmen's Union of North America, a Voluntary Association, the Switchmen's Union of North America, a Voluntary Association, and the Kansas City Terminal Railway Company, a Corporation, Appellees.

No. 17149.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

March 8, 1963.

Rehearing Denied April 3, 1963.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Lucian Lane, Kansas City, Mo., made argument for the appellant and filed brief with John Murphy, Tucker, Wilson, Lane & Kelly, Kansas City, Mo.

Lee Leibik, Chicago, Ill., made argument for R. J. Childers and Switchmen's Union of North America, appellees and filed brief with Ruth Weyand, Chicago, Ill.

Sam D. Parker, Kansas City, Mo., made argument for appellee Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. and filed brief with W. M. Stapleton, Lathrop, Righter, Gordon & Parker, Kansas City, Mo.

Before JOHNSEN, Chief Judge, and VAN OOSTERHOUT and MATTHES, Circuit Judges.

MATTHES, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs' amended complaint was dismissed by the court because of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter, and from this judgment plaintiffs have appealed.

Defendants filed answers to the amended complaint in which the jurisdiction of the court was specifically challenged. Defendant R. J. Childers, individually and as General Chairman of Switchmen's Union of North America (Switchmen), and defendant Switchmen also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court, apparently considering the answers as motions to dismiss, granted them and also sustained the motion for judgment on the pleadings.

The broad issue is whether the court is vested with jurisdiction of this action or whether, as the trial court ruled, exclusive jurisdiction of the controversy is in the Railroad Adjustment Board (Board). More particularly (1), does the complaint properly bring the validity of a provision of a labor contract into issue so as to confer jurisdiction on the court or does the pleaded controversy involve the interpretation of the contract so as to give the Board exclusive jurisdiction; (2) if the validity of the contract is not in question, does the complaint properly allege discrimination in the enforcement of a provision of the contract so as to confer jurisdiction on the court?

Plaintiff Haley, a member of plaintiff Lodge 732, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (BRT) was an employee of defendant Kansas City Terminal Railway Company (Terminal). Because of an altercation with defendant Childers, an employee of Terminal and a member of Switchmen, both men were discharged from service, Haley's discharge being effective February 21, 1960. At all times material herein, Switchmen was the authorized bargaining agent for Terminal's employees classified as yard foremen and yard helpers, a classification that concededly encompasses both Haley and Childers. Under paragraph XXV(G) of the labor contract in effect when the litigated incident occurred, a disciplined employee had the right to appeal through the appropriate committee from the disciplinary ruling, provided appeal was made in writing within thirty days from date of written decision. If an employee failed to so appeal within thirty days, the case was to be closed, but such failure would not prevent the committee to ask for leniency on behalf of the employee.

Paragraph XXV(L) of the contract, referred to as the leniency provision and alleged to contravene the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, provides that a switchman who is discharged will not be returned to service with former seniority rights and privileges unless his case is pending with Switchmen and the case is presented to Terminal within one year.

Childers timely appealed under paragraph XXV(G) of the contract from the decision discharging him, and he was ultimately reinstated. Haley failed to appeal within the thirty days and has not been reinstated. He alleged, however, that he presented a claim to Switchmen within one year from the date of his discharge but that Switchmen arbitrarily failed and refused to present his claim to Terminal and that Childers and Switchmen have deliberately and arbitrarily discriminated against him because of his membership in a minority and rival labor union.¹

Plaintiffs sought: (1) a judgment declaring paragraph XXV(L) of the contract null and void; (2) injunctive relief requiring Terminal to confer and deal with Haley and BRT and requiring Childers and Switchmen to represent Haley without discrimination in Haley's claim for reinstatement; and (3) damages against Childers and Switchmen for $12,500.

Although both Haley and BRT are plaintiffs and Childers, Switchmen, and Terminal are all joined as defendants, it is clear that the real controversy is between Haley and Childers — Switchmen.

It is elementary that jurisdiction is the threshold issue in every case in the federal courts. Jurisdiction of the subject matter must be affirmatively shown by the complaint in actions initiated in the federal courts, and in the absence of proper jurisdictional averments, the complaint may be dismissed on motion.² A motion to dismiss seeking to test the question of jurisdiction admits facts well pleaded. But a mere conclusion of law or, as here, a naked conclusory allegation that a bargaining contract violates a federal statute, has no efficacy and is wholly insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the federal court where such allegation is unwarranted by the asserted facts and is contradictory to well pleaded facts. Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 fn. 4, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 91 L.Ed. 1209 (1947); McGuire v. Todd, 5 Cir., 198 F.2d 60 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 835, 73 S.Ct. 44, 97 L.Ed. 649 (1952); Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Company, Inc., S.D.Cal., 146 F.Supp. 594 (1956), affirmed, 9 Cir., 245 F.2d 874 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 927, 78 S.Ct. 384, 2 L.Ed.2d 357 (1958). See also: Hess v. Petrillo, 7 Cir., 259 F.2d 735 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 954, 79 S.Ct. 743, 3 L.Ed.2d 761 (1959); Ryan v. Scoggin, 10 Cir., 245 F.2d 54 (1957); Cohen v. United States, 8 Cir., 129 F.2d 733 (1942); Tate v. City of Eufaula, Alabama, M.D.Ala., 165 F.Supp. 303 (1958).

With the foregoing rule in mind, we hold that plaintiffs' allegation that paragraph XXV(L) is contrary to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the federal court. Like the trial court, we are satisfied that the selection of Switchmen's Union as the bargaining agent for all switchmen employed by Terminal was sanctioned by the Act, particularly § 2, 45 U.S.C.A. § 152, Fourth, which provides:

"Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. The majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class for the purpose of this chapter. * * *"

Section 2 of the Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 152, First, requires carriers and employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements covering rates of pay, rules and working conditions. Paragraph XXV(L) is a part of the bargaining agreement between Terminal, a carrier, on the one hand, and Switchmen, the duly designated and organized representative of its employees, on the other. The Act does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the carrier and the bargaining agent of the employees from agreeing upon the terms and conditions under which discharged employees may be reinstated. The agreement provided that a discharged employee could appeal as a matter of right from the decision discharging him, provided the appeal was timely taken and the prescribed procedural steps were met. Failure to make appeal in writing within the thirty days would close the case; however, the employee through a committee, could resort to paragraph XXV(L), the challenged leniency provision, thereby making it possible for him to be reinstated with former seniority rights and privileges. But paragraph XXV(L) required an employee to process his claim through the bargaining agent, Switchmen, and to have it presented to Terminal within one year. Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, we find nothing illegal in providing that the claim for reinstatement must be "pending with Switchmen's Union," and in our view this requirement is not offensive to 45 U.S.C.A. § 152, Third, which provides that "neither party shall in any way interfere with, influence, or coerce the other in its choice of representatives;" nor is it contrary to any other provision of the Act. In Switchmen's Union of North America v. Ogden Union Railway & Depot Co., 10 Cir., 209 F.2d 419 (1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 989, 74 S.Ct. 852, 98 L.Ed. 1123 (1954), a provision similar to paragraph XXV(L) was attacked as being contrary to the Act. In rejecting this contention, the Court stated:

"The provision is intended to do no more than regulate the composition of the roster of employees in the company — a matter certainly within the bargaining province of the two parties most affected, namely management and the duly elected representatives of the majority of the employees." 209 F.2d at 421.

Having found that the validity of the bargaining agreement was not legitimately brought into issue, we must affirm the dismissal of the suit against Terminal, for the only claim remaining against Terminal draws into controversy the interpretation and application of the bargaining agreement — the resolution of which lies within the exclusive domain and jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board. Section 153, First (i), 45 U.S.C.A. provides that "disputes between an employee * * * and a carrier * * * growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements * * * may after failure to reach settlement at lower administrative levels be referred * * * by either party to * *...