Haley v. City of Alton

• Decision Date: 19 June 1894
• Citation: 152 Ill. 113,38 N.E. 750
• Parties: HALEY et al. v. CITY OF ALTON.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

152 Ill. 113

38 N.E. 750

HALEY et al.

v.CITY OF ALTON.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 19, 1894.

Appeal from Madison county court; W. H. Krome, Judge.

Petition by the city of Alton for confirmation of a special tax. Mary Haley and others filed objections, which were overruled and judgment of confirmation entered. Objectors appeal. Affirmed.

Alex. W. Hope, for appellants.

John F. McGinnis, for appellee.

BAKER, C. J.

This was a proceeding in the county court of Madison county to confirm a special tax for the improvement of Belle, Third, and State streets in the city of Alton. Objections filed by the appellants were overruled, and judgment entered confirming the assessment roll returned by the commissioners, and objectors appeal. A great many grounds of reversal are urged. We shall notice only those which we regard of substantial importance.

The objection to the notice by the commissioners of the assessment, and that certain property was not listed on the assessment roll in the proper name of the owners, is, we think, without merit, especially after appearance. Murphy v. City of Peoria, 119 Ill. 509, 9 N. E. 895;Walters v. Town of Lake, 129 Ill. 23, 21 N. E. 556;Quick v. Village of River Forest, 130 Ill. 323, 22 N. E. 816;White v. City of Alton (Ill. Sup.) 37 N. E. 96.

The second point made is that the city council, after the passage of the ordinance, did not order a petition filed in the county court of Madison county, as required by statute. Section 5 of the ordinance provides: ‘Upon the filing of the report of said C. A. Herb, D. Ryan and William Armstrong (commissioners appointed to estimate the cost of the improvements) as hereinbefore required, and the approval thereof by the city council, the corporation counsel is hereby directed to file the proper petition in the county court of Madison county.’ There was, therefore, an order to file the petition. But it is contended that section 5 should not have been in the ordinance, and that the order to file the petition should have been made after the report of the commissioners estimating the cost, and that, being made before that report, the county court had no jurisdiction to order the tax levied. The time when the order was made is not, that we can see, of controlling importance. The ordinance ordered the petition should be filed after the report of the estimate had been filed and approved; and, even if such an order was necessary to give the court jurisdiction, we think that the order here given should be regarded as sufficient.

The next point made is that the petition does not recite the whole ordinance; that is, that it should set out the ordinance fixing the grade of the streets to be improved. The ordinance authorizing this improvement provides that it shall ‘conform to the respective established grades of said streets, as now established by ordinance of said city of Alton.’ And the claim, as we understand, is that the ordinances fixing the grades of the streets involved should have been set out in the petition. In support of this claim the case of Ogden v. Town of Lake View, 121 Ill. 422, 13 N. E. 159, is cited. An examination of that case will disclose that the ordinance there in question was for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a connected system of sewers in and along certain streets; and the ordinance set out in the original record did not sufficiently describe the manholes and catchbasins. In reference to the question presented in this case we used the following language: ‘In the view we take of the case, it is unnecessary to express any opinion upon the question whether an ordinance providing for the construction of a local improvement like the present will be sufficient which merely refers to some other ordinance for a description of the nature and character of the improvement, for, conceding that would be a substantial compliance with section 135, above referred to, still we do not think the judgment in the present case can be sustained upon that theory.’ The object of requiring a description of the improvement is that an intelligent estimate of the cost may be made, and we have frequently held that if the ordinance so specifies the location, character, and description of the work that a committee can make such an estimate, it is sufficient. Where the grade or city datum is fixed by ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to the grade or city datum, without setting forth the ordinance establishing it. White v. City of Alton, supra. The commissioners or committee estimating the cost of the improvement will in such case take notice of that established grade, as they would of streets or intersections established by other ordinances. We think the ordinance as set out in the petition fully complies with the requirement of the statute. The nature of te improvement is permanent, the material to be used brick, and the locality-the streets-named, with a perfect description as to how the work is to be done. By reference to a grade already established, it also shows just what the grade of the pavement is to be.

The improvement contemplates three streets, viz. Belle street, the paving on which is 30 feet in width; Third street, 58 1/2 feet in width; and State street, 56 feet in width. Co...