Haley v. Estelle, 80-1052

• Decision Date: 17 December 1980
• Docket Number: No. 80-1052,80-1052
• Citation: 632 F.2d 1273
• Parties: Alvon O'Neal HALEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. W. J. ESTELLE, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee. Summary Calendar. . Unit A
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1273

632 F.2d 1273

Alvon O'Neal HALEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. W. J. ESTELLE, Director, Texas Department of Corrections Respondent-Appellee.

No. 80-1052

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Unit A

Dec. 17, 1980.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Jan. 23, 1981.

Alvon O'Neal Haley pro se.

Mark White, Atty. Gen., Bill Willis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respondent-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before AINSWORTH, GARZA and SAM D. JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.

AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge:

Alvon O'Neal Haley appeals the dismissal of his second federal habeas corpus petition. The court below dismissed the petition on the authority of Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, finding that Haley had abused the writ of habeas corpus. We hold that the district court erred in making that determination. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand for further consideration.

This petition marks the second time Haley has challenged his Texas conviction for aggravated robbery in the federal courts. In April 1976, proceeding pro se, Haley filed his initial section 2254 petition in which he alleged three errors pertaining to his conviction: (1) the trial court erroneously admitted evidence obtained in violation of his Miranda rights; (2) the trial court allowed introduction of evidence tainted by an unlawful identification process; and (3) the trial court admitted evidence obtained by an illegal search. The district court found these claims to be without merit and denied relief without an evidentiary hearing. Haley did not appeal that decision.

Upon exhausting new claims in the Texas state courts, Haley filed his second application for habeas corpus in federal court on September 22, 1978. Haley alleged, in essence, three new grounds ¹ which he claimed entitled him to relief: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial judge's partiality to the state caused the court to give improper instructions and make unlawful comments; and (3) the state was permitted to improperly bolster a witness.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the second application, contending it was a "successive petition" and should therefore be barred pursuant to Rule 9(b). ² Respondent asserts that the issues in the second petition "should have been well known to Petitioner when he filed his first application" and that Haley's dilatory actions amount to an abuse of the writ "by filing successive applications and piecemealing his issues." In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Haley pled that he was a layman and, as such, unaware of the present allegations at the time of his first application. Haley pointed out that at no time subsequent to the original appeal of his conviction had he been assisted by counsel and that he had discovered the facts supporting the present allegations only with the help of another inmate.

The case was referred to a United States magistrate who recommended the district court dismiss the petition pursuant to Rule 9(b). The magistrate stated that "petitioner has made no showing whatsoever that he was unable for any legitimate reason" to raise the present allegations in the initial application. The district court followed that recommendation.

It is clear that Rule 9(b) is a restatement of the principles judicially developed in the "abuse of the writ" doctrine. See Paprskar v. Estelle, 612 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1980). Under this doctrine, a habeas petition can be dismissed without considering the merits only when there has been an abuse of the writ. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1078, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963). However, we have recognized that this procedure "is of rare and extraordinary application." Paprskar v. Estelle, supra at 1007; Simpson v. Wainwright, 488 F.2d 494, 495 (5th Cir. 1973).

A petition will be dismissed for abusing the writ where it can be shown that the petitioner either deliberately withheld a claim from a previous petition or was inexcusably neglectful. See Paprskar v. Estelle, supra at 1006; Turnbow v. Beto, 464 F.2d 525, 526 (5th Cir. 1972). The principle behind Rule 9(b) is to dismiss those petitions that constitute "needless piecemeal litigation" or whose "purpose is to vex, harass, or delay." Sanders v. United States, supra, 373 U.S. at 18, 83 S.Ct. at 1078. From this language, it is clear that a petitioner cannot be charged with having abused the writ of habeas corpus if, at the time of his earlier petition, he was unaware of the facts on which his newly asserted claims are based, or was unaware that those facts constituted a basis for which federal habeas corpus relief could be granted. Thus, the petitioner may have adequate reasons for not presenting his claims earlier. See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 291, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1063, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948); Johnson v. Copinger, 420 F.2d 395, 399 (4th Cir. 1969).

While a prisoner should not be allowed to abuse the writ of habeas corpus, he should not be penalized for availing himself of access to the courts. Simpson v. Wainwright, supra at 496. The Supreme Court has stated that in a habeas corpus proceeding, the "primary purpose" is to assure that no one is unjustly imprisoned. Therefore, if a prisoner is unaware of the legal significance of relevant facts, it would be unreasonable to prohibit his attempt for judicial relief. Price v. Johnston, supra, 334 U.S. at 291, 68 S.Ct. 1063.

In this case, a holding of abuse of writ is not warranted. There was neither inexcusable neglect nor deliberate withholding of a ground for relief. Haley has been without the benefit of counsel throughout the proceedings in both habeas petitions. It cannot be assumed that he would be familiar with federal procedure or the legal basis that may justify his cause. As the Supreme Court said in Price :

Prisoners are often unlearned in the law and unfamiliar with the complicated rules of pleading. Since they act so often as their own counsel in habeas corpus proceedings, we cannot impose on them the same high standards of the legal art which we might place on the members of the legal profession. Especially is this true in a case like this where the imposition of those standards would have a retroactive and prejudicial effect on the petitioner's inartistically drawn petition.

Price v. Johnston, supra, 334 U.S. at 292, 68 S.Ct. at 1063.

Once the Government has pled there has been an abuse of writ, the burden is on the petitioner to prove that Rule 9(b) does not apply. Where a substantial conflict exists, it may be...