Haley v. Gross
Decision Date | 29 May 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 95-1130,95-1130 |
Citation | 86 F.3d 630 |
Parties | Arzel HALEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Boniface GROSS, Lieutenant McKee, and Michael Ellis, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Michael N. Bledsoe (argued), Michael N. Bledsoe & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Michael A. Wulf, Alix E. Armstead, Office of Atty. Gen., Springfield, IL, Jerald S. Post (argued), Office of Atty. Gen., Civ. Appeals Div., Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellants.
Before CUMMINGS, CUDAHY, and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.
On May 16, 1994, a jury found that Superintendent Boniface Gross, Lieutenant Scott McKee, and Sergeant Michael Ellis 1 ("defendants") were deliberately indifferent to the safety of Arzel Haley while he was an inmate at the Menard Correctional Facility, in violation of the Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The jury found that the deliberate indifference of these defendants was a proximate cause of Haley's injuries, which were sustained when another inmate set their joint cell on fire, severely burning Haley and killing himself. The jury found the defendants jointly and severally liable to Haley for $1.65 million in compensatory damages, but did not award punitive damages. The defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law and, alternatively, requested a new trial. After their motions were denied, they appealed. On appeal the defendants maintain 1) that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 2) that trial errors occurred which, at a minimum, require the grant of a new trial, and 3) that they are shielded from liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity. We affirm the jury verdicts of deliberate indifference and the lower court's denial of the defendants' post-verdict motions.
The denial of a post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law, under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is subject to de novo review. Matlock v. Barnes, 932 F.2d 658, 663 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 909, 112 S.Ct. 304, 116 L.Ed.2d 247 (1991). We review a district court's denial of a Rule 50 judgment notwithstanding the verdict motion by asking "whether the evidence presented, combined with all reasonable inferences permissibly drawn therefrom, is sufficient to support the verdict when viewed in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed." Id. (quoting Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir.1985)). Thus in determining whether the jury could lawfully find that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the safety of Haley, we must consider all the evidence that came before the jury at trial and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Haley. The facts below are presented from this perspective.
On Monday, April 3, 1989, a terrible fire occurred in one of the cells at the Menard Correctional Facility. The fire was set by Kim Wilborn, one of the two inmates housed in the cell. Wilborn was killed in the blaze, and Arzel Haley, his cellmate, was severely burned, requiring extensive, painful skin grafts and months of recovery. 2 The intensity of the fire, described at trial as an "inferno," may have been enhanced by oil-based paint on the walls of the cell. Rescue efforts were halting at best, primarily because very few officers were in the cellhouse at the time the fire broke out and Haley's cell was "deadlocked," meaning it could only be opened with the right key, rather than with the general crank. Haley's deliberate indifference claims are based upon events that preceded this fire.
Haley had been living in cell 35 on the Ten Gallery of the East Cellhouse (cell 10-35) since December of 1988. 3 Wilborn was moved into this cell with Haley on March 17, 1989, approximately two-and-one-half weeks before the fire. Haley and Wilborn did not get along from the beginning. Haley was 19 years old at the time and weighed about 160 pounds. Wilborn, who was generally known by the nickname "Country," was in his thirties and was substantially larger than Haley. Haley, along with various other inmates, testified that Wilborn was widely believed to be crazy by people who observed him at Menard. These inmates consistently described him as "buggy," meaning crazy or disturbed. They noted that Wilborn rarely associated with or talked to other inmates, spent most of his time in his cell, acted peculiarly, talked to himself or his "imaginary friend," would walk around the jail gallery in only his underwear, did not wear shoes, never showered or brushed his teeth, and dressed in smelly, disheveled clothing.
Baron Horton, an inmate who lived in cell 10-38 at the time (three cells down from Haley and Wilborn), testified that the nickname "Country" came from Wilborn's appearance: being barefooted, wearing raggedy clothes, etc. Horton also testified to observing Wilborn talking to a non-existent person while waiting in the "chow line" and drinking coffee with an imaginary friend in his cell--Wilborn had prepared two cups though no one else was around. Horton noted that anyone who saw Wilborn would think he was crazy and that Wilborn "looked as if he needed help." Edward Swift, another inmate at Menard at the time, confirmed that Wilborn was generally thought to be "mentally disturbed" or "crazy," due to his unusual actions and appearance, as well as his non-association with other inmates (being a "loner"). Inmate Clarence Dace, who lived four cells down in 10-39, likewise affirmed these perceptions of Wilborn. The testimony of these inmates, including Haley, would allow the jury to reasonably infer that anyone familiar with Wilborn would perceive that he had mental problems. 4
Haley testified that he first began requesting to be moved to a new cell on the Wednesday or Thursday preceding the Monday, April 3 fire. 5 Haley testified that he first spoke to Superintendent Boniface Gross, who was in charge of the cellhouse at the time. 6 He testified that he went to see Gross in his office on Four Gallery during the morning of that Wednesday or Thursday. Haley told him that he and his "celly" (cellmate Wilborn) were having problems and that his celly was crazy and buggy. He explained to Gross why he thought Wilborn was crazy, noting that Wilborn hadn't taken a shower since he moved in, didn't come out of the cell, moved Haley's things around, "tried to start stuff," and tried to intimidate Haley. Haley also told Gross that Wilborn had reported once attempting to burn his own sister's house down. Haley testified that Gross told him that he would check into it and see what he could do. Haley also spoke to Sergeant Ellis about the situation, who he saw on Two Gallery.
Later that day, Haley again saw Superintendent Gross and asked him when he or his celly were going to be moved from their cell. Haley noted that Gross seemed to have forgotten what he was talking about, so Haley reminded him of the information he had earlier conveyed. Haley testified that Gross told him he would check into it before shift change that day, which occurred at 3:00 in the afternoon. Gross never got back to him, however, and Haley did not see him again until the Monday of the fire. Haley also testified, and other inmates confirmed this testimony, that he was known not to be a gang member and that at Menard members of "the organization" (i.e., gangs) were substantially more likely to have requests granted.
By Sunday, when nothing had yet been done and realizing that Gross was off for the weekend, Haley went back to Sergeant Ellis, who he spoke to near the sergeant's cage on the way up to the galleries. Haley testified to again telling Ellis about the problems he and his celly were having, though Ellis "knew the situation" when Haley reminded him about it. Ellis told Haley that he would check into it. Haley noted that the conversation was short, five to ten seconds long, since other inmates were hanging out and waiting to talk to Ellis in the area near the sergeant's cage.
At trial Haley described a terrible night with Wilborn that Sunday evening. He testified that they were arguing and that Wilborn had earlier threatened that "something crucial was going to happen if they didn't get him out of the cell" or they didn't get separated that Sunday. When night came on Sunday and they were still together, Haley was terrified. He stayed up until around 3:00 a.m., afraid that if he went to sleep Wilborn would "try something." Not only did Wilborn threaten him, but he was acting strangely, walking around the cell, and not going to sleep. When Haley woke up Monday morning, he went to breakfast and then went directly to Superintendent Gross's office, but he still wasn't around. So Haley went and found Sergeant Ellis and told him about his continuing problems with his cellmate. The jury could have inferred from Haley's testimony, though it was less than perfectly clear, that Haley told Ellis about how Wilborn had threatened him. Once again, Ellis said he would "check into it."
Between 11:00 and 12:00 that Monday morning, on his way back from morning yard, Haley found Superintendent Gross on Two Gallery talking to inmates outside the sergeant's cage. Haley again requested that he and Wilborn be separated. Haley testified that Gross appeared not to remember him, so he once more explained the situation and why he wanted to be separated from his celly. This time Gross told Haley that he should check back with Gross. Later that day, after discovering that Wilborn was deadlocked in their cell, 7 though Haley did not know why, he again went in search of aid. Haley waited around for awhile near the sergeant's cage on Two Gallery for a sergeant or superintendent to return. Eventually Superintendent Gross came in, and Haley again spoke to him about getting moved. While Haley's testimony on the conversation is a bit vague, the jury could have reasonably inferred that...
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