Haley v. State

• Decision Date: 18 April 1956
• Docket Number: No. 29284,29284
• Citation: 133 N.E.2d 565,235 Ind. 333
• Parties: William Leonard HALEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 565

133 N.E.2d 565

235 Ind. 333

William Leonard HALEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 29284.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 18, 1956.

Patrick E. Chavis, Jr., Willard N. Ransom, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., Owen S. Boling, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

LANDIS, Judge.

Appellant was convicted after a jury trial of second degree murder for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals from the judgment assigning as error the overruling of his motion for a new trial.

Appellant first contends the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law, and claims the evidence is insufficient to establish the necessary elements of second degree murder, in that there was no evidence of a purposeful and malicious killing of decedent by appellant.

The evidence most favorable to appellee (The State) shows decedent was mortally wounded by stabbing with a knife, shortly after midnight on November 7, 1953. Appellant admits a controversy between himself and decedent in an automobile in which deceased, his brother, and appellant, were seated at the time in question; that deceased told appellant to get out of the car, but he didn't do so; that appellant slashed out at decedent with his (appellant's) knife, which the evidence indicated had a four inch blade; that deceased, in said altercation, struck appellant over the head with a beer bottle. Deceased was stabbed twice in the upper left chest; an autopsy showed the point of the blade pierced the heart, and that from such wound decedent died in a very short time. Appellant had told a cab driver, at about 10:00 p. m., shortly before the incident, in substance, that he (appellant) would have to have some money; that if he could get inside a car, he would get some money or put the cold steel on somebody. That appellant told the cabby about 1:00 a. m., shortly after the incident, that 'he had just got a Son of Bitch,' that 'he got in the car with two of them and he could not get out and he went to one of them in the chest with his knife.' That he got to one of them with his knife in the chest; that 'one of them hit him in the head with a beer bottle before he could get out of the car.' (R. pp. 180-190). That appellant further said, 'he should have killed the bastard.' Decedent's brother, the other occupant of the car, was admittedly uninjured.

The foregoing evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, were sufficient to entitle the jury to conclude that decedent was mortally wounded by a deadly weapon held in appellant's hand.

It is a well settled legal principle that malice may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in such a manner as likely to cause death. May v. State, 1953, 232 Ind. 523, 112 N.E.2d 439; Landreth v. State, 1930, 201 Ind. 691, 171 N.E. 192, 72 A.L.R. 891; Dundovich v. State, 1921, 190 Ind. 600, 610, 131 N.E. 377. In the case before us, the jury might reasonably have concluded there was intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to, and which did, actually cause death. Under such circumstances malice could be inferred, unless such use was in self defense, or upon sudden heat occasioned by adequate provocation. Dundovich v. State, supra, 1921, 190 Ind. 600, 610, 131 N.E. 377; McDermott v. State, 1883, 89 Ind. 187; Brown v. State, 1897, 147 Ind. 28, 33, 46 N.E. 34; Bridgewater v. State, 1899, 153 Ind. 560, 55 N.E. 737; Coolman v. State, 1904, 163 Ind. 503, 72 N.E. 568.

No contention is made by appellant that the stabbing was done in self defense, but appellant claims that a killing in combat which engenders hot blood is not murder, in the absence of purpose and malice concurring in the act. The evidence favorable to appellee indicates the trouble started in the car when decedent would not give appellant money he asked for, and when he told appellant to get out of the car, which appellant did not then do. Malice on the part of appellant in stabbing the decedent may be inferred from the circumstances, including the statements he made to the cab driver shortly before the killing, which have been previously set forth.

All these circumstances in evidence before the jury, were evidence not only of malice, but of premeditation on the part of appellant; and the jury, upon the basis of such evidence and the inferences therefrom, could properly find the appellant guilty of second degree murder.

Appellant next complains under grounds four and six of the supplemental motion for new trial of:

'4. Irregularities in the proceedings of the court or jury and or abuse or discretion by which the defendant was prevented from having a fair and impartial trial in violation of his constitutional rights in this to-wit:

'a. That the defendant was represented by counsel incompetent to try said cause; that the record of said cause shows that the State of Indiana obtained the admission of a certain confession by cross examination of the defendant which had theretofore been suppressed by the court, without objection, by the attorney for the defendant; that the court knew or should have known that the said attorney did not object thereto because of a gross inability and incompetence to try said cause and that the defendant was prejudiced and prevented from fairly presenting his defense because of said inability and incompetence.

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'6. Irregularities in the entire proceedings of the court in that the court knew or should have known that the incompetence of the defendant's attorney in the entire trial of said cause was so great that the defendant was prejudiced and prevented from having a fair and impartial trial of said cause, and knowing this the court should have withdrawn the submission of said cause.'

Appellee (The State) contends these specifications of the supplemental motion for new trial are not properly before the court as such supplemental motion was not filed until thirty three days after the verdict of the jury, and the same was, therefore,...