Haley v. Under Sec'y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop.
Decision Date | 08 September 2015 |
Docket Number | Case No. 1:15–cv–102 (GBL/TRJ). |
Citation | 129 F.Supp.3d 377 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Parties | Jeffrey HALEY, Petitioner–Plaintiff, v. UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY and Director of the USPTO, Respondent, Michelle Lee and Sarah Harris, Defendants. |
Jeffrey Haley, Bellevue, WA, pro se.
David Moskowitz, U.S. Attorney's Office, Alexandria, VA, for Respondent/Defendants.
GERALD BRUCE LEE
, District Judge.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Michelle Lee and Sarah Harris ("Defendants")'s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) and Petitioner–Plaintiff Jeffrey Haley ("Haley")'s Cross–Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Cross–Motion") (Doc. 13). This case involves the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("the USPTO")'s decision to disbar Haley (Admin. R. at 9–24) as reciprocal punishment after Haley agreed to resign from the Washington State Bar Association ("the WSBA") in lieu of discipline (Id. at 28–31). Following disbarment, Haley jointly filed (1) a petition for review of the USPTO's disciplinary ruling and (2) a Bivens action ("Complaint") against Defendants.
There are five issues before the Court. One, whether the Court, given Haley's alternative means of redress and the practical implications of allowing such a suit, should grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss because it would be inappropriate to devise a new Bivens remedy for Haley's claims. Two, whether the Court should grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss because Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity due to their quasi-judicial roles in adjudicating agency disciplinary actions. Three, whether the Court should grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss because Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as the constitutional right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Four, whether the Court should grant Haley's Cross–Motion because the USPTO had no congressionally-granted authority to impose reciprocal discipline against Haley. Five, whether the Court should grant Haley's Cross–Motion because in punishing Haley, the USPTO exercised its authority in a manner that was arbitrary and capricious. For the reasons that follow, the Court must GRANT Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and the Court must DENY Haley's Cross–Motion.
The WSBA filed a complaint against Haley alleging misconduct under the Rules of Enforcement Lawyer Conduct ("ELC") on August 14, 2013. (Admin. R. at 32–35).
In Haley's response to the complaint he stated, "It is not worth the trouble for me to go through a disputed proceeding on this matter, so I hereby permanently resign my former membership which has been in suspension for more than seven years." (Id. at 36–37). After a series of negotiations with the WSBA which allowed him to resign without actually admitting to the wrongful conduct, Haley signed the Resignation in Lieu of Discipline (Id. at 28–31) pursuant to ELC Rule 9.3 ).
On June 20, 2014, the Director of the Office of Reciprocal Discipline ("OED") for the Patent Bar filed a complaint for reciprocal discipline against Haley pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 11.24
. (Admin. R. at 42–46). After Haley filed a response (Id. at 56–70), the USPTO weighed the arguments of Haley and OED and issued a final order (Id. at 9–25) on December 31, 2014 disbarring Haley. On January 26, 2015, Haley filed a joint petition for review of the USPTO's disciplinary order and complaint against the two officials who signed the order. Haley's Complaint alleged violation of his First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 1). On April 20, 2015, Defendants Michelle Lee and Sarah Harris filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7), and on April 24, 2015, Haley filed a Cross–Motion (Doc. 13).
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
should be granted unless the complaint "states a plausible claim for relief" under Rule 8(a). Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir.2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). In considering a rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint," drawing "all reasonable inferences" in the plaintiff's favor. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir.2011) (citations omitted). No such assumption of truth is afforded to those "naked assertions" and "unadorned conclusory allegations" devoid of "factual enhancement." Vitol, S.A. v. Primerose Shipping Co., 708 F.3d 527, 543 (4th Cir.2013) (citations omitted). The complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, taken as true, "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and "nudge [the] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Vitol, 708 F.3d at 543 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).
Summary judgment is appropriate where a court finds there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56
. However, "when a party seeks review of agency action under the APA before a district court, the district judge sits as an appellate tribunal." Rempfer v. Sharfstein, 583 F.3d 860, 865 (D.C.Cir.2009) (quotations omitted); see Marshall County Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1226 (D.C.Cir.1993) (). Therefore, when reviewing agency actions...
To continue reading
Request your trial- Integrated Direct Mktg., LLC v. May
-
Swyers v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
...similarly declined to recognize a Bivens remedy against PTO employees on this ground. See Haley v. Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Prop., 129 F. Supp. 3d 377, 383 (E.D. Va. Sept. 8, 2015) ("[Plaintiff] has an alternate remedy because 35 U.S.C. § 32 grants [plaintiff] an opportu......
-
Piccone v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
...has refused to imply a right of action to cover PTO disciplinary actions under Bivens, see Haley v. Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property, 129 F. Supp. 3d 377, 382-83 (E.D. Va. 2015), and the Court will not do so here. 14. For instance, Piccone objects that the ALJ erred by ......
-
Academy v. Nat'l Accrediting Comm'n of Career Arts
...to an appellate tribunal) (citing Rempfer v. Sharfstein, 583 F.3d 860, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Haley v. Under Sec'y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop., 129 F. Supp. 3d 377, 381 (E.D. Va. 2015)). 2. As noted in this Court's prior rulings in this case, the Fourth Circuit has acknowledged that "......