Halifax Corp. v. First Union Nat. Bank, Record No. 001944.
Decision Date | 08 June 2001 |
Docket Number | Record No. 001944. |
Citation | 44 UCC Rep.2d 661,546 S.E.2d 696,262 Va. 91 |
Parties | HALIFAX CORPORATION v. FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK. |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Robert W. Ludwig, Jr., (John J. Vecchione; Edwin Y. Szeto; Henry St. John Fitzgerald; Ludwig & Robinson, on briefs), for appellant.
Grady C. Frank, Jr. (Thomas C. Junker; Rebecca E. Kuehn, Falls Church; Paige B. McThenia, Buena Vista; LeClair Ryan, on brief), for appellee. Present: CARRICO, C.J., HASSELL, KEENAN, KINSER, and LEMONS, JJ., POFF and STEPHENSON, Senior JJ.
The primary issue that we consider in this appeal is whether a plaintiffs cause of action against a bank is precluded by Code § 8.4-406(f), which is a part of Virginia's Uniform Commercial Code.
II.
Halifax Corporation filed its motion for judgment against First Union National Bank and Wachovia Bank, N.A. In Count I of a multi-count motion for judgment, Halifax sought recovery from First Union under Code § 8.4-401, which is a part of Virginia's Uniform Commercial Code. In Count II, Halifax sought damages based upon First Union's alleged breach of its deposit agreement with Halifax. In Count III, Halifax sought to recover against First Union and Wachovia Bank for purported claims of negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness under Code §§ 8.3A-404, 8.3A-405, 8.3A-406, and 8.4-406, which are parts of Virginia's Uniform.Commercial Code.
First Union filed a motion for summary judgment alleging, among other things, that Halifax's claims were barred under Code § 8.4-406(f). The circuit court, in a written opinion, agreed with First Union and entered an order which granted the motion for summary judgment. Halifax nonsuited Wachovia Bank and appeals the circuit court's judgment in favor of First Union.
III.
Because this case was decided on a motion for summary judgment, we will state the facts pled in the plaintiff's motion for judgment and adopt inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to Halifax Corporation, the non-moving party, unless the inferences are strained, forced, or contrary to reason. Slone v. General Motors Corp., 249 Va. 520, 522, 457 S.E.2d 51, 52 (1995).
Halifax is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Virginia. Between August 1995 and March 1999, Mary K. Adams served as Halifax's comptroller.1 Between August 1995 and January 1997, she wrote at least 88 checks on Halifax's account at Signet Bank, which was subsequently acquired by First Union National Bank. Adams used facsimile signatures on the checks, and she made the checks payable to herself or cash. Adams deposited these checks in her personal account at the former Central Fidelity Bank, which is now Wachovia Bank, N.A. First Union, as drawee bank, "paid each of these checks and debited [Halifax's] account despite the forged and/or unauthorized drawer's signatures."
First Union paid each check and debited Halifax's account even though most of these corporate checks "were drawn in large amounts exceeding $10,000 and $20,000, of which approximately one quarter were drawn in exceptionally large amounts of between $50,000 and $100,000 each, and payable to `Mary Adams,' an individual who [First Union] knew to be an employee and Comptroller of [Halifax]." First Union paid these large checks "despite one, and in many instances, two levels of inspection of the individual checks for purposes of payment approval."
In January 1999, Halifax discovered accounting irregularities in certain cheek transactions and initiated an investigation. Subsequently, Halifax learned that Adams had embezzled at least $15,445,230.49 from its account. Halifax does not dispute that First Union sent Halifax monthly statements reflecting the unauthorized checks and that Halifax failed to notify First Union of the unauthorized signatures within one year after the statements were sent to Halifax.
IV.
The following former and current statutes are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Code § 8.4-401, a current statute, states in pertinent part:
Former Code § 8A-406 stated in part:
(Emphasis added).
The General Assembly amended Code § 8.4-406 and, effective January 1, 1993, the revised statute states:
Code § 8.1-203, a...
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