Halin v. United Mine Workers of America

• Decision Date: 16 January 1956
• Docket Number: No. 12255.,12255.
• Citation: 97 US App. DC 210,229 F.2d 784
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
• Parties: Arthur H. HALIN and Esther C. Halin, Appellants, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA and Mohler Construction Company, Appellees.

97 US App. DC 210, 229 F.2d 784 (1956)

Arthur H. HALIN and Esther C. Halin, Appellants, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA and Mohler Construction Company, Appellees.

No. 12255.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued March 22, 1955.

Decided January 16, 1956.

Mr. Lester Wood, Washington, D. C., for appellants.

Mr. Kahl K. Spriggs, Washington, D. C., for appellee United Mine Workers of America.

Mr. J. Harry Welch, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. H. Mason Welch and John R. Daily, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee Mohler Construction Company.

Before WILBUR K. MILLER, BAZELON and WASHINGTON, Circuit Judges.

WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judge.

United Mine Workers of America, the owner of an old office building, engaged the Mohler Construction Company to do certain reconstruction work therein. It also contracted with J. C. Harding Company to install a new electrical system in the building. Arthur H. Halin, a Harding employee, brought this suit for damages against UMW, Mohler and his own employer, alleging that, due to their negligence "in failing to provide adequate board-walks for the workmen, said plaintiff, Arthur H. Halin, fell a distance of twenty-five feet from one floor to a lower floor, and suffered injuries and discomfort as a result thereof." Halin's wife also sued for loss of consortium.

After a jury had been impaneled, an opening statement was made by plaintiff's counsel and thereupon the court, without taking testimony, granted the motions of the defendants UMW and Mohler, for a directed verdict on the ground that no cause of action had been stated.¹ With respect to UMW, the trial judge expressed the view that the owner of a building who contracts for repairs is not under an active duty to furnish the contractor's employees with a safe place to work. In granting Mohler's motion, the judge relied upon our decision in Arthur v. Standard Engineering Co., 1951, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 399, 193 F.2d 903, 32 A.L.R.2d 408, certiorari denied 1952, 343 U.S. 964, 72 S.Ct. 1057, 96 L.Ed. 1361, and held counsel's statement did not show Halin was Mohler's "mutual benefit" invitee in using the allegedly inadequate boardwalk.

According to the opening statement, Mohler's men had removed the flooring on the seventh floor and had laid loose planks across the exposed joists "so that the electricians could go in and do certain work in under the joists." Halin went to that floor to "tie in" a panel box, which Mohler's superintendent had told Harding's assistant foreman must be done before the old joists and other old material were removed. When Halin stepped from the first board to the second, "it suddenly gave way with him and caused him to fall between the joists * * * landing on * * * the sixth floor * * *."

The trial judge was clearly correct in directing a verdict for UMW. It was not charged with active negligence, and had no part in, nor any duty with respect to, laying or maintaining the temporary walkway. If there was a dangerous condition, it was created by those whom UMW had engaged to renovate the building. Restatement, Torts § 426 (1934). In regard to Mohler, whether a directed verdict was correct depends upon what was said in the opening statement concerning the relationship between that defendant and Halin, when the latter used the appliance set in place by the former. If he was an invitee, Mohler owed him the duty of furnishing him with a reasonably safe walkway. If he was a licensee, Mohler is not liable unless the injuries were caused by its active negligence, which is not charged here. Arthur v. Standard Engineering, supra, and cases there cited.

In cases of this sort, we have adopted the "mutual advantage" theory in regard to invitees. Arthur v. Standard Engineering, supra; Firfer v. United States, 1953, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 216, 208 F.2d 524; Martin v. United States, 1955, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 294, 225 F.2d 945. The principle is that invitation is inferred where there is a common interest or mutual advantage, while license is inferred where the object is the mere pleasure or benefit of the person using another's appliance. Cf. Bennett v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 1880, 102 U.S. 577, 585, 26 L.Ed. 235.

We reproduce a portion of the opening statement which has to do with the mutual advantage question:

"* * * We will show you that after they had ripped out the floor of the eighth sic floor, that Mohler\'s construction men, so that the electricians could get in and do certain work in under the joists, had put down certain walk boards, which were placed over the width of the beams or joists under the floor."

"Mohler Construction Company, the main contractor in this work that was being

...