Hall Et Al v. Lanning Et Al

• Decision Date: 01 October 1875
• Citation: 91 U.S. 160,23 L.Ed. 271
• Parties: HALL ET AL. v. LANNING ET AL
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

91 U.S. 160

23 L.Ed. 271

HALL ET AL. v. LANNING ET AL.

October Term, 1875

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.

This was an action of debt brought on a judgment rendered in New York against the plaintiffs in error. One of them, Lybrand, pleaded separately nul tiel record, and several special pleas questioning the validity of the judgment as against him for want of jurisdiction over his person. On the trial, the plaintiff simply gave in evidence the record of the judgment recovered in New York, which showed that an attorney had appeared and put in an answer for both defendants, who were sued as partners. The answer admitted the partnership, but set up various matters of defence. The cause was referred, and judgment given for the plaintiffs. This was the substance of the New York record. The plaintiffs gave no further evidence.

Lybrand then offered to prove that he never was a resident or citizen of the State of New York; and that he had not been within said State of New York at any time since, nor for a long time before, the commencement of the suit in which the judgement was rendered, upon which the plaintiff in this case brought suit; and that he never had any summons, process, notice, citation, or notice of any kind, either actual or constructive, ever given or served upon him; and that he never authorized any attorney or any other person to appear for him; and that no one ever had any authority to appear for him in said suit in the State of New York, or to enter his appearance therein, nor did he ever authorize any one to employ an attorney to appear for him in the action in which said judgment was entered; and that he never entered his appearance therein in ¢- person; and that he knew nothing of the pendency of said suit in the said State of New York until the commencement of the present suit in this court; that he was a partner in business with his co-defendant Hall at the time the transaction occurred upon which the plaintiffs brought suit in New York, though said partnership had been dissolved, and due notice thereof published, some six months prior to the commencement of said suit in New York.

This evidence, being objected to, was overruled by the court, which instructed the jury as follows: 'That the record introduced in evidence by the plaintiffs was conclusive evidence for the plaintiffs to maintain the issues submitted to the jury by the pleadings; and that they should return a verdict for the plaintiffs, and against both defendatns.'

A bill of exceptions was taken to this ruling, and the matter brought here on writ of error.

Mr. Samuel W. Packard for the plaintiffs in error.

The controlling question in this case is, whether the court erred in refusing to allow the introduction of evidence to show that the judgment obtained in New York was void, as to Lybrand, for want of jurisdiction of the person. The general rule of law in that State is, that 'want of jurisdiction may always be interposed against a judgment when sought to be enforced, or when any benefit is claimed from it: the want of jurisdiction, either of the subject-matter or of the person of either party, renders the judgment a mere nullity.' Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 275, per James, J.; Shumway v. Stillman, 6 Wend. 447; Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121; Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 164, per Allen, J.; Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 id. 542, per Church, C. J.

For the purpose of showing that the court did not have jurisdiction, the recitals in the judgment record may be contradicted. Adams v. Saratoga & Vermont R. W. Co., 10 N. Y. (6 Selden) 332, 333, per Gridley, j.,; Harrington v. People, 6 Barb. 607, 610, per Paige, J., and other cases in New York there cited; Latham v. Edgerton, 9 Cow. 228, and cases there cited.

But there is this exception to the general rule above stated in New York. Where an attorney has appeared without authority for a party, he cannot be allowed to dispute the authority of the attorney when the judgment is brought in question, except by a direct proceeding in the court where the judgment remains; and he cannot always do that if the attorney is responsible, as a suit against the attorney is, under some circumstances, held an adequate remedy.

The reasons of the exception are, because the title to real estate depends to a great extent upon the records of the courts; and the injured party has an ample remedy against the attorney, if responsible, or he can apply to the court in which judgment was rendered for relief. Brown v. Nichols, 42 N. Y. 26, per Ingall, J., 32, and per Earle, J., 30; Denton v. Noyes, 6 Johns. 296.

These reasons do not apply to a suit upon such judgment in another State; because,

First, The title to real estate is not thereby affected.

Second, There is no remedy in any of the courts of the State where suit is brought upon the judgment, either by direct application to the court in which it was rendered, or by suit against the attorney who appeared without authority.

The fact that a party must resort to a distant forum outside the limits of his own State for redress has frequently been held to be an inadequate or insufficient remedy, and almost equivalent to none at all. Buckmaster v. Grundy, 3 Gilman (Ill.), 626, 630, 631; Tribbles v. Toul, 7 Mon. 455; Green v. Campbell, 2 Jones (Eq.), N. C. 448; Richardson v. Williams, 3 id. 119; Smith v. Field, 6 Dana (Ky.), 364; Taylor v. Stowell, 4 Met. (Ky.) 176, 177; Pander v. Cox, 28 Ga. 306, 307; Key v. Robinson, 29 id. 34; Lirch v. Foster, 1 Ves. Sr. 88; Edminson v. Baxter, 4 Hayw. (Tenn.) 112; Graham v. Tarkersby, 15 Ala. N. S. 644; Hinrichson v. Reinbach, 27 Ill. 301.

As the evidence offered by Lybrand that the attorney who appeared for him did so without authority does not contradict, but simply explains, the record, he was not estopped. Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 186; Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 338; Barden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121; White v. Jones, 38 Ill. 163; Welch v. Sykes, 3 Ill. 200; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Shumway v. Stillman, 6 Wend. 447; Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380, and cases cited therein; Haskin v. Blackmer, 20 Iowa, 162, and cases cited therein; Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272; Wilson v. Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 6 Leigh, 570; Price v. Ward, 1 Dutch. 229; Bigelow on Estoppel, 226; 6 Robinson's Practice, 438; 2 American Leading Cases (5th ed.), 633, 642, and cases cited; Freeman on Judgments, sect. 563 (2d ed. p. 559).

The recitals in the record of a judgment of one State, when sought to be enforced in another, can be contradicted as to any jurisdictional fact, notwithstanding their conclusive effect in the State where the judgment was rendered, and notwithstanding the constitutional provision 'that full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State,' and the act of Congress passed to carry it into effect. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457; Knowles v. Gas-Light & Coke Co., 19 id. 59; Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend. 148, per Marcy, J.; Rope v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328, 332-337; Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272; Shumway v. Stillman, 6 Wend. 453; Noyes v. Butler, 6 Barb. 613; Norwood v. Cobb, 24 Tex. 551; Carleton v. Bickford, 13 Gray, 591.

Mr. Sidney S. Harris for the defendants in error.

The excluded evidence, if admitted, would not have impeached the validity of the judgment.

Hall and Lybrand were partners. The suit in New York which resulted in the judgment related wholly to their partnership transactions. The authority of one partner to employ an attorney to represent the firm in a suit, and to enter the appearance of all its members, rests on the undisputed doctrine, that such partner, in all things relating to the firm transactions, can lawfully represent the firm, unless restricted by agreement. Parsons on Partn. 174.

It is clear that one partner can make contracts for the partnership which will not only bind it to the extent of its assets, but which may lead to the ultimate individual liability of all the partners. This is a necessary legal result of his exercise of partnership authority; and either partner, acting for the firm, can employ an attorney to resist a recovery in a suit against it and to defend its interests. Parsons on Partn. 175, note; Harrison v. Stickney, 7 T. R. 208, Dampier, arguendo; Collyer on Partn., sects. 441, 678, and note; Winship v. The Bank of the United States, 5 Pet. 561; Bennett v. Stickney, 17 Vt. 531; Everson v. Gehrman, 10 How. Pr. 301; Taylor v. Coryell, 12 S. & R. 250.

One partner can bona fide admit service of process for both, and the judgment rendered will not be set aside on the motion of the other partner. Olwell v. McLaughlin, 10 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 316; Lippman v. Judson, 1 Code, N. S. 161, note; Hammond v. Harris, 2 How. Pr. 331; Crane v. French, 1 Wend. 311; Grazebrook v. McCrudie, 17 id. 437; Blodget v. Conklin, 9 How. Pr. 442.

If the partnership was dissolved, Hall still had the power to act for the firm in respect to any transactions which occurred when the partnership continued. Wood v. Braddick, 1 Taunt. 104, per Lord Mansfield; Pritchard v. Draper, 1 Russ. & My1. 191; Vinal v. Burrill, 16 Pick. 401; Bridge v. Gray, 14 id. 55; Simpson v. Geddes, 2 Bay, 533; Garland v. Agee, 7 Leigh, 362; Woodworth v. Downer, 13 Vt. 522.

The rule in this country is, that the dissolution operates as a revocation of all authority to make new contracts, but not to arrange, liquidate, settle, and pay those before created (Darling v. March, 22 Me. 184); and that either partner, after dissolution, may acknowledge in the name of the partnership a balance due from it (Ide v. Ingraham, 5 Gray, 106). In Pennsylvania it is held that a partner may, after dissolution, borrow money to pay partnership debts (Estate of Davis, 5 Whart. 530), renew the notes of the firm (Brown v. Clark, 14 Penn. St. 469), or give notes in its name in payment of debts (Robinson v. Taylor, 4 Barr, 242).

As the power of each...