Hall-Jones v. Berryhill
| Decision Date | 01 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 16-CV-0064-LTS,16-CV-0064-LTS |
| Parties | JEALEE ANNETTE HALL-JONES, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
This case is before me on a Report & Recommendation (R&R) by the Honorable C.J. Williams, Chief United States Magistrate Judge. Doc. No. 17. Judge Williams recommends that I affirm the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner) denying plaintiff Jealee Hall-Jones' application for Social Security disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et. seq. (Act).
Hall-Jones filed timely objections (Doc. No. 18) to the R&R. Although the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Hall-Jones was disabled between October 16, 2012, and December 31, 2013, Hall-Jones contends that the ALJ erred in determining she was not disabled between January 1, 2014, and the date of his decision, January 13, 2015. The procedural history and relevant facts are set forth in the R&R and are repeated herein only to the extent necessary.
The Commissioner's decision must be affirmed "if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 2006); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (). "Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 2003). The Eighth Circuit explains the standard as "something less than the weight of the evidence and [that] allows for the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions, thus it embodies a zone of choice within which the [Commissioner] may decide to grant or deny benefits without being subject to reversal on appeal." Culbertson v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994).
To determine whether the Commissioner's decision meets this standard, the court considers "all of the evidence that was before the ALJ, but it [does] not re-weigh the evidence." Vester v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2005). The court considers both evidence which supports the Commissioner's decision and evidence that detracts from it. Kluesner v. Astrue, 607 F.3d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 2010). The court "must search the record for evidence contradicting the [Commissioner's] decision and give that evidence appropriate weight when determining whether the overall evidence in support is substantial." Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 555 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Cline v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1991)).
To evaluate the evidence in an appeal of a denial of benefits, the court must apply a balancing test to assess any contradictory evidence. Sobania v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 879 F.2d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1989). The court, however, does not "reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ," Baldwin, 349 F.3d at 555 (citing Bates v. Chater, 54 F.3d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1995)), or "review the factual record de novo." Roe v. Chater, 92 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Naber v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 186, 188(8th Cir. 1994)). Instead, if, after reviewing the evidence, the court "find[s] it possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the Commissioner's findings, [the court] must affirm the [Commissioner's] denial of benefits." Kluesner, 607 F.3d at 536 (quoting Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 2008)). This is true even if the court "might have weighed the evidence differently." Culbertson, 30 F.3d at 939 (quoting Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1992)). The court may not reverse the Commissioner's decision "merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision." Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984); see also Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2005) ().
A district judge must review a magistrate judge's R&R under the following standards:
Within fourteen days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Thus, when a party objects to any portion of an R&R, the district judge must undertake a de novo review of that portion.
Any portions of an R&R to which no objections have been made must be reviewed under at least a "clearly erroneous" standard. See, e.g., Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) ().As the Supreme Court has explained, "[a] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). However, a district judge may elect to review an R&R under a more-exacting standard even if no objections are filed:
Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any issue need only ask. Moreover, while the statute does not require the judge to review an issue de novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). Thus, a district court may review de novo any issue in a magistrate judge's report and recommendation at any time. Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has "emphasized the necessity . . . of retention by the district court of substantial control over the ultimate disposition of matters referred to a magistrate." Belk v. Purkett, 15 F.3D 803, 815 (8th Cir. 1994). As this court has previously stated, "[e]ven if the reviewing court must construe objections liberally to require de novo review, it is clear to this court that there is a distinction between making an objection and making no objection at all . . . ." Lynch v. Astrue, 687 F. Supp. 2d 841 (2010) (citing Coop. Fin. Assoc. v. Garst, 917 F. Supp. 1356, 1373 (N.D. Iowa 1996)). This court will provide de novo review of all issues that might be addressed by any objection, but will review for clear error matters to which no objection at all has been made. Id.
Hall-Jones alleged disability due to numerous conditions, including migraine headaches, chest pain, degenerative disc disease, loss of feeling and syncope. AR 18. The record demonstrates that she also suffers from type 2 diabetes. AR 17. At issue is the change in Hall-Jones' residual functional capacity (RFC) between the period for whichthe ALJ determined Hall-Jones was disabled and the period for which the ALJ found that she was not disabled. The ALJ found that prior to January 1, 2014, Hall-Jones had the RFC to perform sedentary work, with the following restrictions:
[C]laimant should avoid moderate exposure hazards, such as dangerous machinery and unprotected heights. The claimant should not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant should avoid more than moderate levels of noise. She can only frequently reach overhead bilaterally. Lastly, the claimant would miss 2 days of work per month.
AR 17 (emphasis added). A vocational expert (VE), Melinda Stahr, testified that there were no jobs in the national economy that an individual missing two days of work per month could perform. AR 23.
However, the ALJ determined that as of January 1, 2014, Hall-Jones' migraines had improved to the point that a new RFC analysis was necessary. The ALJ found an identical RFC, except for one change. Rather than missing two days of work per month, Hall-Jones would be "off task for approximately 10-15% of the work day." AR 24. The VE testified that there were jobs in the national economy that a person with Hall-Jones' physical limitations could perform in spite of being off task for up to 15% of the day.
Hall-Jones makes a number of arguments that broadly fall into two categories. First, Hall-Jones argues that the ALJ's RFC finding for the period beginning January 1, 2014, is not supported by substantial evidence. Second, she argues that the VE's testimony that there were jobs in the national economy that Hall-Jones could perform was flawed and, therefore, does not constitute substantial evidence in support of a finding that Hall-Jones was not disabled.
Judge Williams began his analysis by addressing the ALJ's stated basis for re-evaluation of Hall-Jones' RFC as of January 1, 2014. Judge Williams recommended upholding the January 1, 2014, RFC determination because "[t]he medical evidence inthis case is susceptible to the ALJ's conclusion that claimant's headaches improved in 2014." Doc. No. 17 at 15. Specifically, Judge Williams stated:
[O]n January 20, 2014, claimant visited her treating physician and reported "I still have the same...
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