Hall Manor Owner's Ass'n v. City of West Haven, No. 13654
Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
Writing for the Court | Before PETERS; HULL |
Citation | 212 Conn. 147,561 A.2d 1373 |
Parties | HALL MANOR OWNER'S ASSOCIATION v. CITY OF WEST HAVEN. |
Decision Date | 18 July 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 13654 |
Page 1373
v.
CITY OF WEST HAVEN.
Decided July 18, 1989.
[212 Conn. 148]
Page 1374
Kathleen S. Mass, Hamden, with whom, on the brief, were Vincent R. Falcone and Mark Healey, West Haven, for appellant (plaintiff).Mark J. DeGennaro, Deputy Corp. Counsel, for appellee (defendant).
Before [212 Conn. 147] PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, GLASS and HULL, JJ.
[212 Conn. 148] HULL, Associate Justice.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the plaintiff's residential complex known as Hall Manor is entitled to refuse collection by the defendant, the city of West Haven, pursuant to a West Haven ordinance that regulates such collection within the city. We agree with the trial court that, under the language of the ordinance, the complex is not eligible for the city provided service, and, accordingly, find no error.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Prior to January 20, 1983, the Hall Manor complex was a residential apartment building containing seventy-six individual apartments. On January 20, 1983, a document entitled "Declaration of Covenants, Easements, Reservations and Tenancies in Common" was recorded on the land records of the city of West Haven purporting to create "Hall Manor, A Planned Unit Development Modular Complex." This declaration divided the complex into nineteen attached and detached "modules," each containing four apartment dwelling units. Fee simple ownership for each module was then conveyed separately to various purchasers. According to [212 Conn. 149] the declaration, the plaintiff, a Connecticut corporation comprised of owners of the nineteen modules, was conveyed fee simple ownership of the land and common improvements, exclusive of the buildings. 1
Page 1375
Since January 20, 1983, the plaintiff has removed the refuse generated at its complex based upon the defendant's claim that such removal is the plaintiff's responsibility. Refuse collection in the city of West Haven is regulated by a city ordinance which provides, inter alia, that "[t]he Department of Public Works is responsible for the collection, removal and disposal of garbage, refuse and other waste material from all private dwellings in the city." West Haven Code § 119-1(D). While no definition of "private dwellings" was contained in the ordinance as adopted in February, 1983, 2 the city amended the ordinance on June 27, 1983, to include the following: " 'Private dwellings' as used herein shall include all residential condominiums as the term condominium is defined by the Condominium Act of the Connecticut General Statutes. It is expressly understood that condominiums shall not include commercial or other forms of non-residential condominium unit ownership. It shall not include apartments nor co-op housing ownership." West Haven Code § 119-1(D)(1). The ordinance provides further that "[t]he collection of garbage, refuse and other waste material from industrial, business and apartment buildings of more than [212 Conn. 150] four (4) dwelling units shall be the responsibility of the property owner(s)." West Haven Code § 119-1(E).
In February, 1988, the plaintiff instituted a declaratory judgment action against the city seeking a declaration that, pursuant to the ordinance, Hall Manor was entitled to municipal refuse collection, and seeking compensatory damages for expenses incurred for refuse removal during the five year period in which the defendant failed to provide the service to the plaintiff's residential complex. The case was referred to Hon. Harold M. Mulvey, state trial referee. A stipulation of facts, trial briefs and exhibits were submitted to the trial court to serve as the basis for its decision. The plaintiff claimed in its trial brief that Hall Manor was a "private dwelling" within the meaning of the ordinance and therefore eligible for the municipal service. The city responded that the complex, as a planned unit development, was not a "private dwelling" and thus not eligible for the service. The trial court agreed with the defendant and rendered judgment accordingly. This appeal by the plaintiff ensued.
On appeal the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred by ruling that, under the language of the ordinance, Hall Manor is not a "private dwelling" entitled to municipal refuse collection. The plaintiff argues in the alternative that: (1) Hall Manor is entitled to the municipal service because it is a condominium; (2) Hall Manor, although a planned unit development, is entitled to the service because it consists of individual private dwelling units; and (3) Hall Manor is implicitly entitled to the service because it is composed of nineteen distinct four-unit apartment buildings. As to each of these claims, we disagree.
The plaintiff first contends that Hall Manor is entitled to municipal refuse collection because it is a condominium, and as such is specifically defined by the ordinance [212 Conn. 151] as a "private dwelling" eligible for the municipal service. We conclude that Hall Manor is not a condominium.
The ordinance's inclusion of condominiums within the phrase "private dwelling" is limited by the provision that the term "condominium" be defined "by the Condominium Act of the Connecticut General Statutes [§ 47-68a et seq.]" West Haven Code § 119-1(D)(1). General Statutes § 47-68a(a) defines a "condominium" as "real property and any incidents thereto and interests therein, lawfully submitted to this chapter by the recordation of condominium instruments pursuant to the provisions
Page 1376
of this chapter." "Condominium instruments," in turn, are defined as "the declarations, bylaws, survey maps and plans recorded and filed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter." General Statutes § 47-68a(d).While the plaintiff has recorded an instrument labeled as a declaration, this document does not fulfill the requirements of General Statutes § 47-68a et seq. General Statutes § 47-70(a) clearly provides that "[t]he declaration shall contain the following information: (1) The name by which the condominium is to be identified, which name shall include the word 'condominium' or be followed by the words, 'a condominium;' (2) A description of the land on which the buildings and improvements are, or are to be, located together with the title and reference to a survey of such land prepared and certified substantially correct by a licensed surveyor or engineer and filed prior to or simultaneously with such declaration...." (Emphasis added.) The declaration fails to meet either of these statutory requirements. First, while the declaration does contain the name of the complex, that name does not include the word "condominium" nor is the name followed by the words "a condominium." To the contrary, the plaintiff's complex is referred to throughout the declaration [212 Conn. 152]...
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United Illuminating Co. v. City of New Haven, 15462
...looked beyond the use of the word shall and examined the statute's essential purpose. [Hall Manor Owner's Assn. v. West Haven, 212 Conn. 147, 152, 561 A.2d 1373 (1989) ]. The test to be applied in determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory is whether the prescribed mode of acti......
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Mahoney v. Lensink, 13605
...in this context is directed toward a matter of substance, the statutory provision is mandatory. Hall Manor Owner's Assn. v. West Haven, 212 Conn. 147, 153, 561 A.2d 1373 (1989); Fidelity Trust Co. v. BVD Associates, 196 Conn. 270, 278, 492 A.2d 180 12 See footnote 10, supra. 13 General Stat......
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State v. Tabone, 18119.
..."the use of the word `shall,' though significant, does not invariably create a mandatory duty." Hall Manor Owner's Assn. v. West Haven, 212 Conn. 147, 152, 561 A.2d 1373 (1989). When negative terminology accompanies the phrase, however, as is the case here, 973 A.2d 97 the term 292 Conn. 45......
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Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 19105.
...automatically invalidate action upon a failure to comply.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall Manor Owner's Assn. v. West Haven, 212 Conn. 147, 153, 561 A.2d 1373 (1989).9 See footnote 7 of this opinion.10 Although we have referred to some of these considerations as “tests,” we genera......
-
State v. Tabone, No. 18119.
..."the use of the word `shall,' though significant, does not invariably create a mandatory duty." Hall Manor Owner's Assn. v. West Haven, 212 Conn. 147, 152, 561 A.2d 1373 (1989). When negative terminology accompanies the phrase, however, as is the case here, 973 A.2d 97 the term 292 Conn. 45......
-
United Illuminating Co. v. City of New Haven, No. 15462
...looked beyond the use of the word shall and examined the statute's essential purpose. [Hall Manor Owner's Assn. v. West Haven, 212 Conn. 147, 152, 561 A.2d 1373 (1989) ]. The test to be applied in determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory is whether the prescribed mode of acti......
-
Mahoney v. Lensink, No. 13605
...in this context is directed toward a matter of substance, the statutory provision is mandatory. Hall Manor Owner's Assn. v. West Haven, 212 Conn. 147, 153, 561 A.2d 1373 (1989); Fidelity Trust Co. v. BVD Associates, 196 Conn. 270, 278, 492 A.2d 180 12 See footnote 10, supra. 13 General Stat......
-
Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., No. 19105.
...automatically invalidate action upon a failure to comply.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall Manor Owner's Assn. v. West Haven, 212 Conn. 147, 153, 561 A.2d 1373 (1989).9 See footnote 7 of this opinion.10 Although we have referred to some of these considerations as “tests,” we genera......