Hall v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 09 April 1968
• Docket Number: No. 52849,52849
• Citation: 158 N.W.2d 107,261 Iowa 1258
• Parties: John M. HALL, Administrator with Will Annexed of the Estate of Cecil R. Hall, a/k/a C. R. Hall, Appellant, v. ALLIED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. John M. HALL, Administrator of the Estate of Genevieve M. Hall, Appellant, v. ALLIED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 107

158 N.W.2d 107

261 Iowa 1258

John M. HALL, Administrator with Will Annexed of the Estate of Cecil R. Hall, a/k/a C. R. Hall, Appellant, v. ALLIED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

John M. HALL, Administrator of the Estate of Genevieve M. Hall, Appellant, v. ALLIED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 52849.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 9, 1968.

Frank W. Davis, Des Moines, for appellant.

Kent M. Forney, of Bradshaw, Fowler, Procter & Fairgrave, Des Moines, for appellee.

MASON, Justice.

These two cases, consolidated and argued together here, involve the uninsured motorist clause of a family automobile insurance policy issued by defendant Allied Mutual Insurance Company to Cecil R. Hall. John M. Hall, as the personal representative of Cecil R. and Genevieve M. Hall, seeks declaratory judgment in this law action construing the contract and determining the proper measure of damages to be applied. The petitions are identical, except in the case involving Mrs. Hall it is alleged she was a passenger in the automobile operated by her husband and was within the coverage of his policy.

I. Part IV Coverage J of the insurance contract provides defendant agrees 'to pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called 'bodily injury', sustained by the insured, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured automobile; provided, for the purposes of this coverage, determination as to whether the insured or such representative is legally entitled to recover such damages, and if so the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement between the insured or such representative and the company or, if they fail to agree, by arbitration.'

The issue is whether the measure of damages under the Oklahoma law or the Iowa law is applicable in determining defendant's liability under this particular policy provision.

The cases were submitted to the court without a jury upon a stipulated record. No oral testimony was taken.

As part of this stipulation the parties requested the court to take judicial notice of the Oklahoma Wrongful Death Statute which provides that the personal representative of a decedent may institute an action for wrongful death in which case the damages must inure to the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and children, if any, or next of kin to be distributed in the same manner as personal property of the deceased. The action must be commenced within two years.

The parties further stipulated that under Oklahoma law the measure of damages in a death case is determined by the extent to which the deceased contributed to the support of the surviving spouse, child or next of kin, in addition to which the personal representative is entitled to recover for necessary medical and funeral expenses.

Under Iowa law the measure of damages in a death case is the present worth or value of the estate decedent would be reasonably expected to have saved and accumulated as the result of his own efforts from the date of his death if he had lived out the term of his natural life, plus medical expense and the lesser of his funeral expense or the interest thereon over the remainder of his life expectancy.

II. The facts of the cases are not in dispute.

At the time of death of plaintiff's decedents there was in force a family automobile insurance policy issued by defendant to Mr. Hall which by its terms in Part IV thereof afforded contractual coverage to plaintiff's decedents against injury or death resulting from the negligent acts of an uninsured motorist.

The contract of insurance was entered into in Iowa and both parties to it were citizens and residents of Iowa, both at the time of making the contract and at the time decedents died.

Decedents were killed in an automobile accident near McAlester, Oklahoma, November 29, 1963, when the automobile owned by Cecil R. Hall was struck by an automobile driven by Sybil Roach Shook and owned by Ivan L. Shook, both of whom were then residents of Texas.

Sybil Roach Shook was guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of the death of plaintiff's decedents. The automobile operated by Sybil was at the time of the accident an uninsured automobile. At the time of death neither decedent left a surviving spouse, dependent child or next of kin financially dependent upon them or either of them.

No action has been instituted in Oklahoma against either Sybil or Ivan L. Shook to recover damages in any amount for the wrongful death of plaintiff's decedents. There has been no arbitration of the claims made in behalf of plaintiff's decedents and no demand for arbitration has been made in writing by either party to the other.

There is no question concerning the applicability of the uninsured motorist coverage to this accident. Decedents were driving or riding in an 'insured automobile', were struck by an 'uninsured automobile' causing their deaths. Thus plaintiff is entitled to recover some amount under the policy in each case. The extent of that coverage is a proper subject for a declaratory judgment action. General Casualty Company of Wisconsin v. Hines, Iowa, 156 N.W.2d 118, 120, and citations.

If the Oklahoma law is applicable, plaintiff's recovery under the facts will be limited to the fair and reasonable value of the necessary medical and funeral expenses; while if the Iowa law is applicable the amount of damages would be determined by the law of Iowa as set out, supra, in the stipulation of the parties.

III. The trial court held plaintiff's claim was governed by the Oklahoma law and entered judgment accordingly.

The court further held plaintiff's failure to ask for arbitration of the controversy with defendant did not preclude him from seeking the declaratory relief sought in the petition, and plaintiff's failure to institute suit against Sybil R. Shook or Ivan L. Shook before the expiration of two years from the date of the accident did not constitute a violation of the insurance contract which would preclude plaintiff from maintaining this action.

Although additional relief is prayed for, the stipulations state that at this time the trial court is not being asked to make any determination as to the amount of damages, if any, to which plaintiff would be entitled.

Only plaintiff appeals, assigning as error the court's holding that Oklahoma law determines the applicable measure of damages recoverable under the quoted provisions of the insurance contract.

IV. Plaintiff contends that since the insurance contract was entered into in Iowa, between an Iowa insurer and an Iowa insured, it is the state most intimately concerned with the outcome of this litigation and under the 'grouping of contacts' or 'center of gravity' theory the Iowa, rather than the Oklahoma, measure of damages for wrongful death should be applied.

Defendant argues in support...