Hall v. BD. OF TRUSTEES, SCH. DIST. NO. 2

• Decision Date: 16 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 2811.,2811.
• Citation: 499 S.E.2d 216,330 S.C. 402
• Parties: Judy HALL, Respondent, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SUMTER COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2, Appellant.
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

330 S.C. 402

499 S.E.2d 216

Judy HALL, Respondent, v.THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SUMTER COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2, Appellant.

No. 2811.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Submitted October 8, 1997.

Decided March 16, 1998.

Rehearing Denied April 23, 1998.

Andrea E. White, of Childs & Halligan, Columbia, for appellant.

J. Cabot Seth, of Jones, Seth & Shuler, Sumter, for respondent.HEARN, Judge:

The Board of Trustees of Sumter County School District Number 2 appeals the circuit court's reversal of the Board's decision to terminate the employment of Judy Hall.The Board argues substantial evidence supports its findings with respect to Hall's unfitness for teaching and insubordination.We disagree and affirm the circuit court's decision to reinstate Hall's employment.¹

FACTS

RespondentJudy Hall served as a media specialist for Furman High School in Sumter County for fifteen years.In 1996, Margaree Simon, another Furman High teacher, asked Hall to chaperone the senior class trip to Disney World.Hall initially declined the invitation.Later, when another teacher could not go, Hall agreed to travel with the class, basing her decision on an agreement with Simon that she would serve as a chaperone only while traveling to and from Florida and during a visit to a shopping mall.She would be "off duty" at all other times.Once in Florida, Hall stayed with a friend in a different hotel.Hall returned with the class to Sumter at the end of the trip.

Prior to the trip, Furman High School's principal, Renee Mathews, approved Hall's designation as a chaperone.²She did not, however, learn of Hall's agreement with Simon until after the class returned.When she questioned Hall about her decision to stay apart from the students, Hall acknowledged that she stayed in a separate hotel with her friend, but that Simon—the trip's lead organizer—approved the arrangement.It is conceded there is no written policy for chaperoning offcampus events or trips.Mathews reported her findings to Dr. Frank Baker, superintendent of Furman's school district.On May 6, Dr. Baker met with Hall and placed her on administrative leave.Baker admonished Hall not to discuss the matter with any other employees pending closure of his investigation.Hall later met with Baker again and admitted discussing the matter with three employees, including Simon.On May 16, Baker recommended that the Board terminate Hall's employment based on Hall's failure to supervise the class during the trip and Hall's insubordination stemming from her discussion with co-employees.

The Board accepted Baker's recommendation and terminated Hall's employment.Hall filed a petition for judicial review of the Board's decision.The circuit court reversed and the Board appeals from that ruling.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Our review of a school board decision terminating a teacher's employment is normally limited to determining whether it is supported by substantial evidence.Felder v. Charleston County School Dist,327 S.C. 21, 25, 489 S.E.2d 191, 193(1997).This court may reverse an administrative decision if that decision was "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record" such that the "substantial [rights] of a party have been prejudiced."S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6)(e)(Supp.1997);Lark v. Bi-Lo,276 S.C. 130, 132-33, 276 S.E.2d 304, 305(1981).Moreover, this court may reverse an administrative decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced due to an error of law.S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6)(d)(Supp. 1997);Lark,276 S.C. at 132-33, 276 S.E.2d at 305.

DISCUSSION

Local school boards have the power to employ and discharge teachers.S.C.Code Ann. § 59-19-90(2)(1990).Our General Assembly permits the termination of a teacher's employment—without affording a reasonable time for the teacher to rectify the offending behavior—only under certain narrow circumstances.Section 59-25-430 of the Teacher Employment and Dismissal Act provides: "Any teacher may be dismissed at any time who shall fail, or who may be incompetent, to give instruction in accordance with the directions of the superintendent, or who shall otherwise manifest any evident unfitness for teaching...."S.C.Code Ann. § 59-25-430(1990).Other deficiencies or shortcomings, however, must be addressed by giving the teacher notice and a reasonable time for improvement.S.C.Code Ann. § 59-25-440(1990);Adams v. Clarendon County Sch. Dist. No. 2,270 S.C. 266, 273, 241 S.E.2d 897, 900(1978).Failure to improve within this time constitutes a "good and sufficient" reason warranting the termination of employment.S.C.Code Ann. § 59-19-90(2);Adams,270 S.C. at 272-73,241 S.E.2d at 900.

In this case, Hall's competence as a teacher has not been challenged.To the contrary, the only evidence shows that her performance for the past fifteen years was satisfactory, the highest rating generally given to teachers.Nor has Hall failed to give instruction in accordance with the superintendent's directions.³Therefore, the only basis for terminating Hall without giving her a reasonable opportunity to rectify the offending behavior must involve evident unfitness for teaching.

Section 59-25-430 sets forth a non-exclusive list of examples of unfitness for teaching.Examples include "persistent neglect of duty, willful violation of rules and regulations of [the] district board of trustees, drunkenness, conviction of a violation of the law of this State or the United States, gross immorality, dishonesty, illegal use, sale or possession of drugs or narcotics."Id.It is undisputed that Hall's conduct does not fall within any of these specifically delineated categories.

The Board argues Hall's failure to supervise and insubordination demonstrate her evident unfitness for teaching, thereby justifying her dismissal without providing her with a reasonable time for improvement.We disagree.⁴Although the Teacher Employment and Dismissal Act contemplates "evident unfitness for teaching" to encompass a broad variety of deficiencies, the Act was also intended to prevent the abuse of a school board's power of termination.Adams,270 S.C. at 272 & n. 6, 241 S.E.2d at 900 & n. 6.Consistent with this requirement, South Carolina's appellate courts have upheld immediate termination only where evidence of unfitness for teaching was "undeniably and abundantly present."Kizer v. Dorchester County Vocational Educ. Bd. of Trustees,287 S.C. 545, 550, 340 S.E.2d 144, 147(1986).The following cases illustrate the appropriate application of this standard.

In Kizer, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed a school board's immediate termination where the teacher, among other things, referred to fellow teachers and students as "stupid," obstructed the provision of emergency medical service for a pregnant student suffering a miscarriage, used profanity, and otherwise created a school environment filled with "turmoil, tension, conflict, fear and an absence of trust and respect ... at war with the interests of society."Id. at 550-51, 340 S.E.2d at 147.

More recently, the supreme court extended unfitness for teaching to a teacher's participation in an unauthorized student protest, contrary to the specific directive of the principal that the students return to class.Felder,327 S.C. at 23, 489 S.E.2d at 192.The court found a clear link between the teacher's insubordination, her unfitness for teaching, and her ability to perform her job duties in a professional manner.Id. at 25, 489 S.E.2d at 193.The court also affirmed the school board's finding that the teacher made a false statement to her superior.Id. at 25-26, 489 S.E.2d at 193.

In Hendrickson v. Spartanburg County School District Number 5,this court affirmed a teacher's immediate termination where the teacher slapped a student and could not maintain control of her temper or classroom.307 S.C. 108, 112-13, 413 S.E.2d 871, 873-74(Ct.App.1992).We also upheld an immediate termination where a principal failed to supervise instruction in accordance with the superintendent's directions.Barr v. Board of Trustees of Clarendon County Sch. Dist. No. 2,319 S.C. 522, 530-31, 462 S.E.2d 316, 320-21(Ct.App.1995),cert. denied,(Apr. 4, 1996).This conduct, the court held, demonstrated a "persistent neglect of duty."Id. at 530, 462 S.E.2d at 321.

By contrast, when a teacher's conduct does not demonstrate unfitness for teaching of the type contemplated by the previously cited decisions, procedural safeguards must be followed to allow the teacher reasonable time to correct the problem.This delineation is an important one.As noted in Johnson v. Spartanburg County School District Number 7,"[t]here must be a distinction between the cases, or it renders the legislature's intent to create procedural safeguards for educators a nullity."314 S.C. 340, 343, 444 S.E.2d 501, 503(1994)(assistant principal demoted without an opportunity to modify offensive behavior and without being given notice that he risked demotion).

I.Failure to Supervise

The most cogent argument the Board makes is that the students were entrusted to Hall for the duration of the trip and that "common sense" would dictate that she had a duty to supervise them at all times.It also maintains Hall should have reported the agreement concerning her limited chaperone duties to her principal because the arrangement was outside of the norm.

As noted earlier, Hall's presence was not needed because the trip already had more than the required number of chaperones.Moreover, the Board introduced no evidence to contradict Hall's testimony about her agreement with Simon.In addition, the Board admitted no written policy existed which set out the responsibilities of a chaperone.Hall did exactly what she agreed to do: supervise the students on the trip to and from Florida and chaperone them at an Orlando shopping mall.Regardless of what common sense would appear...