Hall v. Bergman

• Decision Date: 11 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. 18155.,18155.
• Citation: 296 Conn. 169,994 A.2d 666
• Parties: L. Lynne HALLv.Stanley BERGMAN et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

296 Conn. 169

994 A.2d 666

L. Lynne HALLv.Stanley BERGMAN et al.

No. 18155.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 23, 2009.

Decided May 11, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Rene Gerard Martineau, Wallingford, for the appellant (defendant Stuart Cohn).

Susan M. Phillips, for the appellee (plaintiff).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and RODRIGUEZ, Js.^*

PALMER, J.

The plaintiff, L. Lynne Hall, commenced this action against the defendant Stuart Cohn, among others,¹ alleging, inter alia, unjust enrichment, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. A jury returned a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant but awarded the plaintiff zero damages. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for additur or, in the alternative, to set aside the verdict and to order a new trial. The trial court ordered an additur of $2000, which the plaintiff rejected. The court then set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial. On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed the trial court improperly had set aside the verdict. The Appellate Court rejected the defendant's claim and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Hall v. Bergman, 106 Conn.App. 660, 681, 943 A.2d 515 (2008). We granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the trial court's order setting aside the jury verdict?” Hall v. Bergman, 287 Conn. 911, 950 A.2d 1287 (2008). We answer the question in the affirmative and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following facts and procedural history, which are not in dispute, are set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court. “The plaintiff commenced this action on December 6, 2000, against ... [the defendant, who] is the beneficiary of [the Joel Cohn Revocable Trust (trust) ].... [T]he trust was the owner of a condominium known as 16-18-20 Temple Court in New Haven (condominium), which is handicapped accessible and equipped. The [plaintiff's] second amended complaint, which is the operative complaint [sought damages against the defendant for unjust enrichment, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress].² ... The plaintiff sought damages of at least $3,708,000.

“The factual allegations of the plaintiff's complaint follow. In May, 1995, Rhoda Cohn approached the plaintiff and informed her that [the defendant], her son, and his wife were divorcing and vacating the condominium. Because the condominium had been constructed to accommodate a person with physical impairments ... Rhoda Cohn thought that the condominium would be suitable for the plaintiff, who suffered from a physical disability.... [I]n August, 1995, [the plaintiff] entered into a long-term lease agreement for the condominium with [the defendant], who was acting as agent for the trust. Approximately two years later, Rhoda Cohn, acting as trustee, decided to sell the condominium and engaged [the defendant] to approach the plaintiff with an offer to purchase the condominium.... [W]hen [the plaintiff] refused to purchase the condominium, Rhoda Cohn instituted a summary process action against her, which was dismissed. Thereafter, [the defendant] commenced a second summary process action to evict the plaintiff from the condominium. [According to the plaintiff, the defendant] threatened her, violated court orders with respect to her, sexually assaulted her, sabotaged assistive technology devices, misappropriated her personal and professional identity, and in the summer of 1999 permitted a family of a different race to live in the condominium to compel the plaintiff to purchase the premises. The plaintiff also [claimed] that the [defendant] had been unjustly enriched because [the plaintiff] had made certain improvements to the condominium....

“The jury ... initially returned two verdict forms concerning [the defendant]. One of the forms contained the following typewritten statement: ‘We, the jury, find in favor of [the] defendant ... in the above captioned case,’ but it also contained the handwritten words, ‘Count One: Unjust Enrichment.’ The second verdict form contained typewritten language with handwritten figures: ‘We, the jury, find that [the] defendant ... is liable to [the] plaintiff ... and award damages as follows: 1. Economic damages $ 0.00 2. Noneconomic damages $ 0.00 3. Total damages (1) plus (2) [$] 0.00.’ The verdict form also contained the following handwritten language:

“ ‘Count Three: Negligent Infliction of harm. (a), (d)

“ ‘Count Four: Intentional Infliction of harm (a), (d).’ ” Hall v. Bergman, supra, 106 Conn.App. at 663-66, 943 A.2d 515.

“After the jury returned [the verdict forms], the court addressed the jury: ‘Ladies and gentlemen, I've examined your verdict forms. They are not in compliance with the court's instructions, which require that ... you are to return one verdict.... It's not clear as to what exactly your verdict is, so I'm going to send you back and give you [a clean set of verdict forms]. Mister foreman, do you think-do you understand what the court is asking?’ The foreman responded in the affirmative. The court reminded the jury that its instructions were in the copy of the court's charge, which the jury had in the jury room. The court then stated: ‘So, I'll ask the jury to retire again to deliberation, and we will provide you a clean set of ... verdict forms, and you are to return only [one in the case against the defendant].’ ...

“Counsel then approached the bench for a sidebar conference. Once again, the court instructed the jury. ‘Thank you for your patience, ladies and gentlemen. Let me just add ... [that] if you have any specific question about how to fill out the verdict form, given the conclusions you've reached, you should put those in writing, and I'll try to address them as specifically as possible. I'm not saying that you have to do that, but I'm just reminding you that you may do that if you wish. So, I'll ask the jury to retire, and we'll stay in session for just a minute.’ ...

“The court then addressed counsel, stating, ‘I've discussed the procedure with counsel at the sidebar, and I think we're in agreement that what I asked the jury to do is appropriate.’ Both counsel agreed with the court's statement. Shortly thereafter, the jury returned ... a verdict in favor of the plaintiff ... but awarding the plaintiff no economic or noneconomic damages. The court accepted the [verdict] on the basis of the jury poll and excused the jury.

“Immediately after the jury was dismissed, counsel for the plaintiff stated that the [verdict was] inconsistent and that the plaintiff was entitled to nominal damages. The court agreed to permit the plaintiff to file a written motion for nominal damages. Thereafter, counsel for the plaintiff made an oral motion for a mistrial. Counsel for the [defendant] stated that there was no basis for a mistrial. The court ruled [in relevant part] as follows: ‘The request for a mistrial is denied....

“ ‘[With respect] to the fact that the jury had apparently found liability against [the defendant] but no damages, or did so in [its] ultimate verdict, that is consistent with [the] first verdict forms, which seem to suggest that that's what [the jury] wanted to do. It's also in accordance with the instructions of the court, that the parties agreed [on], that it is the plaintiff's burden to prove damages, and that means two things. One, that [the plaintiff] was in fact damaged, she suffered damages, and, two, that the damages were the proximate cause of any wrongdoing by [the defendant]. We don't know which of the two the jury concluded, but either conclusion would be a permissible basis for a finding that [the defendant] might have been liable but [that] no damages should be awarded. So, at this point, at least, I see no basis for a mistrial, and the motion is denied.’ ” Id., at 670-72, 943 A.2d 515.

“Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a written motion for an additur or, in the alternative ... [to set aside the verdict and to order] a new trial on the basis [that the] verdict [against the defendant] ... was inadequate, contrary to law and against the evidence because the jury awarded [the plaintiff] no damages. The plaintiff sought a new trial as to damages only.

“In ruling on the motion for additur, the court stated ... that ‘the jury made a legal mistake, and, therefore, some level of additur is appropriate. The jury initially returned a plaintiff's verdict form against [the defendant] that awarded zero damages and contained a note at the bottom that read, “count three: negligent infliction of harm (a), (d); count four: intentional infliction of harm (a), (d).” The jury also returned a defendant's verdict form for [the defendant] that contained a note reading, “count one: unjust enrichment.” The court sent the jury back with instructions to return only one verdict form-either plaintiff's or defendant's.... Shortly thereafter, the jury returned with the plaintiff's verdict form that awarded zero damages and made no additional notations,’ prompting the following observations from the court: ‘The court does not know the basis of the jury's ultimate verdict with certainty. Further, both sides agreed to submit the case to the jury with general verdict forms rather than with interrogatories that might have disclosed the count or counts [on] which the jury based its verdict for the plaintiff. However, from the initial verdict forms returned by the jury, it appears most likely that the jury found in the plaintiff's favor on [the] count[s] ... alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress ... and ... intentional infliction of emotional distress....

“ ‘These two torts require proof that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress-and “severe” emotional distress in the case of the intentional tort-proximately caused by [the defendant's]...