Hall v. Berryhill

• Decision Date: 18 May 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NUMBER: 16-15485 SECTION: "I"(5)
• Parties: KAREN JOHNSON HALL v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

KAREN JOHNSON HALL v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF

THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

CIVIL ACTION NUMBER: 16-15485 SECTION: "I"(5)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

May 18, 2017

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Local Rule 73.2(B), this matter comes before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment following a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") denying Plaintiff's applications for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits based upon disability. (Rec. docs. 15, 17).

Karen Johnson Hall, Plaintiff herein, filed the subject applications for Social Security benefits on November 15, 2010, with a protective filing date of November 5, 2010, alleging disability as of November 15, 2010. (Tr. pp. 392-398, 399-407, 452). In a "Disability Report-Adult" form that appears in the administrative record below, the conditions resulting in Plaintiff's inability to work were identified as pain in the left foot, chronic back pain, high blood pressure, permanent nerve damage to the right leg, rheumatoid arthritis, torn meniscus in the left knee, chronic bronchial asthma, chronic sinusitis, chronic anxiety/panic disorder, and eczema/dermatitis. (Tr. pp. 470-479). Plaintiff's applications for Social Security benefits were denied at the initial level of the Commissioner's administrative review process on April 28, 2011. (Tr. pp. 231-234, 235-238). Pursuant to Plaintiff's request, a hearing de novo before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") went forward on December 14, 2011 at which Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, and a Vocational Expert ("VE") appeared and testified. (Tr. pp. 239-241, 257, 106-155). On January 27, 2012, the ALJ issued a written decision in which she concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Tr. pp. 177-193). Plaintiff then requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council ("AC") which, on November 28, 2012, remanded the matter to the ALJ for clarification of Plaintiff's mental limitations. (Tr. pp. 194-197).

Following the remand, a second hearing was held by the ALJ with Plaintiff and a VE providing testimony. (Tr. pp. 73-105). On June 21, 2013, the ALJ issued a second written decision in which she again concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. pp. 198-222). Acting on Plaintiff's request for review, on November 5, 2014, the AC remanded the matter to the ALJ a second time to reconcile Plaintiff's residual functional capacity with the skill level of her past relevant work. (Tr. pp. 223-226). On July 1, 2015, yet a third administrative hearing was held, this time before a different ALJ. (Tr. pp. 39-72). On August 5, 2015, that ALJ issued a written decision in which she, too, concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Tr. pp. 16-37). Plaintiff once again requested review of the ALJ's decision by the AC. (Tr. pp. 14-15). After granting Plaintiff an extension of time within which to submit additional information (tr. pp. 7-13), on August 16, 2016, the AC denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision, thus making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. pp. 1-6). It is from that unfavorable decision that the Plaintiff seeks judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§405(g) and 1383(c)(3).

In her cross-motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff frames the issues for judicial review as follows:

1) The Step 2 severity determination is not supported by substantial evidence;2) The residual functional capacity finding is not supported by substantial evidence; and

3) The Step 4 determination is not supported by substantial evidence.

(Rec. doc. 15-2, pp. 4, 6, 9).

Relevant to the issues to be decided by the Court are the following findings that were made by the ALJ:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2010.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 15, 2005, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease, status-post ORIF surgery, hypertension, headaches, asthma, anxiety and other arthralgias (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except she must alternate positions every 30 minutes while remaining on task; she can perform work with only routine workplace changes. She has postural limitations whereby she can occasionally climb ramps/stairs, and stoop but should avoid kneeling. In addition, she has environmental limitations whereby she should avoid work with dangerous/hazardous machinery; and concentrated exposure to environmental irritants/loud noises.

6. The claimant is capable of performing [her] past relevant work as a receptionist. This work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant's residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from November 15, 2005, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f)).

(Tr. pp. 22, 23, 25, 29, 30).

Judicial review of the Commissioner's decision to deny DIB or SSI benefits is limited under 42 U.S.C. §405(g) to two inquiries: (1) whether substantial evidence of record supports the Commissioner's decision and (2) whether the decision comports with relevant legal standards. Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292 (5^th Cir. 1992); Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5^th Cir. 1990); Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1302 (5^th Cir. 1987). If the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive and must be affirmed. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (1971). A finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings exist to support the Commissioner's decision. Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343-44 (5^th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 616, 620 (5^th Cir. 1983). The Court may not reweigh the evidence or try the issues de novo, nor may it substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Cook v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 392 (5^th Cir. 1985). Conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve, not the courts. Patton v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 590, 592 (5^th Cir. 1983).

A claimant seeking DIB or SSI benefits bears the burden of proving that she is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5^th Cir. 1988). Disability is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which ... has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§423(d)(1)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(A). Once the claimant carries her initial burden, the Commissioner then bears the burden of establishing that the claimant is capable of performing substantial gainful activity and is, therefore, not disabled. Harrell, 862 F.2d at 475. In making this determination, the Commissioner uses the five-step sequential analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520 and 416.920, as follows:

1. An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found disabled regardless of the medical findings.

2. An individual who does not have a "severe impairment" will not be found to be disabled.

3. An individual who meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of the Regulations will be considered disabled without consideration of vocational factors.

4. If an individual is capable of performing the work that she has done in the past, a finding of "not disabled" must be made.

5. If an individual's impairment precludes her from performing her past work, other factors, including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity, must be considered to determine if other work can be performed.

On the first four steps of the analysis, the claimant bears the initial burden of proving that she is disabled and must ultimately demonstrate that she is unable to perform the work that she has done in the past. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2294n. 5 (1987). In making this determination, the ALJ is required to assess the demands of the prior work and to compare those demands to the claimant's present capabilities. Villa, 895 F.2d at 1022; Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1386 (5^th Cir. 1988); Epps v. Harris, 624 F.2d 1267, 1274 (5^th Cir. 1980). The assessment of the demands of a claimant's prior work "... may rest on descriptions of past work as actually performed or as generally performed in the national economy." Villa, 895 F.2d at 1022 (citing Jones v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 524, 527 n. 2 (5^th Cir. 1987)). "A finding that a claimant is disabled or is not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis." Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 58 (5^th Cir. 1987).

As noted earlier, Plaintiff challenges the Commissioner's decision to deny her Social Security benefits on three grounds. In the first of those, Plaintiff argues that, at step two of the §§404.152...