Hall v. Calhoun County Bd. of Sup'rs

Decision Date06 October 1964
Docket NumberNo. 28,28
Citation130 N.W.2d 414,373 Mich. 642
PartiesCharles HALL, Plaintiff and Appellee, and City of Battle Creek, Intervening Plaintiff, v. CALHOUN COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, Defendant, and City of Springfield, Intervening Defendant and Appellant.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Sullivan & Hamilton, by Robert P. Hamilton, Battle Creek, for the plaintiff and appellee, Charles Hall.

R. W. Harbert, Jr., Battle Creek, for intervening plaintiff and appellee, City of Battle Creek.

Joseph V. Wilcox, Albion (George R. Sidwell, Lansing, of counsel), for intervenor, City of Springfield.

Before the Entire Bench.

SOURIS, Justice (for affirmance).

In 1959 petitions were filed with defendant board of supervisors for the annexation to the city of Battle Creek of certain property located in the city of Springfield. An election was held on the annexation proposition and it was rejected, less than a majority of Springfield's electors having voted therefor. This result was upheld in Cavanagh v. Calhoun County Board of Canvassers, 361 Mich. 516, 105 N.W.2d 707. In 1960 petitions were filed with defendant board seeking to annex the entire city of Springfield to the city of Battle Creek. The board authorized an election on this proposition and it was approved by the requisite majorities both in Battle Creek and Springfield. However, in Groh v. City of Battle Creek, 368 Mich. 653, 118 N.W.2d 829, we set aside the results of the election because the petitions for annexation had not been signed by at least 35% of the real property taxpayers within the affected area, the petitions having been filed within two years of the 1959 annexation petitions affecting the same area. 1

In January of 1963, after the Groh decision, petitions for the annexation of Springfield to Battle Creek were again circulated and filed with the board of supervisors. These petitions were signed by the requisite number or qualified electors. Nonetheless, in February, 1963 the board of supervisors rejected a resolution to place the annexation proposition on the ballot in the April, 1963 election, whereupon plaintiff Hall, one of the petitioners, filed a complaint in the Calhoun county circuit court seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the board of supervisors to place the proposition on the ballot. On the basis of the undisputed facts just recited, in July of 1963 the court entered its judgment and writ of mandamus in favor of plaintiff requiring the board of supervisors to submit the issue of annexation to a vote of the people pursuant to statutory requirements. The city of Springfield, intervening defendant, has appealed.

Appellant first argues that the board of supervisors could not consider the 1963 petitions because they were in 'conflict' with the petitions affecting the same area filed with the board in 1960, citing § 8a of P.A.1909, No. 279 (as amended), 2 which provides that if a petition has been filed pursuant to § 8 of the act and a subsequent petition is filed affecting the same territory in whole or part, the subsequent petition shall not be submitted to the electors while in conflict with the prior. Here, however, the 1960 petitions were not filed in conformance with the requirements of § 8. In Groh v. City of Battle Creek, 368 Mich. 653, 118 N.W.2d 829, we voided the election held on the 1960 petitions for that very reason. This being so, § 8a does not prohibit a vote on the 1963 petitions, for as we noted in Godwin Heights Public Schools, Kent County v. Board of Supervisors of Kent County, 363 Mich. 337, 342-343, 109 N.W.2d 771, 775, 'the inhibition of section 8a applies to instances in which the previous petitions have been filed pursuant to Section 8.'

Appellant next contends that P.A.1909, No. 279, does not authorize one city to annex another. Section 6 of that act provides:

'Cities may be incorporated or territory detached therefrom or added thereto, or consolidation made of 2 or more cities or villages into 1 city, or of a city and 1 or more villages into 1 city, or of 1 or more cities or villages together with additional territory not included within any incorporated city or village into 1 city, by proceedings originating by petition therefor signed by qualified electors * * *.' 3

Appellant argues that, because § 6 makes no mention of one city annexing another in its entirety, such a procedure is not authorized. Even in isolation however, the language of § 6 is broad enough to permit one city to annex another, for it provides that territory may be added to a city, and nothing in § 6 compels the conclusion urged by appellants that this added territory cannot be the entire area of another city. 4

But we need not view § 6 in isolation, for other sections of the act make specific reference to the annexation of one city by another. Thus, § 13 contains a proviso that:

'* * * when an incorporated city or village is annexed to and incorporated with a city, such annexed territory shall constitute 1 or more separate wards of the city to which it is annexed and have representation in the legislative body of such city to which it is annexed: Provided, The territory so annexed shall have a population equivalent to the approximate population of 1 or more wards of the city to which it is annexed * * *.' 5

Likewise, § 14, dealing with succession to municipal property and liabilities, notes that:

'* * * Whenever a city, village or township is annexed to a city, the city to which it is annexed shall succeed to the ownership of all the property of the city, village or township annexed, and shall assume all of its debts and liabilities. * * *. 6

Since Act 279 makes specific references to the annexation of one city by another, and since such an annexation would not be inconsistent with the operative provisions of § 6, we reject appellant's argument that under the terms of Act 279 it is impossible for one city to annex another.

Appellant also argues that, in any event, it would not be possible to provide in Act 279 for the annexation of one city by another because this would amount to a disincorporation of the annexed city, and the title of Act 279 has reference to the incorporation only of cities. 7 Appellant cites Article V, § 21, of the 1908 Constitution 8 and reasons that if the object of the act as stated in the title is to provide for the incorporation only of cities, no proceedings may be taken under it which would result in the disincorporation of a city. We have said that the act's title is broad enough to encompass annexation, Village of Kingsford v. Cudlip, 258 Mich. 144, 151-152, 241 N.W. 893, and this being so we are not prepared to say that it is not broad enough to encompass annexation of a city. We are committed to a liberal interpretation of the constitutional provision concerning titles of legislative enactments:

'In People [ex rel. Attorney General] v. Bradley, 36 Mich. 447, the question as to the sufficiency of the title to an act was discussed. It was said:

"If the word used by the Legislature can in any of its various uses or meanings be considered appropriate or applicable, then we cannot say that they did not have a right to use it in that sense, even although we might be of opinion that a better and more appropriate one might have been chosen, and one that people generally would have better understood.'

'In Bissell v. Heath, 98 Mich. 472, 477, 57 N.W. 585, 586, the following from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (6th Ed.) p. 175, was quoted approvingly:

"There has been a general disposition to construe the constitutional provision liberally, rather than to embarrass legislation by a construction whose strictness is unnecessary to the accomplishment of the beneficial purposes for which it has been adopted.'

'In 25 R.C.L. many pages (beginning at page 834) are devoted to the subject of titles to legislative acts. 'The mischief sought to be remedied by the requirement' is discussed along the same line of...

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  • Midland Tp. v. Michigan State Boundary Commission, s. 1-6
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    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • October 24, 1977
    ...to sustain the provisions for change of boundaries. The necessity Village of Kingsford was followed in Hall v. Calhoun County Board of Supervisors, 373 Mich. 642, 130 N.W.2d 414 (1964), approving annexation pursuant to the procedures of the Home Rule Cities Act of one city by another agains......
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    ...v. Hertz Driveurself Stations, supra; Knott v. City of Flint (1961), 363 Mich. 483, 109 N.W.2d 908; Hall v. Calhoun County Board of Supervisors (1964), 373 Mich. 642, 130 N.W.2d 414; Continental Motors Corp. v. Muskegon Township (1965), 376 Mich. 170, 135 N.W.2d 908, and cases cited therein......
  • Mooahesh v. Department of Treasury
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    • August 17, 1992
    ...24). Further, every legislative act is presumed constitutional as against constitutional challenges. Hall v. Calhoun Co. Bd. of Supervisors, 373 Mich. 642, 649, 130 N.W.2d 414 (1964). Moreover, every reasonable presumption is indulged in support of an act's constitutionality. Builders Squar......
  • Midland Tp. v. Michigan State Boundary Commission
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    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • October 13, 1975
    ...the HRCA governing annexation. Village of Kingsford v. Cudlip, 258 Mich. 144, 241 N.W. 893 (1932), and Hall v. Calhoun County Bd. of Supervisors, 373 Mich. 642, 130 N.W.2d 414 (1964). The question instead is whether the HRCA title is sufficiently broad to include the object of changing and ......
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