Hall v. Centro Cardiovascular De P.R. Y Del Caribe
Decision Date | 19 September 2012 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 11–1636 (DRD). |
Citation | 899 F.Supp.2d 106 |
Parties | William HALL, et. al., Plaintiffs v. CENTRO CARDIOVASCULAR DE PUERTO RICO Y DEL CARIBE, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Luis G. Martinez–Llorens, Luis N. Saldana–Roman, Pedro Quinones–Suarez, Saldana, Carvajal & Velez–Rive, PSC, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.
Jose A. Gonzalez–Villamil, Gonzalez Villamil Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
OPINION ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiffs field a complaint under the Court's diversity jurisdiction, 1 alleging medical malpractice against Dr. José Martínez–Toro and his conjugal partnership (“Martínez–Toro”) and various other defendants.2 Plaintiffs' complaint alleges the violation of Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, and requests indemnification of the physical and moral damages suffered as a result of the death of Mrs. Sonia Salamán–Canales on July 10, 2010.
Pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Martínez–Toro with its corresponding statement of undisputed material facts and supporting memorandum of law (Docket No. 15). Also pending before the Court is an unopposed Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) issued by Magistrate Judge Bruce J. McGiverin, granting Martínez–Toro's motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 41). Upon review of the R & R, the Court hereby adopts the R & R in toto and GRANTS Martínez–Toro's motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 15), DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs' claims against Martínez–Toro.
The Court may refer dispositive motions to a United States Magistrate Judge for a R & R pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). See alsoFed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); D.P.R. Civ. R. 72(a); and Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 96 S.Ct. 549, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). Nonetheless, an adversely affected party may contest the Magistrate Judge's R & R by filing its objections to the recommendations made. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). In such respect, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), in pertinent part, provides that
any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.
“Absent objection, ... [a] district court ha[s] a right to assume that [the affected party] agree[s] to the magistrate's recommendation.” Templeman v. Chris Craft Corp., 770 F.2d 245, 247 (1st Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021, 106 S.Ct. 571, 88 L.Ed.2d 556 (1985). Additionally, “failure to raise objections to the R & R waives that party's right to review in the district court and those claims not preserved by such objections are precluded upon appeal.” Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 30–31 (1st Cir.1992); see also Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee, 36 F.3d 143, 150–51 (1st Cir.1994) ( ); Lewry v. Town of Standish, 984 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir.1993) ( ); Borden v. Sec. of H.H.S., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.1987) ( ).
The Court, in order to accept unopposed portions of the Magistrate Judge's R & R, needs only satisfy itself that there is no “plain error” on the face of the record. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto, Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1419 (5th Cir.1996) ( en banc ) ( ); see also Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir.1982) ( en banc ) ( ); Nogueras–Cartagena v. United States, 172 F.Supp.2d 296, 305 (D.P.R.2001) ( ); Garcia v. I.N.S., 733 F.Supp. 1554, 1555 (M.D.Pa.1990) ( ).
An adversely affected party may “contest the [m]agistrate [j]udge's report and recommendation by filing objections ‘within ten 3 days of being served’ with a copy of the order.” United States v. Mercado Pagan, 286 F.Supp.2d 231, 233 (D.P.R.2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)). If objections are timely filed, the district judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendation to which an objection is made. See Bonefont–Igaravidez v. International Shipping Corp., 659 F.3d 120 (1st Cir.2011); and Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir.2006).
In the instant case, no objections to the Magistrate Judge's R & R have been filed. As previously explained, this Court has only to be certain that there is no “plain error” as to the Magistrate Judge's conclusions in order to adopt the same. After a careful analysis, the Court finds no “plain error” and agrees with the Magistrate Judge's conclusions.
A motion for summary judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which entitles a party to judgment if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A dispute is ‘genuine’ if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving party.” See Prescott v. Higgins, 538 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir.2008) (citing Thompson v. Coca–Cola Co., 522 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir.2008)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Calero–Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004) ( ). In order for a disputed fact to be considered “material” it must have the potential “to affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660–661 (2000) (citing Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 247–248, 106 S.Ct. 2505);Prescott, 538 F.3d at 40 (citing Maymí v. P.R. Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir.2008)).
The principle of the summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997) ( ). The moving party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue as to any outcome-determinative fact on the record. Shalala, 124 F.3d at 306. Upon a showing by the moving party of an absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that a trier of fact could reasonably find in his favor. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). The non-movant may not defeat a “properly focused motion for summary judgment by relying upon mere allegations,” but rather through definite and competent evidence. Maldonado–Denis v. Castillo–Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994). The non-movant's burden thus encompasses a showing of “at least one fact issue which is both ‘genuine’ and ‘material.’ ” Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.1990); see also Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l, 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.2000) ( ). As a result, the mere existence of “some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not affect an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 247–248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Similarly, “summary judgment may be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Medina–Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must examine the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor in order to conclude whether or not there is sufficient evidence in favor of the non-movant for a jury to return a verdict in its favor. Rochester Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 287 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir.2002). The Court must review the record as a whole and refrain from engaging in an assessment of credibility or weigh the evidence presented. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). The burden placed upon the non-movant is one of production rather than persuasion. In other words, in weighing a non-movant's opposition to summary judgment the Court should not engage in jury-like functions related to the determination of credibility.
“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250–251, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Summary judgment is inappropriate where there are issues of motive and intent as related to material facts. Se...
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