Hall v. Chattin

• Citation: 106 P. 1132,17 Idaho 664
• Parties: JOHN J. HALL, Appellant, v. R. P. CHATTIN et al., Respondents
• Decision Date: 03 February 1910
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

106 P. 1132

17 Idaho 664

JOHN J. HALL, Appellant, v. R. P. CHATTIN et al., Respondents

Supreme Court of Idaho

February 3, 1910

QUALIFICATIONS OF JURORS-CHALLENGE TO JUROR-RELATION OF DEBTOR-BUSINESS RELATION.

1. The word "debtor," as employed in subd. 3, sec. 4380 Rev. Codes, in prescribing the qualifications of jurors means one who is liable on a contract, either express or implied, or by operation of law to respond to another in money, service, goods or chattels, either in the present or at some future date.

2. Facts of this case examined and considered, and held that under the evidence the jurors did not stand in the relation of debtors to the defendant within the meaning of subd. 3 sec. 4380, Rev. Codes.

3. Under the provisions of subd. 3, sec. 4380, Rev. Codes disqualifying a person from acting as a juror in a case where the juror is "united in business with either party" to the action, a person who has an agreement with one of the parties to the action whereby one is sinking an artesian well and the other is contingently liable for a part payment of the expense thereof upon failure to procure water, and has signed and executed a promissory note or contract to that effect, the juror and the party litigant are "united in business" within the meaning of the above statute.

4. The word "business" as used in this statute is employed in a general sense, and must therefore have been intended to refer generally to the commercial, industrial and professional enterprises and engagements into which men jointly enter, whether for a brief or considerable length of time. The facts of this case examined, and held that two of the jurors were "united in business" with one of the parties defendant within the meaning of the statute.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, for the County of Elmore. Hon. Edward A. Walters, Judge.

Action by the plaintiff for damages and to procure an injunction. Judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. Reversed.

Reversed and remanded, with direction. Costs awarded to appellant.

W. C. Howie, for Appellant.

The words "standing in the relation of debtor or creditor," when used as a disqualification of jurors, imply liability. (Melvin v. State, 121 Cal. 16, 53 P. 416; Fowles v. Treadwell, 24 Me. 377, 381; Cook v. Bartholomew, 60 Conn. 24, 22 A. 444, 13 L. R. A. 452; Dodson v. Taylor, 53 N.J.L. 200, 21 A. 293.)

Webster's definition is: "That which is due from one person to another, whether money, goods or services; that which one person is bound to pay to another or perform for his benefit; thing owed; obligation; liability."

Taking this definition in the light of the statutes and the object thereof, the relation of debtor and creditor existed between these parties.

L. B. Green, for Respondents.

The fulfillment of the conditions precedent goes to the existence of the debt. (1 Daniel on Neg. Inst., p. 87.)

Even had the holder of the escrow delivered the notes, there would have been no liability (except perhaps in hands of bona fide purchaser), until the conditions (the completion of the well which must be dry), had been fulfilled. (Provident Life etc. Co. v. Mercer Co., 170 U.S. 593, 18 S.Ct. 788, 42 L. ed. 1156; Long Island etc. Co. v. Columbus etc. Ry. Co., 65 F. 455.)

AILSHIE, J. Sullivan, C. J., and Stewart, J., concur.

OPINION

AILSHIE, J.

This is an appeal from the judgment and order denying a motion for a new trial. The only question presented is the action of the court in denying and overruling challenges made by the plaintiff to two jurors. The jurors, Meserole and Hronek, were challenged by counsel for the plaintiff as follows: "I challenge the juror for the reason of implied bias that his answers show that he is associated with the defendant, Chattin, in a joint enterprise--associated with him in business, and for the reason that his answers show the relation of debtor and creditor exists, that he is indebted to the defendant Chattin." The answers of the jurors on their voir dire examination show that the two jurors and one Johnson and the defendant Chattin owned desert lands in the same locality, and apparently the lands were all in one body. They had entered into an agreement whereby the jurors, Meserole and Hronek, had executed their promissory notes in favor of the defendant Chattin, each in a sum equal to $ 2 per acre for each acre of land owned by the party executing the note, and placed the same in escrow in a bank. This was accompanied with an escrow agreement to the effect that Chattin should sink an artesian well and that if he should strike water before reaching a given number of feet the notes should thereupon be returned to the makers, but that if he failed to strike water before reaching the specified number of feet then and thereupon the notes should be delivered to Chattin.

The juror, Meserole, stated the situation as follows: "I put up a note in escrow, if I put up the money it is in escrow at the bank on this condition, if the well went a certain number of feet without water, we are to forfeit this note or this money, and if they strike water Mr. Chattin pays for the water in the well and pays for the digging of it." The juror, Hronek, stated the condition as follows: "They are sinking the well, Chattin and Johnson, and we are putting up $ 2 per acre in escrow in the bank by note, that if the well gets a certain depth without striking water we pay it; where if they strike the water before getting that depth, Chattin and Johnson take the well without any expense to us. If they fail to get water inside of a certain depth, we pay them so much to know that there is not artesian water at that depth."

The...