Hall v. City of Newport

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Justice ROBINSON, for the Court.
• Citation: Hall v. City of Newport, 138 A.3d 814 (R.I. 2016)
• Decision Date: 02 June 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2015–259–Appeal.,2015–259–Appeal.
• Parties: Joseph HALL et al. v. CITY OF NEWPORT et al.

138 A.3d 814

Joseph HALL et al.

v.CITY OF NEWPORT et al.

No. 2015–259–Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 2, 2016.

Sol Cohen, Pro Hac Vice, Gordon P. Cleary, Esq., Providence, for Plaintiffs.

Lori C. Silveira, Esq., Kenneth M. Sambour, Esq., Marc Desisto, Esq., Providence, for Defendants.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice ROBINSON, for the Court.

The plaintiffs, Joseph Hall, his wife, Marilyn Hall, and their children, Jacob and Philomena Hall (the Halls), appeal from the April 16, 2015 entry of partial final judgment (entered pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure) in favor of the defendant, Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA),¹ in Newport County Superior Court. The partial final judgment was entered as a result of the Superior Court's granting of the defendant's motion for summary judgment. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After a close review of the record and careful consideration of the parties' arguments (both written and oral), we are satisfied that cause has not been shown and that this appeal may be decided at this time.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Travel

According to plaintiffs' first amended complaint, in March of 2003, Leon Budlong, a bus driver in RIPTA's employ, claimed that he was assaulted while on his Ruggles Avenue bus route. Over a year after the assault, Mr. Budlong identified Mr. Hall as his attacker for the first time. Mr. Hall was ultimately acquitted by a jury in the Newport County Superior Court after appealing thereto for a de novo trial following his conviction in District Court. According to the first amended complaint in the instant case, Mr. Budlong's bus route went by the Halls' home on Ruggles Avenue in Newport “some thirty-two * * * times each day.” Mr. Budlong was assigned to that bus route during all times pertinent to this case. The plaintiffs alleged, in their first amended complaint, that Mr. Budlong “embarked on a pattern of harassment of the Halls” in 2004, after identifying Mr. Hall as his alleged attacker.

The plaintiffs' attorney sent two letters to RIPTA informing them of the alleged harassment by Mr. Budlong—one letter being dated September 22, 2005 and the second letter being dated November 14, 2005. In his first letter, the Halls' attorney stated the following:

“One of your trolley drivers, Leon Budlong has engaged in a long series of harassing actions against my clients. My clients have had to resort to the Superior Court to obtain a restraining order against Mr. Budlong, which remains in effect.^[2]

“After an extended absence, Mr. Budlong returned to the route which includes Ruggles Avenue on September 1, 2005 and his harassment of the Halls has escalated.

“This all culminated on Saturday, September 17, 2005 when Mr. Budlong drove his trolley bus up to the Halls' residence, stopped, and took a picture of Mrs. Hall in her yard.

“The Halls have had it with Mr. Budlong and demand that you remove him from this route to prevent any further harassment of them by Mr. Budlong, which would have serious implications for RIPTA.”

After no response was received, Mrs. Hall herself then sent a letter to RIPTA (the third written communication to that entity) on November 28, 2005. In that letter she stated that she was “in fear” for her children, herself, and her husband. She added that Mr. Budlong had “devastated our family by his aggravated, out-of-control harassments.” RIPTA's response came on December 9, 2005. It stated that RIPTA had investigated the matter, and then it provided as follows:

“You have indicated that you would like RIPTA to change Mr. Budlong's route. Please be advised that routes are assigned to drivers pursuant to a detailed process set forth in the collective bargaining agreement between RIPTA and the Amalgamated Transit Union.

“Again, it appears from what we have learned of this matter that this is a private dispute. Furthermore, while you state in your letter that you are in fear for yourself, your husband, and your children, RIPTA considers this to be a police matter, and if at any time you fear for your safety or that of your family, I urge you to contact the police.

“Finally, if you have specific complaints about what Mr. Budlong may be doing while he is driving for RIPTA, I urge you to write to us again.”

On May 23, 2007, plaintiffs filed the instant action in the Superior Court as a result of Mr. Budlong's alleged harassment of them. (The complaint contained other counts addressing the alleged actions and/or inactions of other defendants.) In plaintiffs' first amended complaint, they included one count against RIPTA, alleging a “[f]ailure to [p]roperly [c]ontrol [d]efendant Budlong.” The first amended complaint specifically stated that RIPTA had “received complaints from the Halls about the conduct of their employee, [d]efendant Leon Budlong, explaining his conduct and repeatedly requesting that he be removed from his route” and that RIPTA had “failed to take appropriate action in preventing, discouraging or reprimanding [d]efendant Budlong.” The first amended complaint further alleged that RIPTA's failure to control and supervise constituted negligence because RIPTA had a duty to prevent Mr. Budlong from harassing the Halls; the Halls further alleged that RIPTA breached that duty, which breach was the proximate cause of the Halls' injuries.

Summary Judgment

On October 24, 2014, RIPTA filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the Halls failed to show that Mr. Budlong was an “incompetent or unfit bus driver” and failed to offer any evidence showing that any negligence on the part of RIPTA proximately caused physical injury or any compensable injury to the Halls. The plaintiffs objected in writing to RIPTA's motion for summary judgment, alleging that there were numerous issues of material fact in the case.

Attached to plaintiffs' objection to RIPTA's motion for summary judgment were affidavits from each plaintiff. In his affidavit, Joseph Hall stated that Mr. Budlong: (1) drove by him and rang the trolley bell at him; (2) ripped down reward posters that the Halls had put up in an attempt to find the person who had committed the attack on Mr. Budlong of which Mr. Hall was accused; (3) had his wife call Mrs. Hall on the telephone pretending to be a witness to Mr. Hall's purported attack on Mr. Budlong; (4) harassed Mr. Hall and his family since “May 23, 2004;” (5) stopped in front of the Halls' home; (6) “c[a]me at [them] with [their] children in [their] vehicles to scare them;” (7) “cut off” the Halls' vehicle and then “stalked” them; (8) tried to “run [Mr. Hall] and [his wife] off East Main Road;” (9) blocked the Halls' driveway with his vehicle; (10) drove a RIPTA bus “straight at” the Halls' daughter as she drove behind Rogers High School, forcing her “up onto the sidewalk” and then laughing at her; (11) drove by the Halls' residence and gave them “intimidating stares;” (12) “swerved at” Mr. Hall's truck with his trolley; (13) drove a RIPTA vehicle right through “a stop sign on Ruggles Ave. onto Bellevue Ave.” at the Halls in their truck; and (14) stopped his RIPTA bus by the Halls, who were walking to church, making “masturbation motions” at them. Mrs. Hall's affidavit provided more detail and set forth even more incidents of harassment than had her husband's affidavit. However, the incidents Mrs. Hall referenced are similar in nature to those described by her husband. Mrs. Hall did allege in her affidavit that Mr. Budlong intentionally inflicted emotional distress on her and her family members, causing them to “lose sleep.” Additionally, the affidavits of Philomena and Jacob Hall set forth allegations of similar incidents of harassment by Mr. Budlong.

On April 6, 2015, a hearing was held on RIPTA's motion for summary judgment. Numerous exhibits were entered into the record; those exhibits included the two letters to RIPTA from the Halls' attorney, the letter from Mrs. Hall to RIPTA, and the written response by RIPTA, as well as the affidavits from the four plaintiffs. At that hearing, the hearing justice granted RIPTA's motion for summary judgment. Partial final judgment was entered on April 16, 2015 pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs then filed a timely notice of appeal.

IIStandard of Review

As we have repeatedly stated, this Court reviews the grant of summary judgement in a de novo manner. Shine v. Moreau, 119 A.3d 1, 7 (R.I.2015) ; see DeMarco v. Travelers Insurance Co., 26 A.3d 585, 605 (R.I.2011) ; Tanner v. Town Council of East Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784, 791 (R.I.2005). It is our practice to “review the pleadings, affidavits, admissions, answers to interrogatories, and other appropriate evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Vierra, 619 A.2d 436, 437 (R.I.1993). After that review, if we conclude “that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be decided and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment.” Peerless Insurance Co. v. Luppe, 118 A.3d 500, 505 (R.I.2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Shine, 119 A.3d at 8. We remain mindful of the fact that “[s]ummary judgment is an extreme remedy that should be applied cautiously.” Ferris Avenue Realty, LLC v. Huhtamaki, Inc., 110 A.3d 267, 279 (R.I.2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

It is the party opposing summary judgment that “bears the burden of proving, by competent evidence, the existence of facts in dispute.” Jessup & Conroy, P.C. v. Seguin, 46 A.3d 835, 838 (R.I.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Higgins v. Rhode Island Hospital, 35 A.3d 919, 922 (R.I.2012). That party must,...