Hall v. Coconino Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors

• Decision Date: 22 December 2020
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 20-0111,1 CA-CV 20-0111
• Parties: TERYL HALL, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. COCONINO COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, et al., Defendants/Appellees.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

TERYL HALL, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. COCONINO COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 20-0111

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

December 22, 2020

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County

No. S0300CV201900379

The Honorable Mark R. Moran, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Weinberger Law, Scottsdale

By Brian A. Weinberger

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Coconino County Attorney's Office, Flagstaff

By Aaron M. Lumpkin

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Maurice Portley¹ joined.

CAMPBELL, Judge:

¶1 Teryl Hall appeals from the superior court's judgment dismissing her complaint against the Coconino County Board of Supervisors and the other defendants. Because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Hall's claim for judicial review and Hall failed to state a cognizable claim for declaratory relief, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Hall lives in Happy Jack, Arizona. After another resident applied for a conditional use permit to construct and maintain a private cemetery in Happy Jack, several members of the community attended public meetings and wrote letters to the Coconino County Planning and Zoning Commission ("the Commission") to voice their concerns and opposition to the permit. After reviewing its staff report and hearing the concerns of the residents about the proposed project, the Commission approved the request.

¶3 Hall appealed the Commission's decision to the Coconino County Board of Supervisors ("the Board"). The Board rejected Hall's challenge—a final decision under the county's zoning ordinance.

¶4 Thereafter, Hall filed a complaint against the applicant and the Board in the superior court. After the court dismissed that action for lack of jurisdiction, Hall filed the underlying complaint against the applicant, the Commission, and the Board. Specifically, Hall sought: (1) judicial review of the Board's decision to issue the conditional use permit, contending the Board improperly interpreted the governing zoning ordinance, Coconino County Zoning Ordinance ("Ordinance") § 5.3, and violated her due process rights (Count One); and (2) a declaratory judgmentthat: (i) the Board erroneously interpreted both Ordinance § 5.3 and a related statute governing private cemeteries, A.R.S. § 32-219;² (ii) the application for the conditional use permit failed to conform to Ordinance § 5.3's requirements, and (iii) the Commission and Board violated her due process rights (Count Two).

¶5 The Board and other defendants moved to dismiss the complaint arguing the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under both jurisdictional bases cited in the complaint—the Administrative Review Act ("the ARA"), A.R.S. §§ 12-901 to -914, and A.R.S. § 11-815(G). See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The Board also contended that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In response, Hall asserted that the court had jurisdiction under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act ("the UDJA"), A.R.S. §§ 12-1831 to -1846, as well as the other bases cited in the complaint.

¶6 After the parties fully briefed the matter, the superior court granted the Board's motion to dismiss the complaint. The court's ruling was reduced to a final judgment and Hall timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under the ARA - Count One

¶7 Hall challenges the superior court's determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider her request for judicial review. "Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine a controversy." Grosvenor Holdings, L.C. v. Figueroa, 222 Ariz. 588, 594, ¶ 13 (App. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). Whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Buehler v. Retzer ex rel. Indus. Comm'n, 227 Ariz. 520, 521, ¶ 4 (App. 2011).

¶8 We likewise review de novo issues of statutory interpretation. Id. "When interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to find and give effect to legislative intent." Secure Ventures, LLC v. Gerlach, 249 Ariz. 97, 99, ¶ 5 (App. 2020). Because a statute's plain language is "the best indicator of legislative intent," we give unambiguous words their ordinary meaning and interpret "different sections of a single statute consistently." Id. "Acardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous." Id. (quotation omitted).

¶9 "The superior court's jurisdiction pursuant to the ARA exists only by force of statute and is limited by the terms of the statute." Grosvenor Holdings, 222 Ariz. at 595, ¶ 13 (internal quotation omitted). In other words, "[j]udicial review of an administrative decision is not a matter of right except in those situations in which the law authorizes review." Rose v. Ariz. Dep't of Corrs., 167 Ariz. 116, 118 (App. 1991).

¶10 Under the ARA, a party may obtain judicial review of "a final decision of an administrative agency," A.R.S. § 12-902(A)(1), or a "decision at an administrative hearing as otherwise provided by statute," A.R.S. § 12-902(A)(2). For purposes of the ARA, "administrative agency" excludes "any political subdivision" and "any agency of a political subdivision." A.R.S. § 12-901(1); see also Grosvenor Holdings, 222 Ariz. at 595, ¶ 16 (explaining a county board of supervisors is a political body, not an administrative agency, under the ARA). As such, A.R.S. § 12-902(A)(1) does not afford Hall a path to relief. In contrast, A.R.S. § 12-902(A)(2) allows a party to seek judicial review of an administrative decision by a political subdivision, but "only when there is some special statute expressly making the review procedures of the [ARA] applicable." Coombs v. Maricopa Cnty. Special Health Care Dist., 241 Ariz. 320, 321-22, ¶ 7 (App. 2016) (internal quotation omitted).

¶11 Hall argues judicial review of the Board's decision to issue a conditional use permit is "otherwise provided by" A.R.S. § 11-815(G). As noted by the superior court, A.R.S. § 11-815 authorizes counties to enforce and punish zoning violations. Although Hall contends that the statute "addresses the issuance of permits," it refers only to "building permits" and establishes that "it is unlawful to erect, construct, reconstruct, alter or use any building or other structure within a zoning district . . . without first obtaining a building permit from the inspector." A.R.S. § 11-815(A), (B). The remainder of the statute sets forth the apparatus for counties' enforcement authority: Subsection (D) authorizes counties to establish civil penalties for zoning violations; Subsection (E) permits counties to appoint hearing officers "to hear and determine zoning violations"; Subsection (F) provides for zoning inspectors to present evidence "showing the existence of" zoning violations; and Subsection (G) authorizes county boards of supervisors to review hearing officers' rulings regarding zoning violations. Of particular import to this case, Subsection (G) also provides for "[j]udicial review of the final decisions of the board of supervisors."

¶12 While Subsection (A) states that county zoning ordinances shall be enforced "by means of withholding building permits," A.R.S. § 11-815 makes no mention of conditional use permits. More importantly, Subsection (G), read in context, clearly provides for only limited judicial review of a board of supervisors' final decision concerning the punishment for a zoning violation. Because the statute's limited judicial review provision does not encompass a board of supervisors' decision to approve or deny a conditional use permit, it does not authorize judicial review under the ARA here. See Pima County v. State Dep't of Revenue, 114 Ariz. 275, 279 (1977) ("Clearly, § 12-902 was not intended and cannot be read to confer the right of appeal from an agency's decisions on one who has not been included among those given the right of review in the particular statutes that make such review of the agency's decisions available."). Had the legislature "intended to create a right to judicial review" of a board of supervisors' decision concerning conditional use permits, "we presume it would have done so." Coombs, 241 Ariz. at 322, ¶ 9. Therefore, the ARA provides no jurisdictional basis for Hall's complaint and the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Count One.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Statement of a Cognizable Claim Under the UDJA—Count Two

¶13 Hall challenges the superior court's finding that her claim for declaratory relief failed to: (1) provide a valid basis for jurisdiction, and (2) state a claim upon which relief could be granted. As an initial matter, Hall contends that the Board waived any jurisdictional challenge predicated on the UDJA by failing to raise such a claim in its motion to dismiss. But Hall did not cite the UDJA as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction until her response to the motion to dismiss, so there is no merit to her suggestion that the superior court improperly relied on the Board's "waived" jurisdictional argument. In any event, the superior court has an independent duty to confirm its jurisdiction. See Kim v. Mansoori, 214 Ariz. 457, 459, ¶ 5 (App. 2007).

¶14 As noted, supra ¶ 7, we review de novo whether a court had subject matter jurisdiction over a claim for declaratory relief. Buehler, 227 Ariz. at 521, ¶ 4. We likewise review de novo whether a complaint stated a cognizable claim for declaratory relief. Mayer Unified Sch. Dist. v. Winkleman, 220 Ariz. 378, 390, ¶ 35 (App. 2008) (vacated on other grounds by Mayer Unified Sch. Dist. v. Winkleman, 219 Ariz. 562 (2009)). "Dismissals for failure...