Hall v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 06 November 2018
• Docket Number: Record No. 1751-17-3
• Citation: 69 Va.App. 437,819 S.E.2d 877
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals
• Parties: Tina Lasha HALL, a/k/a Tina Lasha Waller v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia

69 Va.App. 437

819 S.E.2d 877

Tina Lasha HALL, a/k/a Tina Lasha Waller

v.COMMONWEALTH of Virginia

Record No. 1751-17-3

Court of Appeals of Virginia, Salem.

NOVEMBER 6, 2018

Matthew L. Pack (M. Pack Law, PLLC, on brief), Lynchburg, for appellant.

Brittany A. Dunn-Pirio, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: Chief Judge Huff, Judges Beales and Decker

OPINION BY JUDGE RANDOLPH A. BEALES

Following the execution of a search warrant, Tina Lasha Hall, a/k/a Tina Lasha Waller ("appellant") was indicted for four felonies, including possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of a firearm while possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute. Appellant moved to sever the charge for possession of a firearm by a felon from the other charges in the indictment. After she prevailed on a motion to strike at the first trial on the other charges, she moved to dismiss the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, arguing that it violated the principle of collateral estoppel and double jeopardy. The trial court denied appellant’s motion, and she was ultimately convicted. On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss based on "collateral estoppel pursuant to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment"¹ and in finding the evidence sufficient to find her guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

I. BACKGROUND

Relevant Procedural History

On February 16, 2016, appellant was indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, third or subsequent offense; possession of marijuana with intent to distribute; possession of a firearm while possessing cocaine with intent to distribute; and possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. On May 5, 2016, appellant moved to sever the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon from the other charges, and the trial court granted the motion. On January 18, 2017, appellant was tried for the other charges.² At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, the trial court granted appellant’s motion to strike the charges.

On January 23, 2017, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon based on collateral estoppel and double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and proceeded to trial. At a bench trial on August 10, 2017, the trial court found appellant guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. She was sentenced to four years of incarceration with two years suspended and 18 months of supervised probation.

Evidence Presented at Appellant’s Trial for Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon

On the morning of October 30, 2015, at approximately 8:30 a.m., police officers from the Pittsylvania County Sheriff’s Office executed a search warrant on the residence of Ronnie Stone at 1105 Cody Road in Pittsylvania County.

Earlier that morning, approximately an hour before the search warrant was executed, Investigator Robert Worsham with the Pittsylvania County Sheriff’s Office conducted surveillance of the address. From his location in the woods, he witnessed one person—appellant—leave the residence and get into a vehicle. Approximately one week prior to the execution of the search warrant, another officer, Corporal James Davis, knocked on the door of the residence. Appellant answered and, when Corporal Davis inquired about possibly purchasing a vehicle outside of the residence, appellant told him that he would have to wait for Stone to return home.

During the execution of the search warrant on October 30th, in one of the bedrooms of the residence, the officers located an AK-47 between the bed and the nightstand. They found live ammunition in the firearm and another ammunition magazine in the drawer of the nightstand. Appellant’s and Stone’s young child was lying in that bed when the police arrived.

On a dresser in the bedroom, the officers located a tin decorated with sunflowers. The child’s insurance card was found on top of the tin and five one-hundred-dollar bills were found inside. The officers found a bottle of medicine bearing the child’s name on the dresser. They also located two prescription bottles from CVS prescribed to appellant in that same bedroom.

Underneath the bed, the officers found an empty box for a firearm.³ They also located two pieces of mail addressed to appellant. The address on one of the pieces of mail was on Thompson Store Road in Vernon Hill, Virginia. In a shoe box under the bed, the officers found certificates of title for four vehicles—each naming appellant as the vehicle’s owner. The address listed for appellant on the certificates was on Marysville Road in Altavista, Virginia.

The police seized fifteen vehicles at the residence. In one of the vehicles at the residence, a Honda Odyssey, the police found a repair bill for the vehicle bearing appellant’s name. Appellant’s address on the bill was listed as 1105 Cody Road—the address of the residence being searched. Lieutenant Gerald Ford ran a Q-VIN⁴ for appellant and found that she had several vehicles registered in her name. For every vehicle listed on the report, appellant’s address was also listed as 1105 Cody Road. At appellant’s trial, the Commonwealth introduced the answer appellant submitted in a forfeiture proceeding on the seized vehicles. In that document, appellant claimed ownership of seven of the vehicles seized at the residence.

After the warrant was executed, the police directed Stone to call appellant, and Investigator Colbert asked her to return to the residence. When she arrived, she was interviewed by Major Nicholson. Major Nicholson testified that he asked appellant about the firearm and that she told him Stone’s father had given the gun to Stone for his protection approximately two months earlier. Major Nicholson also testified that appellant admitted to him that she was a convicted felon. A copy of appellant’s prior convictions was entered into evidence without objection.

After the Commonwealth rested, appellant’s cousin, Keisha Waller, testified that appellant lived with appellant’s mother at the Thompson Store Road address and that she had never seen appellant with a firearm.

Appellant testified in her own defense. She claimed that she was at Stone’s residence at about 6:00 a.m. that morning to drop off their child. She did not deny "using that address" but claimed that she did not reside there. She testified that Stone’s father had bought a gun about two months prior, but she denied saying anything to Major Nicholson about Stone’s father giving it to Stone. She also denied knowing that there was a firearm in the residence. Appellant testified that the mail and other documents belonging to her were probably in the residence as a result of her "just like randomly leaving, leaving things there ...." She further testified that she did not know how the certificates of title to her vehicles got under the bed at Stone’s residence, and she denied that she was taking the medication found in the bedroom at that time.

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found appellant guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Collateral Estoppel

Although appellant moved to have the charges against her severed, appellant contends that her conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon violates the collateral estoppel principle encompassed in the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against double jeopardy. Specifically, she argues that because she prevailed on her motion to strike on the charge of possession of a firearm while possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute at the first trial, the issue of whether she possessed the firearm had already been litigated, and collateral estoppel principles should have precluded the Commonwealth from proceeding with the trial on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

"Whether there has been a double jeopardy violation presents a question of law requiring a de novo review." Fullwood v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 531, 539, 689 S.E.2d 742, 747 (2010). The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. "This guarantee recognizes the vast power of the sovereign, the ordeal of a criminal trial, and the injustice our criminal justice system would invite if prosecutors could treat trials as dress rehearsals until they secure the convictions they seek." Currier v. Virginia, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 2144, 2149, 201 L.Ed.2d 650 (2018). However, "the Clause was not written or originally understood to pose ‘an insuperable obstacle to the administration of justice’ in cases where ‘there is no semblance of [these] type[s] of oppressive practices.’ " Id. (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688-89, 69 S.Ct. 834, 837, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949) ). Collateral estoppel "is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1195, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). "It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Id. at 443, 90 S.Ct. at 1194. "Collateral estoppel, as applied in criminal proceedings, becomes applicable only when the defendant’s prior acquittal necessarily resolved a factual issue that the Commonwealth seeks to litigate again in a subsequent proceeding." Commonwealth v. Leonard, 294 Va. 233, 239, 805 S.E.2d 245, 249 (2017).

In Currier, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 2144, the United States Supreme Court was presented with an issue virtually identical to the one in the case at bar. In that case, in order to prevent the introduction of evidence of his prior convictions, defendant Michael Currier and the Commonwealth agreed that the trial court should sever the charges of burglary and larceny from his...