Hall v. Craig

• Decision Date: 29 October 1890
• Docket Number: 14,337
• Citation: 25 N.E. 538,125 Ind. 523
• Parties: Hall et al. v. Craig et al
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

25 N.E. 538

125 Ind. 523

Hall et al. v. Craig et al

No. 14,337

Supreme Court of Indiana

October 29, 1890

From the Clark Circuit Court.

Judgment affirmed.

A Dowling, for appellants.

C. L Jewett and H. E. Jewett, for appellees.

OPINION

Elliott, J.

John Craig claimed to be the owner of a lot in the city of Jeffersonville, and that Addison Barrett was in possession of it as his tenant. The tenant, as the complaint alleges, having failed to pay the rent for one year, Craig alleging himself to be the landlord, sued for it. Barrett filed an affidavit stating that Robert W. Nock and Jane L. Hall claimed to be entitled to the rent, and offered to pay the amount due into court. Jane L. Hall and Robert W. Nock appeared and objected to the order substituting them as defendants, but the court overruled their objection, and they were made defendants and ruled to answer.

Our code provides for the filing of interpleaders in actions "upon a contract, or for specific real or personal property." Section 273, R. S. 1881. We can perceive no reason why this case is not within the statute, for the action was upon a contract, namely, the lease, and it was for specific real property.

As the defendants brought in by the affidavit voluntarily appeared they can not successfully assail the ruling of the court upon the ground that they were not brought in by a summons.

The defendants named were not made parties to the original complaint, nor brought into court by the plaintiff, and it was not necessary for the plaintiff to name them in his complaint. The issue which the complaint tendered was whether Barrett was liable to the plaintiff for the rent claimed, and when the claimants, Jane L. Hall and Robert W. Nock, asserted that they, and not the plaintiff, were entitled to the money, they tendered an issue new and different from that tendered by the complaint, and the only issue for trial was the one thus tendered; for, after Barrett interpleaded, there no longer remained an issue as to his liability for the rent, and the only question for trial was who should receive the money paid into court.

If, however, it be conceded that the trial court did err in ordering the defendants named to answer, the plaintiff can not be made to suffer for that error, conceding it to be one, since he did not ask that these defendants should intervene. He did not procure any ruling upon the intervening petition, and if there was error the appellants can not make him the sufferer. But we have no doubt, as already indicated, that there was no error prejudicial to the appellants. Had they not come in it is quite clear that Craig would have been entitled, upon the facts alleged in the complaint, to recover the rent that Barrett had covenanted to pay, so that if any one had reason to complain it was Craig.

The appellant Jane L. Hall filed a first paragraph of cross-complaint, in which she pleaded these facts: She owns in fee, and long has owned, the real estate in controversy, and is in possession of it. John Craig wrongfully claims an interest in the property and demands from her tenant, Addison Barrett, the rent due from him as such tenant. Craig answered the cross-complaint, and in his answer alleges that Jane L. Hall was for a long time prior to the 14th day of February, 1881, the owner of the property involved in the controversy; that taxes amounting to a large sum were due upon it and delinquent; that on the day named the treasurer sold the property to Josiah Locke for $ 222.30, and the auditor executed to him a certificate; that on the 16th day of March, 1883, Locke presented his certificate and the auditor executed a deed to him for the property; that on the 9th day of October, 1883, Locke began an action against Jane L. Hall and Addison Barrett, in the Clark Circuit Court, to obtain possession of the property and to quiet the title to it; that an issue was formed on the complaint of Locke by an answer of general denial; that the cause was tried upon the issue joined and the court adjudged that the deed to Locke did not vest title in him, and also adjudged and decreed that there was due to Locke for taxes paid by him $ 727.27, and that this sum was the first lien upon the property; that a certified copy of the decree was issued to the sheriff who sold the property to John Craig for $ 1,000, and executed to him a deed of conveyance.

The answer to the first paragraph of the cross-complaint is good. The decree establishing the lien and directing a sale was an adjudication of the validity of the lien and of the right of Locke to have the property sold to pay his lien. These questions were conclusively settled, for there was jurisdiction of the subject and of the parties, so that the only question that can arise is whether the sale made upon the decree was effectual to convey title. Upon the facts pleaded there can be no doubt as to the validity and efficacy of the sale. The presumption is that the sheriff did his duty, and made the sale according to law. Coan v. Elliott, 101 Ind. 275. The answer under mention shows a valid decree, a sale to a third person, and the execution of a deed, and this is prima facie sufficient to sustain Craig's title.

In an additional paragraph of the cross-complaint Jane L. Hall alleges substantially the same facts respecting the decree and sale as those set forth in the answer we have summarized, but assails the validity of the sale by the following allegations: "The defendant says the sale was wrongful and invalid for the reason that the said premises were not appraised, and although they were reasonably worth at the time of the sale $ 6,000 they were sold for the sum of $ 1,000 only. And the defendant says that immediately upon said sale and the payment of said bid the sheriff executed a deed in fee simple for said premises notwithstanding the defendant was allowed by law one year to redeem the real estate from the sale. And the defendant says that within one year after said sale, to wit, on the 1st day of September, 1883, she filed with the clerk of the Clark Circuit Court her statement showing her interest in the real estate, and paid to the clerk for the purpose of redeeming the property $ 1,080, being the amount of the bid, with eight per cent. interest, but John Craig refused and yet refuses to accept the same."

There was no...