Hall v. Delphi-Deer Creek Township School Corp.

Decision Date30 March 1934
Docket Number14,941
Citation189 N.E. 527,98 Ind.App. 409
PartiesHALL v. DELPHI-DEER CREEK TOWNSHIP SCHOOL CORPORATION ET AL
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

From Carroll Circuit Court; Benton A. Devol, Special Judge.

Action by Doris Garner Hall against Delphi-Deer Creek School Township and others for breach of a teaching contract. From a judgment for defendants on demurrer to plaintiff's complaint, plaintiff appealed.

Reversed.

Smith & Smith, Joseph T. Ives, and Gus A. Hall, for appellant.

John H Cartwright, James P. Wason, and Benjamin A. Carr, for appellees.

OPINION

SMITH, J.

Appellant brought this action against appellee, School Corporation of Delphi-Deer Creek Township, Carroll county, Indiana, to recover damages for the breach of a contract of employment to teach in the public schools of appellee in the city of Delphi, Carroll county, Indiana.

The complaint is in three paragraphs, to each of which appellee filed a separate demurrer, which demurrers were sustained; and, upon appellant's refusal to plead further, judgment was rendered against her in accordance with the statute.

A motion by appellee to strike out parts of the third paragraph of the complaint was sustained. The rulings upon the several demurrers and this motion are each assigned as errors for reversal.

From the conclusion we have reached in this case, it will be necessary to consider only the second paragraph of complaint and the sustaining of the demurrer thereto.

For an understanding of the questions presented, we will set out in substance the second paragraph of complaint, which alleges that on the 5th day of May, 1930, appellant was duly licensed to teach school in the state of Indiana; that, on said date, the then trustees of appellee made, entered into, and filed upon its records in its office in the city of Delphi, the following order:

"Motion was made and carried that the teachers as listed on attached list be employed at the salaries indicated and the Superintendent is instructed to contract with all those willing to contract at the salary indicated.

Signed:

L. M. Pletcher, Pres.,

Theodore H. Baum, Treasurer,

Carl C. McFarland, Sec.,"

that in the list attached to said order appellant, being then unmarried, was listed as follows: "Doris Garner, $ 175.00 per month, approved by Board 1930-1931;" that L. M. Pletcher, Theodore H. Baum, and Carl C. McFarland were then trustees of appellee, and constituted the school board of the city of Delphi and Deer Creek Township, Carroll county, Indiana; that the officers of the school board were as above named; that C. T. Amick was the superintendent of said school; that, upon the 24th day of May, 1930, the superintendent, under and by direction of said order, prepared and tendered to appellant a contract in writing which appellant accepted, a copy of which is made a part of the complaint; that the superintendent returned said contract to the files of appellee in its office in the city of Delphi, and accepted the same; that appellant entered upon her duties as teacher in the school of appellee under and by virtue of the terms of said written contract signed by her, and the written order of the appellee employing her to teach in said schools; that appellant taught in the appellee's school from the beginning of the school term in the fall of 1930 until September 5, 1930, when she was wrongfully and unlawfully discharged by appellee, and was thereafter prevented by appellee from carrying out her part of the contract; that during the entire school year, appellee refused to permit appellant to perform her duties under said contract, all without fault on her part; that, after appellee breached said contract, the appellant offered to perform the duties incumbent upon her by said contract and order of appellee, and notified appellee that she was ready, able, and willing to carry out her part of said contract and order; that, after her dismissal by appellee, appellant attempted to secure employment as a teacher elsewhere, but was unable to do so; and was damaged in the sum of $ 2,500 by reason of the breach of appellee, and prays judgment for said sum.

The contract referred to as a part of the complaint was signed by appellant, and provides for her employment to teach in the public schools of appellee for the school term commencing in September, 1930, for the school year of nine months, for the sum of $ 1,575 to be paid in nine equal installments during the school year at the rate of $ 175 per month; and then follow other formal parts of the contract, which are not necessary to set out herein.

The question to be determined in this case is, Do the written order, heretofore set out, which was signed by the members of the school board, and the contract signed by appellant together constitute such a contract as contemplated by the statutes that an action for damages may be maintained against appellee for its breach?

To determine this question it will be necessary to notice the statutes providing for the making of contracts by school trustees with teachers. In 1899, the Legislature passed a statute consisting of two sections; the first (2 Burns Ann. St., 1926, § 6965, 1899 Acts, p. 173), reads as follows:

"All contracts hereafter made by and between teachers and school corporations of the state of Indiana shall be in writing, signed by the parties to be charged thereby, and no action shall be brought upon any contract not made in conformity with the provisions of this act."

The later act concerning teachers' contracts was passed by the Legislature in 1921 (2 Burns Ann. St. 1926, § 6967, 1921 Acts, p. 195), and reads as follows:

"All contracts hereafter made by and between teachers and school corporations shall be in writing; shall state the date of the beginning of the school term, the number of months in the school term, the total amount of the salary to be paid during the school year, and the number of payments that shall be made during the school year: Provided that, in this act, a month shall mean not more than twenty school days."

There are two other sections to this act of 1921, but neither has anything to do with the determination of this appeal; one concerns the payment of teachers during the closing of the schools, and the other gives the school corporation power to regulate the payment of teachers who may be absent on account of sickness, or otherwise.

Appellant and appellee both discuss the question at great length as to whether section (1) of the act of 1921 repealed section (1) of the act of 1899. We hold that, under the well-known rules of construction of statutes in this state, section (1) of the act of 1899 was not repealed by section 1 of the act of 1921. There is no provision in the act of 1921 specifically repealing section (1) of the act of 1899, so if section (1) of the act of 1899 is repealed by section (1) of the 1921 act, it must be by implication. "Repeals by implication are not favored." Straus Brothers Company et al. v. Fisher et al. (1928), 200 Ind. 307, 315, 163 N.E. 225, and cases there cited. Both of these acts relate to school teachers' contracts, but there is no repugnancy therein; moreover, both acts can be construed together, and in harmony with each other. The act of 1921 in section (1) enumerates certain terms of the contract to be embodied therein. True, it states that such "contracts shall be in writing" and does not add the phrase from the act of 1899 "signed by the parties to be charged thereby." There is no declared purpose in the act of 1921 to repeal the act of 1899, supra. Our Supreme Court, in the case of Straus Bros. Co. v. Fisher, supra, on page 315, said:

"And, in the absence of any declared purpose that one statute shall repeal another relating to the same subject matter, they will be given such a construction, if that be reasonably possible, that both may be given effect. Kramer v. Beebe (1917), 186 Ind. 349, 355, 115 N.E. 83. In the construction of statutes, specific provisions will prevail over general provisions with relation to the same subject matter. And it is a rule of statutory construction that a general statute, without negative words, does not repeal the particular provisions of a former statute on a special subject to which the general language of the later act, if it stood alone, might be deemed to apply, unless the two statutes are irreconcilably inconsistent. Walter v. State (1886), 105 Ind. 589, 592, 5 N.E. 735; Kingan & Co. v. Ossam (1921), 190 Ind. 554, 557, 131 N.E. 81; Monical v. Heise (1911), 49 Ind.App. 302, 305, 94 N.E. 232."

Under these statutes such contract for employment of school teachers must be in writing and signed by the parties to be charged thereby; to do this, however, it is not necessary that the signatures of the parties shall all be upon one paper. This contract may consist of different papers executed by the parties, and will constitute a contract in writing within the statute. The written order of the board of trustees of appellee has specified the name of the teacher the amount of salary to be paid, and the year for which she was...

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