Hall v. Hall

• Decision Date: 08 March 1917
• Citation: 100 A. 441,91 Conn. 514
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: HALL v. HALL et al.

100 A. 441

91 Conn. 514

HALL

v. HALL et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 8, 1917.

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Joseph P. Tuttle, Judge.

Action by Judson S, Hall against John Hall and others. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Action for damages for wrongfully depriving the plaintiff of his prospective inheritance, and for false imprisonment, brought to and tried before the superior court in New Haven county, which sustained a demurrer to the complaint, and upon the plaintiff's refusal to plead over entered judgment for the defendant. The complaint is in two counts, and the substance of it, as stated on the appellant's brief, is that the defendants by fraud and conspiracy acquired for themselves and deprived the plaintiff of one-fourth of his father's property which he would otherwise have inherited, and by fraud and conspiracy procured the false imprisonment of the plaintiff. In particular it is alleged that the plaintiff and the defendants were the only children of Seth J. Hall, deceased; that on or about January 1, 1909, the defendants, who are the two brothers and the sister of the plaintiff, entered into a conspiracy to deprive and defraud the plaintiff of any share in the estate of their father who was then alive; that in pursuance of this conspiracy the defendants made false representations to the father as to the plaintiff's sanity, and by that and other means fraudulently obtained from the father, who was then physically and mentally feeble, certain transfers of property and releases of mortgages; and that on May 25, 1909, when the father was incapable of making a will, they obtained from him by undue influence and duress a pretended will, giving to them all of his estate, of the value of more than $500,000, except the life use of $25,000 to the plaintiff. It is further alleged that the father died May 27, 1909, and that in pursuance of the foregoing conspiracy the defendants presented the will for probate on June 1, 1909. and that it was admitted to probate on June 10, 1909; that the defendants on June 1, 1909, procured the arrest of the plaintiff and his confinement in the Connecticut Hospital for the Insane until he escaped in April, 1910, and in the following September again procured his arrest and confinement until he escaped for a second time in April, 1912; that in June, 1909, they procured the appointment of the Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Company as conservator of the person and property of the plaintiff, and by false and fraudulent representations prevented the conservator from opposing the probate of the will or taking an appeal therefrom. The first count then alleges that by reason of the conspiracy and acts done in pursuance thereof the defendants deprived the plaintiff of a one-fourth interest in the father's estate of the value of more than $250,000. The second count recites by reference most of the above allegations, and lays the foundation for a claim for damages for false imprisonment. The only relief demanded is money damages.

Section A of the defendants' demurrer is addressed to the first count in so far as the same purports to set forth a cause of action for depriving the plaintiff of a right to one-fourth or any interest in the property transferred to the defendants during the father's lifetime, on the grounds: (1) That it was the absolute property of Seth J. Hall; (2) that the transfer if invalid could only be set aside after Mr. Hall's death, by his executor. Section B of the demurrer is addressed to the first count in so far as it purports to set forth a cause of action for depriving the plaintiff of a right to a legacy or devise under the will of Seth J. Hall (1) on the ground that the property was the absolute property of Seth J. Hall, and (2) because the will has been duly probated and its validity cannot be questioned elsewhere than in the court of probate for the district of Meriden or by appeal therefrom. The second count was demurred to to the same extent and upon the same grounds.

These demurrers were sustained, and although they left the second count of the complaint untouched so far as the cause of action for false imprisonment was concerned, the record shows that judgment was entered for the defendants because, as stated in the judgment file, the plaintiff failed to plead over. Nevertheless the plaintiff has not appealed on that ground, and the only reason of appeal presented by the record is that the court erred in sustaining the defendants' demurrer.

Tracy Waller, of New London, and Robert K. Waller, of New York City, for appellant George D. Watrous, of New Haven, and Hugh M. Alcorn, of Hartford, for appellees.

BEACH, J. (after stating the facts as above). Section B of the demurrer is defective in form. It relates on its face to an alleged cause of action "for depriving the plaintiff of a right to a legacy or devise under the will of Seth J. Hall." Literally speaking, no such cause of action is attempted to be stated in the complaint, which admits that the plaintiff has received the benefit of his legacy under the will, to wit, the life use of $25,000.

The parties in the trial court and in this court have treated this branch of the demurrer as if it related to the cause of action for depriving the plaintiff of his inheritance by fraudulently procuring the execution of a pretended will, and fraudulently preventing him and his conservator from opposing the probate of the will, and from appealing from the decree admitting it to probate. The trial court so treated the demurrer in its memorandum of decision, and the plaintiff's counsel refused to plead over on the theory that by such decision his principal cause of action had been wiped out of the complaint for reasons which made it impossible to reinstate it by amendment. Under these circumstances we adopt that construction of the demurrer which has been practically agreed on by the parties in interest.

As to the cause of action founded on the alleged fraudulent procurement of transfers of property and releases of mortgages in the lifetime of the father, the defendants' demurrer seems to be well taken. The complaint alleges that at the time of these transfers the grantor was physically and mentally feeble and unable to properly manage his affairs, but there is no sufficient allegation that he was then incapable of making an intelligent transfer of property. That being so, Mr. Hall had a legal right to do as he pleased with his property, and as the plaintiff had no legal interest therein, he suffered no legal wrong by the transfers. It is well settled that the only persons who can maintain an action to set aside transfers of property on the ground of fraud, other than the grantor, or, after his death, his personal representatives, are those to whom the grantor owed a debt or duty which will be avoided or violated if the transfer is permitted to stand. Thus in Ullrich v. Ullrich, 68 Conn. 580, 37 Atl. 393, it was held that a wife had no standing in court to set aside a voluntary transfer of property made by her husband to his brother after she had threatened to sue for divorce and alimony and to attach her husband's property; and in Harris v. Spencer, 71 Conn. 233, 236, 41 Atl. 773, it is said that a husband married before 1877, and therefore entitled to an interest in his wife's property after her death, has no legal...