Hall v. Hall
| Decision Date | 21 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 20190169,20190169 |
| Citation | 950 N.W.2d 168 |
| Parties | Robert M. HALL, Plaintiff and Appellant v. ESTATE OF John F. HALL and all unknown heirs, devisees, successors, and creditors of Myles Franklin Hall, Myles F. Hall, a/k/a Myles Hall, deceased, and all other persons unknown claiming any estate or interest in, or lien or encumbrance upon, the property described in the Complaint, Defendants and Deborah E. Hall, Leslie Hall, a/k/a Leslie Hall Butzer, Defendants and Appellees |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Zachary E. Pelham (argued), and Benjamin W. Keup (appeared), Bismarck, ND, for plaintiff and appellant.
William C. Black, Bismarck, ND, for defendants and appellees.
[¶1] Robert Hall appeals from a judgment entered in favor of the defendants Estate of John Hall; Deborah Hall; and Leslie Hall, aka Leslie Hall Butzer; (Hall defendants) in this action to quiet title to a non-participating royalty interest (NPRI) in certain real property. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in vacating a default judgment against John Hall. However, because res judicata does not bar Robert Hall's claims, we conclude the court erred in granting summary judgment to the Hall defendants. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
[¶2] In 2018, Robert Hall commenced this quiet title action against the Hall defendants, seeking to quiet title to a 1.04% NPRI in certain real property. He alleges the Hall defendants claim an ownership interest in the property that is adverse to him. Robert Hall and the Hall defendants are the heirs of Myles Hall. Robert Hall alleges he purchased the NPRI at issue from his father, Myles Hall, in 1988.
[¶3] Myles Hall was the assignee in a 1953 assignment of oil and gas royalty, which conveyed the NPRI at issue in this case. Robert Hall asserts that he purchased the NPRI from his father for $100 in cash in 1988, and that a notation and signature with a date at the bottom of the 1953 assignment of royalty was written by his father on the original assignment of royalty document. Myles Hall died in February 1992 in Minnesota. Probate proceedings were commenced in Minnesota, and Robert Hall was co-personal representative of the Estate. No probate proceedings were commenced in North Dakota.
[¶4] Although Myles Hall died in 1992, record title to the NPRI apparently remained in Myles Hall's name. Robert Hall, as the personal representative in a Minnesota probate of his father's estate, successfully defended a 2011 quiet title action against the Estate of Myles Hall that the surface owners of the real property brought under North Dakota's abandoned mineral statutes, N.D.C.C. ch. 38-18.1 (). The surface owners sought to claim their ownership of the purported abandoned mineral interests under the statutes. Robert Hall did not personally intervene or raise any issue in the 2011 quiet title action about his alleged 1988 purchase of the NPRI from Myles Hall. Robert Hall asserts the 2011 quiet title action resulted in the NPRI being "restored" in his father's name, as it had been previously held.
[¶5] The district court's 2015 judgment in the 2011 quiet title action addressing the Estate of Myles Hall's interest states, in relevant part:
Pursuant to said Order [granting the Estate of Myles Hall's motion for summary judgment], which is incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby ... ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant Estate of Myles Hall is the owner of a 1.04% non-participating royalty interest in [the subject real property].
[¶6] In 2018, Robert Hall brought this quiet title action against the Hall defendants seeking the 1.04% NPRI be quieted in his name. In May 2018, defendant Leslie Hall, aka Leslie Hall Butzer, filed an answer and counterclaim. Robert Hall moved for a partial default judgment against defendants Deborah Hall and John Hall. In July 2018, Deborah Hall filed an answer and counterclaim, and the district court subsequently denied the motion for default judgment as to her. In August 2018, the court granted the motion for default judgment against John Hall, and a judgment was entered against him.
[¶7] In November 2018, defendants Leslie Hall and Deborah Hall moved for summary judgment, arguing that collateral estoppel and res judicata barred Robert Hall's claims. Robert Hall opposed the motion and moved for summary judgment on defendants’ outstanding counterclaims. The district court granted Leslie Hall and Deborah Hall's summary judgment motion, denied Robert Hall's subsequent motion for reconsideration, and granted Robert Hall's summary judgment motion to dismiss the defendants’ counterclaims seeking attorney fees. In May 2019, Robert Hall appealed.
[¶8] John Hall died in July 2019, while this appeal was pending. The personal representative of the Estate of John Hall moved the district court to vacate the August 2018 default judgment against John Hall and also moved this Court for a temporary remand to decide the motion. In October 2019, the court on remand granted the motion to vacate. In November 2019, the court also entered an order adopting the parties’ stipulation for substitution of parties, substituting the Estate of John F. Hall for John F. Hall as a defendant. After the parties stipulated to a final judgment to include all of the Hall defendants, Robert Hall filed an amended notice of appeal to include the order to vacate.
[¶9] Robert Hall contends the district court abused its discretion in vacating the default judgment against John Hall.
[¶10] In Bickler v. Happy House Movers, L.L.P. , 2018 ND 177, ¶ 12, 915 N.W.2d 690 (quoting Key Energy Servs., LLC v. Ewing Constr. Co., Inc. , 2018 ND 121, ¶ 13, 911 N.W.2d 319 ), we explained:
On appeal, to establish a basis for relief under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) from a district court's denial of a motion for relief from a default judgment, a party must show the district court abused its discretion.... An abuse of discretion by the [district] court is never assumed and must be affirmatively established, and this Court will not overturn a court's decision merely because it is not the one it would have made had it been deciding the motion.
[¶11] "[T]here should generally be greater liberty in granting motions under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) when the matter involves a default judgment rather than a judgment following a full trial on the merits." Bickler , at ¶ 12 (quoting Key Energy Servs. , at ¶ 13 ); see also Overboe v. Brodshaug , 2008 ND 112, ¶ 8, 751 N.W.2d 177 ; Gepner v. Fujicolor Processing, Inc. , 2001 ND 207, ¶ 14, 637 N.W.2d 681. In Gepner , at ¶ 14 (internal citations and quotations omitted), this Court discussed relevant considerations to guide the district court's discretion:
This court has long encouraged trial courts to be more lenient when entertaining Rule 60(b) motions to vacate default judgments as distinguished from "litigated" judgments, that is, judgments entered after trial on the merits. While a trial court certainly has discretion to grant or deny a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate a default judgment, the range of that discretion is limited by three important considerations. First, Rule 60(b) is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed and applied. Second, decisions on the merits are preferable to those by default. Third, as a consequence of the first two considerations, where timely relief is sought from a default judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so that cases may be decided on their merits.
A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably, or when it misinterprets or misapplies the law. Warnke v. Warnke , 2011 ND 212, ¶ 4, 806 N.W.2d 606.
[¶12] Robert Hall argues that the Estate of John Hall's motion to vacate and accompanying brief and affidavits provided no evidence the district court could rely on to reach a reasoned and reasonable decision. He contends the Estate failed to overcome the rebuttable presumption that service was proper, as evidenced by the affidavit of non-service. He also asserts that as an in rem action, personal service was not absolutely necessary and service by publication was sufficient. He further contends this was not an exceptional circumstance warranting the decision to vacate and the court's decision is contrary to law.
[¶13] The Estate of John Hall responds, however, that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding the motion to vacate was timely filed and in determining justice requires a decision on the merits. The Estate asserts the motion was made within one year of the default judgment and the court had already established the codefendants had meritorious defenses, as they had been granted summary judgment. The Estate further contends Robert Hall is not prejudiced by having the default judgment vacated.
[¶14] Here, the district court granted the motion to vacate the default judgment against John Hall. In so doing, the court stated: "The motion to vacate was timely filed and justice requires a decision based upon the merits." While somewhat conclusory, the court explained its decision, which does not appear arbitrary or capricious when considering the prior summary judgment proceedings. We have said that a court should be more lenient in considering Rule 60(b) motions to vacate default judgments as distinguished from "litigated" judgments and that we prefer decisions on the merits. Moreover, in this case the court had already determined the other similarly situated codefendants, as heirs of Myles Hall, had established meritorious defenses.
[¶15] On the basis of our review, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in vacating the default judgment against John Hall.
[¶16] Robert Hall argues the district court erred in granting the defendants’ summary judgment motion because his...
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