Hall v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co.

• Decision Date: 19 July 1947
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 801-804.
• Parties: HALL et al. v. HAWAIIAN PINEAPPLE CO., Limited. SAME v. CALIFORNIA PACKING CORPORATION. SAME v. MOORE, Circuit Judge (two cases).
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

72 F. Supp. 533

HALL et al. v. HAWAIIAN PINEAPPLE CO., Limited.

SAME v. CALIFORNIA PACKING CORPORATION.

SAME v. MOORE, Circuit Judge (two cases).

Civ. Nos. 801-804.

District Court, Hawaii.

July 19, 1947.

Harriet Bouslog and Myer C. Symonds, both of Honolulu, Hawaii, and Herbert Resner (of Gladstein, Anderson, Resner & Sawyer), of San Francisco, Cal., for petitioners.

Anderson, Wrenn & Jenks, of Honolulu, Hawaii, for respondent Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Ltd.

Vitousek, Pratt & Winn, of Honolulu, T. H., for respondent California Packing Corporation.

Rhoda V. Lewis, Acting Atty. Gen., Territory of Hawaii, and Michiro Watanabe, Deputy Atty. Gen., Territory of Hawaii, for respondent Moore.

McLAUGHLIN, District Judge.

These cases grow out of a situation developed as a result of a strike in the Hawaiian pineapple industry. They are based upon the Civil Rights Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 43, and consequently 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (14) gives this Court jurisdiction.

They are unpopular cases not alone because they involve picketing, present serious and somewhat novel questions of federal labor and constitutional law, but also because restraining orders issued in two of the cases indirectly resulted in what seemed to be a conflict between this Court and a Territorial court.

Soon after the strike began on July 11, the Hawaiian Pineapple Company and the California Packing Corporation applied on July 12 to Judge Moore of the Territorial First Circuit Court for injunctive relief in equity with regard to certain aspects of picketing. The Circuit Court issued a very broad restraining order ex parte and an order to show cause, returnable July 16 at 1:30 o'clock p.m.

On July 14 petitioners filed two of the four suits here involved against the two named corporations, and upon an ex parte showing of deprivation of constitutional rights this Court issued a restraining order against the corporations restraining them from taking further action in the Territorial suits and an order to show cause returnable at 9 a.m. July 16.

Apparently in view of a remark passed by this Court in granting the above restraining order that it was of doubtful value in relation to the objective sought, on July 15 petitioners filed two more suits of like nature asking identical relief against Judge Moore directly.

The Court declined to restrain Judge Moore but did issue a show cause order returnable at the same time as the others in the related cases.

At no time has this Court interfered either with the First Circuit Court's power to punish for criminal contempt, or with the law enforcement agencies of either the Territory or the City and County.

This fact is mentioned for in the increasingly tense situation which existed before the strike was ended July 15 at midnight, publicity given to the legal phase of the situation was faintly reminiscent of another commonly misunderstood legal situation in the days of military government in Hawaii.

So let it be distinctly understood that this is no battle of injunctions or restraining orders by courts of different jurisdictions. The issues presented are serious and complicated legal issues—issues that cannot be brushed aside in accordance with one's likes and dislikes—as has been attested by the fact that argument here has taken many hours on the part of several attorneys, including the Acting Territorial Attorney General. If the power exists, and it is made to appear that anyone under color of law, including a judge, is depriving persons of their constitutional rights without an adequate remedy, a federal court has a peculiar duty to examine the allegations and to act if need be, irrespective of the unpopularity of the issue or of individual feelings. Constitutional rights of persons as contrasted with property rights occupy a preferred position, and as the Supreme Court has said "the right to exercise the liberties safeguarded by the First Amendment `lies at the foundation of free government by free men.'" Marsh v. State of Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509, 66 S.Ct. 276, 280, 90 L.Ed. 265.

This Court has no intention or desire to usurp the powers of the Supreme Court of either the Territory or of the United States and to sit in judgment upon the acts of a Territorial circuit court. But, despite this fact, as has been pointed out, where it is made to appear that it may be this Court's special duty under the Civil Rights Act to examine alleged infringements of constitutional rights, that duty will not be neglected.

Perhaps a situation such as this could develop only in a place such as Hawaii. At least it has to my knowledge never come about in like circumstances in any one of the states. The closest similar case arising in a state that presently comes to mind is reflected in Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423, and possibly Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324.

In any event, because Hawaii is not a state and thus has no independent sovereignty which must be respected as in the case of a state and because this is not a "court of the United States"—not a constitutional federal court—there is room for substantial doubt as to whether or not 28 U.S.C.A. § 379 applies despite 48 U.S.C.A. § 645, which says that in general the relations governing state and federal courts shall govern the relations between this and the territorial courts. So many times within the Judicial Code Hawaii and this Court are neither fish nor fowl that it is hard to be sure of the answer until the Supreme Court has spoken. Witness the confusion on a similar point now pending before three judges in the so-called Chinese Language School case, involving 28 U.S.C.A. § 380.

The comity statute, defining a long standing policy declared by Congress that "to prevent needless friction between state and federal courts" no writ of injunction shall be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any state court, for all practical purposes, should apply in this jurisdiction. The spirit of the law is and will be observed regardless of the legal technicalities involved.

But assuming that it does, as held in Alesna v. Rice, D.C., 69 F.Supp. 897, it is well settled that this "hands off" statute is not jurisdictional and has exceptions, few though they be. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 62 S.Ct. 139, 86 L.Ed. 100, 137 A.L.R. 967. Where there is basic equity jurisdiction, plus exceptional circumstances showing a danger of irreparable injury both great and immediate, a federal court may enjoin, despite the comity statute, even a criminal proceeding in a state court. See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, supra, and cases cited in Alesna v. Rice, supra.

Here I believe we have a case sounding within the exceptions to the statute. An equitable basis exists, and it is apparent that the danger of irreparable injury is great and immediate in that a right to picket peacefully does not exist once a strike is settled. It is of value during labor disputes and if the content of the right be drained away, curtailed unlawfully, and left but an empty shell irreparable damage has been most certainly suffered.

So it is that upon these petitions the Court has taken temporary jurisdiction to ascertain whether or not it should render the relief prayed for.

To a considerable extent the cases have become moot. The strike, as noted, is over and all picketing has ceased. However, as there may hereafter be criminal contempt proceedings for violations of Judge Moore's restraining order, it appears advisable to examine the issues presented.

In any event, the argument in response to the Court's inquiry as to whether or not even this aspect of the case is not also moot is that Judge Moore may cite plaintiffs for contempt of his restraining order, and as it is claimed to be void as violative of plaintiffs' federal and constitutional rights, plaintiffs stand in jeopardy and should be relieved from the threat of unlawful criminal proceedings.

Four causes of action are alleged. It is alleged that the Circuit Court's action is unlawful and deprives plaintiffs of their federal and constitutional rights because:

1. The Circuit Court ignored the Norris-LaGuardia Act which is claimed to be applicable to the Territorial courts as courts of the United States defined by that Act. 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq.

2. In any event it is claimed the Norris-LaGuardia Act gives this Court exclusive jurisdiction to issue in compliance with it injunctions in labor disputes in Hawaii, therefore the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction.

3. The right to picket peaceably is an exercise of the right of free speech, and the Circuit Court's restraining order deprives plaintiffs of this right by unduly restraining it so as to make it practically nonexistent.

4. So also of plaintiffs' right to peaceable assembly.

Points 1 and 2 are held to be unsound and without merit in accordance with Alesna v. Rice, D.C., 69 F.Supp. 897, which on the merits unfortunately is not yet at issue and upon the preliminaries was not as fully argued on points 3 and 4 as has been this case.

It is now of course well settled by Supreme Court decisions, starting with Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093, that the rights to picket peaceably and to peaceably assemble are rights guaranteed by the Constitution. And the Hutcheson case (United States v. Hutcheson), 312 U.S. 219, 61 S.Ct. 463, 85 L.Ed. 788, seems to stand for the proposition that the rights of labor enumerated in Section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 52, and Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 104, have been federalized as substantive rights.

These federal rights are binding upon the Territory to the same extent that they are binding upon the states. Both must shape their statutes and specific injunctions in equity with due respect for them. A superficial regard for them will not suffice.

Additi...