Hall v. Hilderbrand
| Decision Date | 23 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 18-cv-00434-KMT |
| Parties | VICKI HALL, Plaintiff, v. DONNA HILDERBRAND, DONNA HILDERBRAND, INC., and REMAX PROPERTIES, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
ORDER
Before the court is the "Motion to Dismiss under 12(b)(6) of Donna Hilderbrand and Donna Hilderbrand, Inc.," filed by Defendants Donna Hilderbrand and Donna Hilderbrand, Inc. [collectively, "the Hilderbrand Defendants"], as well as Plaintiff's "Motion for Leave to Amend and Supplement Complaint." (["Defendants' Motion"], Doc. No. 52; ["Plaintiff's Motion"], Doc. No. 64.) Plaintiff has responded in opposition to the Hilderbrand Defendants' motion, and the Hilderbrand Defendants have replied. (["Plaintiff's Response"], Doc. No. 59; ["Defendants' Reply"], Doc. No. 61.) The Hilderbrand Defendants have, likewise, responded in opposition to Plaintiff's motion. (["Defendants' Response"], Doc. No. 69.)
Pro se Plaintiff Vicki Hall is a disabled individual, who is said to require special accommodations with respect to her housing. (["Complaint"], Doc. No. 17 at 4; Doc. No. 9.) On August 17, 2010, Plaintiff reportedly executed a residential lease agreement for a single unit in a duplex property in Colorado Springs, Colorado.1 The 2010 lease identified Plaintiff as the "Tenant," and Donna Hilderbrand, Inc. as the "Landlord." (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) Paragraph 31 of the 2010 lease stipulated that Plaintiff, while responsible for certain yard care and maintenance, would not be responsible for lawn mowing and snow removal.2 (Id. at 9 ¶ 31.) Plaintiff alleges that this provision was made to address her specific disability. (Compl. 6.) The 2010 lease was said to have been extended, without incident, through July 31, 2016. (Id.)
According the Third Amended Complaint, on July 7, 2016, Donna Hilderbrand "threw" three copies of a new lease on Plaintiff's table, and said, "sign it or move." (Id.) The new lease, which purported to cover the same property as the 2010 lease, identified "Donna Hilderbrand on behalf of Owner/Landlord" as the "Landlord," Plaintiff as the "Tenant," and "RE/MAX Properties, Inc." as the "Broker." (Doc. No. 1 at 12.) The new lease allegedly "did not take into consideration [Plaintiff's] reasonable accommodation" with respect to lawn mowing and snow removal.3 (Compl. 5.)
Plaintiff reportedly refused to sign the new lease until the property "passe[d] inspection." (Id. at 6.) It is alleged that Donna Hilderbrand, in response, scribbled "not valid" on one copy of the new lease, "removed the other two copies," and then "left before the inspector arrived." (Id.; see Doc. No. 1 at 22.) Plaintiff claims that the property then "failed inspection." (Compl. 6.)
Two weeks later, on July 20, 2016, Plaintiff reportedly mailed Donna Hilderbrand an eight-page, typewritten "response" to the new lease, entitled "Notes for lease negotiation for property at 4014 E. San Miguel Street, Colorado Springs, CO 80909" [hereinafter, "Negotiation Notes"].4 (Id.; see Defs.' Mot. Ex. 1 ["Notes"].) The Negotiation Notes contain numerouscomplaints, inquiries, and demands pertaining to the rental property, as well as requests for modifications to the 2016 lease terms. (See Notes 1-8.). According to the Third Amended Complaint, within "hours" of Donna Hilderbrand's receipt of the Negotiation Notes, on July 22, 2016, Plaintiff was served a "Notice to Quit" the property. (Compl. 5-6.) Plaintiff thereafter commenced this action, some sixteen months after her eviction, on February 21, 2018. (See Doc. No. 1.)
On March 21, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint, asserting five claims against Defendants Donna Hilderbrand, Donna Hilderbrand, Inc., and RE/MAX. (Compl. 2, 4-11.) The first two claims allege a failure to accommodate Plaintiff's disability, in violation of the Fair Housing Act ["FHA"], 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), against all Defendants. (Id. at 4-5.) The third claim, which is vaguely worded, is asserted against the Hilderbrand Defendants. (Id. at 6-7.) The fourth claim alleges negligence by RE/MAX. (Id. at 8.) The fifth claim, entitled "Summary of harm done to me as a result of this situation," does not identify any Defendants or causes of action. (Id. at 9-11.)
On July 8, 2019, Defendant RE/MAX filed a motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 24.) In addition, on August 30, 2019, Defendants collectively sought dismissal of the Third Amended Complaint for insufficient service of process. (Doc. No. 36.) On September 24, 2019, this court granted Defendants' motions, in part, with respect to Plaintiff's claims against DefendantRE/MAX, and Defendant RE/MAX was dismissed from the case. (Doc. No. 49 at 13.) As a result, only the first three claims, which are asserted against the Hilderbrand Defendants, remain.
The Hilderbrand Defendants now move to dismiss the remaining three claims against them, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 52.)
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. The court, therefore, "review[s] h[er] pleadings and other papers liberally and hold[s] them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys." Trackwell v. United States, 472 F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (). However, a pro se litigant's "conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). A court may not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that have not been alleged, or that a defendant has violated laws in ways that a plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983); see Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (); Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991) (). The plaintiff's pro se status does not entitle her to an application of different rules. Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 957 (10th Cir. 2002).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant may move to dismiss a claim for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "The court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted." Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted).
"A court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint presumes all of plaintiff's factual allegations are true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Plausibility, in the context of a motion to dismiss, means that the plaintiff pleaded facts which allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The Iqbal evaluation requires two prongs of analysis. First, the court identifies "the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth," that is, those allegations which are legal conclusions, bare assertions, or merely conclusory. Id. at 679-81. Second, the court considers the factual allegations "to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." Id. at 681. If the allegations state a plausible claim for relief, such a claim survives the motion to dismiss. Id. at 679.
At the same time, however, the court need not accept conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments. S. Disposal, Inc., v. Tex. Waste, 161 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir.1998). Iqbal, 556 U.S at 678. Moreover, Id. (citation omitted). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id. (citation omitted).
In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court may consider documents incorporated by reference, documents referred to in the complaint that are central to the claims, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice. Tellabs, Inc, 551 U.S. at 322; Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 2010). Publicly filed court records, including court transcripts, are subject to judicial notice. St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007); Trusdale v. Bell, 85 F. App'x 691, 693 (10th Cir. 2003).
Here, Plaintiff has attached "copies of...
To continue reading
Request your trial