Hall v. Hobart

• Decision Date: 09 April 1911
• Docket Number: 3,325.
• Parties: HALL et al. v. HOBART.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

186 F. 426

HALL et al. v. HOBART.

No. 3,325.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

April 9, 1911

This was an action of ejectment, instituted by the defendant in error, Corinna L. Hobart, to recover possession of a lot of ground fronting on the Mississippi river, commonly known as 'Boom Landing,' and the accretions and rights appertaining thereto, including part of an island which arose from the bed of the river opposite to it, known as 'Hall's Island.' Her remote grantor acquired the lot by patent from the United States dated March 24, 1849, in which it was bounded on the southwest by the Mississippi river. The defendant the city of Minneapolis claimed the island through mesne conveyances from the state of Minnesota which asserted title to it by reason of its ownership of the bed of the river. At the trial a jury was waived the cause submitted to the court upon the pleadings and proof, and the following controlling facts were found:

'That the Mississippi is and always has been, at and about the point in controversy, a stream of water navigable in fact * * * that about the year 1875, or a little prior thereto, there began to appear above the surface of the water in the river opposite plaintiff's premises, at several different points, separated from each other by stretches of water, the island, afterwards known as 'Hall's Island,' the title and right to the possession of a portion of which is here in controversy; that when this island first began to appear it was at these several different points above the surface of the water at ordinary low stages thereof, and at ordinary high staes it was entirely submerged; that by gradual deposits of earth and sand and other material from the water of the river the exposed portions of said island grew gradually in area, extent, and height, so that in a few years the detached portions thereof became connected together in one continuous island, which island showed continuously thereafter above the water at all ordinary stages, except extreme high water during the spring freshets; that the growth of said island continued in like manner until the year 1902 (in which year the patent from the state to defendant Hall, hereinafter referred to, was issued), at which time it was more or less covered with willows, brush, and cottonwood trees, and was about 1 1/2 acres in extent; that this island was formed, by gradual deposits on the bed of the river of earth and sand and other material from the water thereof, at and about the line of boom piers which had been placed in the river at a distance of about 200 feet from plaintiff's shore line, and where the water was about 8 or 10 feet deep, which piers had been put in for the purpose of attaching booms thereto to hold and control logs coming down the river; that said island was formed on the east side of the middle thread of the said Mississippi river, and the main navigable channel of said river has since the formation of said island always been on the west side thereof, said island lying between said main navigable channel and said plaintiff's shore line; that the width of the open navigable channel of said river on the west side of said island is about 600 feet and the depth thereof for a large part of said distance is from 10 to 15 feet; that while said island, at the time of its formation as above set forth, was, and ever since has been, separated from the plaintiff's shore line by the water of the river for a distance of from about 75 to about 200 feet, said water, or channel, if it may be called a channel, varying in width at different points between said limits, the bottom of said channel has been gradually filling up with earth and sand and other material from the water of the river, so that the depth of the water therein was at times of ordinary low water, in the year 1902, and for some years prior thereto, only about 2 feet at any point from the shore of the island to the shore of the main land at the shallowest part thereof, and about from 3 to 5 or 6 feet at the deepest part thereof, and in the year 1908 only from about 1 1/2 to about 2 feet at the shallowest part, and from about 3 to 4 feet at the deepest part, except where the same had been artificially deepened; * * * that the said channel between said island and the plaintiff's said premises on the east shore of said river has, since the formation of said island until the year 1905, been used at all seasons of the year, except when covered with ice, at all ordinary stages of water, for transporting large quantities of pine and other logs to the several sawmills located upon said channel and upon the east bank of the Mississippi river, it being necessary at times of extremely low water to scrape the channel to permit the free passage of such logs.'

There was a further finding to the effect that Hall, the original patentee from the state of Minnesota, and who was at the time of the trial the officer of the city of Minneapolis in actual custody of the island, in the year 1906 executed and delivered to the city of Minneapolis a deed purporting to convey the island to the city in trust for 'public municipal purposes only,' and also a definite finding 'that thereafter the defendant city of Minneapolis took possession of said island, and made and constructed large and valuable improvements thereon, using the same as a public park, and the channel on the east side thereof as a public swimming pool in the summer months, and as a public skating rink in the winter months,' and also a finding that before the city had taken possession of the island, and made the improvements thereon, plaintiff caused a written notice to be duly served on the city advising it of her claim to the island.

The trial court found as a conclusion of law from these facts that plaintiff was the owner and entitled to the immediate possession of the lot bounded on the river, and as such 'was the beneficial owner, and entitled to the immediate and exclusive possession and use (subject only to the paramount right and title of the state therein, or of the general government, for the purpose of protecting, preserving, and improving the public right of navigation on said river), of all that part of that certain island, known as 'Hall's Island,' in said river, which lies between the shore line of said above-described premises and the middle thread of said river, and between two lines drawn perpendicularly to said thread, one at the northerly and one at the southerly end of the shore line of said premises, and is therefore, as against the defendants herein, entitled to the immediate possession of said portion of said island.'

Judgment was afterwards entered accordingly. From that judgment, defendants prosecute error. There is but one assignment of error, stated, however, in different ways, and that is that the facts found by the court are not sufficient to support the judgment.

A. C. Finney and George W. Armstrong (Frank Healy, on the brief), for plaintiffs in error.

George T. Simpson, Atty. Gen., and C. Louis Weeks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for State of Minnesota.

Fred W. Reed, for defendant in error.

Washburn, Bailey & Mitchell and Crassweller, Crassweller & Blu filed brief in answer to brief of the State of Minnesota.

Before SANBORN and ADAMS, Circuit Judges, and REED, District Judge.

ADAMS Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

This being an action of ejectment, plaintiff must recover, if at all, on the strength of her own title, and not on the weakness of the defendants'. She is conceded to have been the owner in fee simple of a lot of ground fronting on the east bank of the Mississippi river, which was originally acquired by patent from the United States, and was therein described as bounded on the southwest by the Mississippi river. While the object of this suit is to recover possession of the lot, with its accretions generally speaking, the chief controversy is over plaintiff's right to the possession of that part of Hall's Island which lies opposite her lot, and between it and the navigable channel of the river. The river, at the place of present inquiry, is conceded to be navigable in fact, and navigability in fact is conceded to be the test of navigability within the meaning of the law governing the relative rights of riparian owners and the state. It is further conceded that these rights, so far as this case is concerned, are to be determined by the laws of the state of Minnesota as interpreted by its highest judicial tribunal. See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 24 L.Ed. 224; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 11 Sup.Ct. 808, 838, 35 L.Ed. 428; Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 192, 53 N.W. 1139, 18 L.R.A. 670, 38 Am.St.Rep. 541.

What, then, are the rights under the law of Minnesota of a riparian owner, in fee, of a lot of land originally acquired by patent from the United States, and bounded by a navigable river to an island which, after title to the lot emanated from the government, arose from the bed of the river between the shore line and the main navigable channel of the river? As this island, according to the facts found, arose from the bed of the river as an accretion thereto, its ownership most obviously depends upon the ownership of the bed. This much is conceded.

Primarily the riparian owner's title extends at least to highwater mark. As to this there is no dispute. He has, however, a certain qualified or dependent right to that part of the shore between high and low water mark (In re Minnetonka Lake Improvement Co., 56 Minn. 513, 520, 58 N.W. 295, 45 Am.St.Rep. 494), which need not now be discussed. What his rights are between low-water mark and the middle thread or navigable channel of the river is the controlling and important question for decision; and, as this must be...