Hall v. Iskcon D.C.
| Decision Date | 12 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 356,356 |
| Parties | JAMES ELLIS HALL, II v. ISKCON OF D.C. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 477604V
UNREPORTED
Nazarian, Ripken, Harrell, Glenn T., Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Ripken, J.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
In the instant case, we are asked to decide whether the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to an action that has been ongoing for multiple years in numerous courts. Appellant, James Hall ("Hall"), initially filed a complaint against appellee, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness of Washington, D.C. ("ISKCON"), in the District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County. His multiple contentions included religious discrimination. The District Court dismissed Hall's complaint, and he filed a de novo appeal in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Following a hearing, the circuit court granted judgment in favor of ISKCON.
Hall, thereafter, filed a complaint based on the same underlying facts against ISKCON in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Following a hearing, the circuit court, citing res judicata and collateral estoppel, dismissed Hall's complaint with prejudice. The court also denied Hall leave to amend the complaint. Hall appeals from these orders. For the reasons stated below, we hold that the circuit court did not err. Accordingly, we shall affirm the circuit court's judgment.
ISKCON is a non-profit religious organization that operates a Hindu temple (the "Temple") in Potomac, Maryland. On June 12, 2018, K.C., an ISKCON member who lived at the Temple, filed a Petition for Peace Order in the District Court for Montgomery County. She claimed that Hall had been stalking and harassing her over the previous few months, and her attempts to curtail his behavior—including verbal requests to stop by K.C. as well as other members of ISKCON and a verbal trespass warning by ISKCON—were unsuccessful. On June 22, 2018, the District Court granted K.C.'s petition and ordered Hallto stay away from K.C. and certain areas on Temple grounds. ISKCON then sent a "Notice Against Trespass" to Hall, informing him that he was prohibited from entering all ISKCON property.
Meanwhile, in the District Court, Hall filed a complaint against ISKCON and ISKCON's community president, Anada Vrindavan on June 11, 2018.1 In that complaint, Hall claimed that ISKCON, a "[p]rivate social organization" had "engag[ed] in religious discrimination" and that he had been "excluded/discriminated against because of [his] religious beliefs." Hall asked the court to "overrule the trespassing notice" and to award tort damages of $0.01.
ISKCON thereafter filed a motion to dismiss, and, on October 5, 2018, the District Court held a hearing on that motion. At the hearing, ISKCON argued that Hall's claim should be dismissed because ISKCON was a religious organization and had a right to exclude Hall from the Temple. ISKCON also noted that it did not bar Hall from entering the Temple because of his religious beliefs; rather, it barred Hall because he had been "stalking and harassing a member of the [T]emple's community."
Hall responded by claiming that ISKCON had barred him from the Temple because he wrote some books that were critical of the organization. Hall also claimed that the Temple was a "place of public accommodation" and thus was not permitted to ban him on religious grounds. The court granted ISKCON's motion to dismiss. It found that ISKCONwas "a religious organization where attendees congregate for worship" and that it had a right to exclude Hall from its property.2
In the circuit court, Hall filed a de novo appeal of the District Court's order dismissing his complaint on November 5, 2018.3 In that filing, Hall again claimed that ISKCON had committed religious discrimination in barring him from the Temple. Hall further contended that ISKCON's actions negatively affected his employment as a "volunteer" and his ability to sell his books. Hall also claimed that ISKCON had "coerced" K.C. into filing her petition for a peace order.
On May 7, 2019, the circuit court held the hearing on Hall's de novo appeal. Hall was incarcerated at the time serving a sentence for the aforementioned stalking and related offenses,4 but was present for the hearing. Due to his incarceration, and citing an inabilityto prepare, Hall asked that the court postpone the case for one year. The court denied the motion. It found that Hall already had been given considerable time to prepare for his de novo appeal, that the case had already been postponed as a result of his incarceration, and that prior to his arrest, he had in fact moved to accelerate the date.
The circuit court asked Hall to present his case. Hall objected to "moving forward with the trial." The following colloquy ensued:
ISKCON thereafter moved for judgment based on Hall's failure to present evidence in support of his claim. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of ISKCON, finding that Hall had been given "every opportunity to present his case" and had "not taken advantage of that." Hall sought certiorari in the Maryland Court of Appeals, which denied his petition as there had been no showing that review by certiorari was "desirable and in the public interest."
Not to be deterred, Hall returned to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County where he filed an original complaint against ISKCON alleging "[i]nterference with the right to freedom of religious practice," "[v]iolation of civil rights," "[d]efamation and harassment," and "[m]alicious intent to damage or destroy valuable intellectual property" on January 10, 2020. For the "interference" claim, Hall alleged that ISKCON had interfered with his rights when it barred him from the Temple in May and June of 2018. For the "civil rights" claim, Hall alleged that ISKCON had violated his civil rights when it refused to sell his books in March of 2018 and then barred him from the Temple in May of 2018. For the "defamation and harassment" claim, Hall alleged that, beginning in May and June of 2018, ISKCON had engaged in a course of conduct designed to impede his book sales and injure his reputation. For the "malicious intent" claim, Hall alleged that, beginning in May of 2018, ISKCON had engaged in a course of conduct "with the intent to damage or destroy valuable intellectual property." Hall again asked the court to retract the trespassing notice and toaward him monetary damages, though he increased his damages request from $0.01 to $150 million.
ISKCON filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Hall's claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. At the hearing on that motion, ISKCON argued that Hall's claims were barred because they were based on the same set of facts that served as the basis for his District Court claim, which had already been decided. ISKCON also argued that, to the extent that any of Hall's claims deviated from his District Court action, those claims were barred because they should have been included in the District Court action.
The circuit court agreed with ISKCON that Hall's complaint was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court dismissed Hall's complaint with prejudice and without leave to amend. This timely appeal followed.
In this appeal, Hall presents two issues, which we have rephrased and condensed into a single issue: Did the circuit court err in dismissing Hall's complaint and in denying him leave to amend?5 For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the circuit court did not err.
Hall contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing his complaint with prejudice and without leave to amend. He asserts that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply because, in the de novo appeal of his District Court case, "a hearing on the merits was never held" and he "was not given a fair chance to be heard." Hall also asserts that several of the claims included in his circuit court complaint were not the subject of his District Court complaint. Finally, Hall asserts that the relief sought in his circuit court complaint, which included monetary damages totaling $150 million, was different than the relief sought in his District Court complaint, in which he sought rescission of the trespassing notice and $0.01 in monetary damages. After setting out the standard of review, we first explain that the circuit court correctly determined res judicata bars relitigation of Hall's claims and, second, explain that collateral estoppel also bars his claims.
"When reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, the appropriate standard of review is whether the trial court was legally...
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