Hall v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 01 July 1879
• Citation: 2 N.W. 55,41 Mich. 286
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: STEPHEN C. HALL v. WALDO M. JOHNSON and RICHARD O. WHEELER.

2 N.W. 55

41 Mich. 286

STEPHEN C. HALL v. WALDO M. JOHNSON and RICHARD O. WHEELER.

Supreme Court of Michigan

July 1, 1879

Remark of the court to the jury, in the introductory portion of his charge, held, not objectionable. Fraudulent representations are not ground for relief, where they are immaterial, even though they be relied upon. What are material representations must depend upon the particular circumstances of the case. Certain instructions having reference to the particular circumstances of the case considered and held not erroneous.

Error to Muskegon _______.

Smith, Mins, Hoyt & Erwin, for plaintiff.

Norris & Uhl, for defendants.

MARSTON J.

This was an action of assumpsit, brought to recover on a non-negotiable promissory note, payable to Mrs. John W Young, and by her assigned to defendants in error as collateral security for the debt of her husband. The defense set up was that the note was given without consideration, and that it was never assigned to the plaintiffs--defendants in error--the same having been obtained by them by means of fraudulent representations made by their agent.

On the trial there was evidence given tending to show that the note was a gift to Mrs. Young without consideration, and there also was evidence tending to show there was a valuable consideration from the husband of the payee, to whom the note was first made payable, but afterwards, and before delivery changed by inserting before the name of the payee the abbreviation "Mrs.," thus making it payable to the wife of John W. Young.

There was also evidence introduced tending to show that the defendants below--the makers of the note--were informed of the transfer to the plaintiffs, and repeatedly, by letters to them, recognized and admitted the validity of the obligation and promising and averring a willingness to pay the same whenever a matter in dispute between Johnson & Wheeler and John W. Young should be adjusted.

We have not been able to discover any error committed in the admission of oral testimony, or in receiving the various letters admitted between plaintiffs and Mr. and Mrs. Young, and between plaintiffs and defendant Hall. Nor do we discover any error in the charge of the court, which submitted and left fairly to the jury every material disputed fact, under instructions as favorable as the defendant was entitled to. The jury were instructed that the plaintiffs were bound by any statement or representations made by their agent to Mrs. Young for the purpose of inducing her to part with the note; that "if he made any representations that were false--that were untrue--that Mrs. Young relied upon, that induced her to part with the note, no matter for what purpose she parted with it, no title whatever, either as collateral security or otherwise, ever vested in these plaintiffs." What instruction more favorable than this the defendant could be entitled to we fail to discover.

We do not understand counsel to complain of what is here quoted but that, previous to so charging, the court had said: "Did he, the agent, make any false statements--any false representations--for the purpose of obtaining the note, and which were material." This was said by the court in what might be called the introductory part of the charge, when the attention of the jury was being directed to the nature of the controversy, and the general character of the questions at issue. When the court came to charge the jury--to give them instructions for their guidance when they would retire to deliberate--nothing was said as to the materiality of the representations, if any were made and found to be untrue. Irrespective of their materiality, the jury were instructed that, if false representations were made, upon which Mrs. Young relied, and which induced her to part with the note, plaintiffs could not recover. We are of opinion that, even in this part of the charge, the court must have had in mind material false representations, as she would not likely have relied upon immaterial representations, or parted with the note upon the strength thereof. This view is most favorable to the plaintiff in error, and yet will not help him. False representations, no matter how acted upon, will not be sufficient to set aside an agreement, otherwise valid, unless they were material. Immaterial representations, whether true or false, cannot be made the basis of relief, even although coupled with the assertion that they were relied upon. They may constitute a moral wrong, but not a legal one. False representations may be made, of such a character that no person of ordinary intelligence could be misled thereby, and that could have had no influence whatever in inducing the other party to enter into the agreement. What might be considered sufficiently material to induce one person to act, might have little or no influence upon another, so that no definite rule can be laid down. In each case the court, or jury, must be satisfied that the...