Hall v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
| Decision Date | 25 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. JKB-19-2510 |
| Parties | JOSEPH HALL, SR., Plaintiff v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
This dispute arises out of a loan agreement between pro se Plaintiff Joseph Hall and Defendant J.P. Morgan Chase Bank. Plaintiff brings a variety of claims under state and federal law challenging the validity of the agreement and its terms. Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 16), Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (ECF No. 23), Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14), Plaintiff's Motions for Admissions and Production of Documents (ECF Nos. 26, 27, 33), Defendant's Motion to Stay Discovery (ECF No. 29), Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 31), and Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery (ECF No. 32). No hearing is required. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2018).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny Plaintiff's motion to remand, deny Plaintiff's motion to strike, grant Defendant's motion to dismiss, deny Plaintiff's discovery requests, deny Defendant's motion to stay, and deny Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
On November 30, 2007, Plaintiff borrowed $114,695 from Freedom Mortgage Corporation and secured the loan with a deed of trust. (Deed of Trust, Compl. Ex. B at 20, ECF No. 1-2.) The deed of trust encumbered a property at 1144 N. Stricker Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21217. (Id. at 29.) The beneficiary of the deed of trust was Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"). (Id. at 20.) On July 6, 2012, MERS assigned the deed of trust to Defendant. (Assignment of Deed of Trust at 54, Compl. Ex. F, ECF No. 1-2.)
On April 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant in Circuit Court in Baltimore City, Maryland, seeking to quiet title to the property. ). The suit in large part contended that the loan agreement was unenforceable because MERS had fraudulently assigned the deed of trust to Defendant. (2015 Compl., Mot. Dismiss Ex. B, ECF No. 14-3.) During the course of the lawsuit, the parties attended a court-ordered mediation session with mediator Ira Himmel. (Mediation Documents, Compl. Ex. G at 58-60, ECF No. 1-2.) During the mediation session, a handwritten document was produced that appeared to describe the terms of a possible loan modification. (Id.) The document was not signed by either of the parties. (Id.) Defendant contends the author of the document was Mediator Himmel. (Mot. Dismiss at 2, ECF No. 14.) At one point, Plaintiff agrees that Mediator Himmel was the author (Opp'n Mot. Dismiss at 13, ECF No. 17), and at another point, contends that Defendant's counsel was the author (Mot. Remand at 7, ECF No. 16).
On the day following the mediation, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. (2015 Circuit Court Docket at 5.) The Circuit Court granted Defendant's motion in full and entered judgment for Defendant. (Circuit Court 2016 Mem. Op., Mot. Dismiss Ex. D, ECF No. 14-5.) Plaintiff then filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Circuit Court denied. Plaintiff appealed and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. (Court of Spec. Appeals 2017 Mem. Op., Mot. Dismiss Ex. G, ECF No. 14-8.)
One year later, in the summer of 2018, the parties signed a loan modification agreement, which added $56,826.43 to Plaintiff's principal balance. (2018 Loan Modification, Mot. Dismiss Ex. H, ECF No. 14-9.) The signatures of Plaintiff and a representative of Defendant are on the agreement. (Id. at 9-11.) The agreement stated that it would "supersede the terms of any" other modification to which the parties had previously agreed. (Id. ¶ 4C.)
On July 26, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant suit in Circuit Court of Baltimore City. (Compl., ECF No. 1-2.) Defendant subsequently removed the action to federal court and the matter was assigned to the undersigned. (Not. Removal, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff's primary contention in this suit is that the parties reached a binding settlement agreement during the 2016 mediation session, which Defendant refuses to honor. (Compl. at 1-3.)1 Specifically, he brings the following claims: quiet title (Count I), breach of contract (Count II), bad faith breach of contract (Count III), and violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") (Count IV). (Id.)
The first issue before the Court is whether this is the proper forum to hear this case. Plaintiff contends it is not the proper forum and he has filed a motion to remand and a related motion to strike.
Defendant removed this action to federal court on the basis of diversity. (Not. Removal at ¶¶ 7-12.) Defendant contends the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 are met because there is complete diversity between the parties (Plaintiff is a resident of Maryland and Defendant is a resident of Ohio) and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 (the dispute involves a claim for at least $1,000,000 in damages and a property secured by a loan of $114,695). (Id.) Plaintiff does not dispute these jurisdictional facts, and the Court concludes the § 1332 requirements are satisfied.
Plaintiff does, however, contend that removal was improper for numerous other reasons: (1) state law predominates in the matter; (2) Defendant has "unclean hands"; (3) Defendant did not comply with the procedural requirements of removal; and (4) the court lacks jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Court addresses these arguments in turn.
Plaintiff's first two arguments fail for the same reason: even if the allegations they rest on were accepted as true, neither argument would compel remand. First, even if state law predominated here, "the existence of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction does not preclude removal of an action to a federal court . . . ." 14C C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3721 (2019). And second, even if the doctrine of unclean hands applied here, "the doctrine of unclean hands does not strip a federal court of jurisdiction to hear a case that has been properly removed." Craddock v. Beneficial Fin. I Inc., Civ. No. GEC-14-00093, 2014 WL 2090554, at *2 (W.D. Va. May 19, 2014). Accordingly, the Court declines to disrupt Defendant's statutory right to removal on either of these grounds.
Plaintiff's third argument—Defendant did not follow the proper removal procedures—implicates 28 U.S.C. § 1446, which provides the procedures for removal. This provision states that a defendant must file "a notice of removal . . . containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal" within 30 days of receiving service of the plaintiff's complaint. § 1446(a)-(b). The defendant should attach to the notice of removal "a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant . . . ." § 1446(a). Plaintiff contends that Defendant failed to comply with these procedures because it did not remove the action within 30 days or timely fileall state-court papers. (Mot. Remand at 8; Mot. Strike at 1-2, ECF No. 23.) The latter alleged deficiency is the basis of Plaintiff's motion to strike.
Plaintiff misunderstands the rules regarding the timing for removal. The 30-day removal clock begins running on the day the defendant is served with the complaint, not, as Plaintiff contends, on the day the plaintiff files suit. See § 1446(b). Here, Plaintiff filed his suit on July 26, 2019, but he did not serve Defendant until August 1, 2019. (2019 Circuit Court Docket, Opp'n Mot. Remand Ex. A, ECF No. 19-1; Affidavit of Service, Opp'n Mot. Remand Ex. B, ECF No. 19-2.) Removal of the action on August 30, 2019 was within the 30-day window and was timely.
Plaintiff similarly misreads the scope and significance of the rules regarding the filing of state-court papers. When Defendant filed its notice of removal, it attached a copy of Plaintiff's complaint, the civil cover sheet, the Writ of Summons served upon Defendant, and a certificate of service stating that the notice of removal had been mailed to Plaintiff. (ECF Nos. 1, 1-1, 1-2, 1-3.) It did not attach—critically, according to Plaintiff—an affidavit from the service processor certifying that Defendant was served on August 1, 2019. (Mot. Strike Reply at 1-2, ECF No. 25.) Defendant only filed this affidavit of service after Plaintiff contested the timeliness of removal in his motion to remand. (Affidavit of Service at 1.)
The absence of the affidavit of service from the initial batch of removal papers does not compel remand. First, Plaintiff has not identified any authority providing that an affidavit of service qualifies as a "process, pleading[], and order[]" that must be attached to a notice of removal under § 1446(d). Even if the affidavit did qualify, "the failure to file all the state-court papers" at the time of removal is not a "jurisdictional defect" and is "curable in . . . federal court." 14C C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3733 (2019); see also Cardoza v. Med. Device Bus. Servs., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 3d 399, 406 (W.D. Va. 2019) (). Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff's motion to strike Defendant's untimely filing of state-court papers and will decline to remand the action on the grounds that Defendant did not comply with the removal procedures.
Plaintiff's fourth argument in support of remand—that the Court lacks jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine—also lacks merit. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, "lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final...
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