Hall v. Lalli
Decision Date | 13 April 1999 |
Docket Number | No. CV-97-0476-PR,CV-97-0476-PR |
Citation | 194 Ariz. 54,977 P.2d 776 |
Parties | 299 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 9 In Re Joan K. HALL and Stanley E. Lalli, a minor child, Petitioners/Appellants, v. Joseph A. LALLI, Respondent/Appellee. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
O P I N I O N
¶1 In 1979, the state brought a paternity action against Joseph Lalli (Lalli) to determine if he was the father of Stanley Lalli (Stanley). Stanley was not named as a party, but the complaint did mention his mother, Joan Hall (Joan). The trial court dismissed the claim with prejudice. In 1995, Joan and Stanley brought a new paternity action against Lalli. The trial court dismissed both claims as barred by res judicata due to the 1979 dismissal. Stanley appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. We granted review to determine whether a child's paternity claim is barred by an earlier contrary judgment to which the child was not a party.
¶2 Joan and Lalli were married in 1971. In 1978, Lalli filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in which he stated that he and Joan were the parents of three minor children and that Joan was not then pregnant. A default decree was entered against Joan, granting custody of the three children to Lalli. Four months later, Joan gave birth to Stanley.
¶3 In 1979, Joan was receiving Aid to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC). In November of that year, the State of Arizona brought a paternity action on Joan's behalf, seeking reimbursement from Lalli for the AFDC benefits paid Joan as Stanley's mother. A few months later, the state moved to dismiss the complaint, attaching Joan's handwritten letter that stated Lalli was "not the natural father of Stanley." The court dismissed the state's complaint with prejudice, in effect determining that Lalli was not Stanley's father.
¶4 In 1995, Joan brought a paternity action against Lalli, alleging he was and is Stanley's father. Because Stanley was still a minor, the trial court granted Joan's motion to intervene as Stanley's "best friend," thus joining him as a party. Lalli filed a motion to dismiss both Joan's and Stanley's claims, arguing they were barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the 1979 paternity action and the present case had been brought by the same "parties or their privies." In ruling on the motion, the trial judge relied on a case from Division One of our Court of Appeals as the dispositive law. See Bill v. Gossett, 132 Ariz. 518, 647 P.2d 649 (App.1982) ( ). Following Bill, the trial judge dismissed both claims. Only Stanley appealed the dismissal, arguing that he was neither a party to the 1979 proceeding nor in privity with the state or his mother. Disagreeing with Bill, Division Two of our Court of Appeals held that Stanley had not been in privity with any party to the 1979 action and thus res judicata did not bar his claim. Hall v. Lalli, 191 Ariz. 104, 109, 952 P.2d 748, 753 (App.1997). We granted review to resolve the conflict between our appellate divisions and to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata should be applied under these circumstances. Ariz.R.Civ.App.P. 23(c)(3). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5(3).
¶5 Because the court of appeals' opinion addressed only pure questions of law, we review de novo. See, e.g., Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. v. KPNX Broadcasting Co., 191 Ariz. 297, 300, 955 P.2d 534, 537 (1998).
¶6 Res judicata protects "litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue" and promotes "judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). This principle provides finality and deters harassment of former litigants. See Circle K v. Industrial Comm'n, 179 Ariz. 422, 426, 880 P.2d 642, 646 (App.1993). Due process, on the other hand, dictates that a party has the right to be heard. "It is a rule as old as the law that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his day in court...." Phoenix Metals Corp. v. Roth, 79 Ariz. 106, 109, 284 P.2d 645, 647 (1955) (quoting 12 AM.JUR. Constitutional Law § 573).
¶7 The doctrine of res judicata will preclude a claim when a former judgment on the merits was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and the matter now in issue between the same parties or their privities was, or might have been, determined in the former action. Hall, 191 Ariz. at 106, 952 P.2d at 750; Aldrich & Steinberger v. Martin, 172 Ariz. 445, 448, 837 P.2d 1180, 1183 (App.1992). The 1979 dismissal satisfies all factors except whether Stanley, who was not a named party to the first paternity action, was in privity with either the state or his mother. 1 If so, res judicata bars his present claim.
¶8 Finding "[p]rivity between a party and a non-party requires both a 'substantial identity of interests' and a 'working or functional relationship' ... in which the interests of the non-party are presented and protected by the party in the litigation." Phinisee v. Rogers, 229 Mich.App. 547, 582 N.W.2d 852, 854 (1998) (quoting S.O.V. v. Colorado, 914 P.2d 355, 360 (1996)). Bill was the first Arizona case that dealt with mother-child privity in a paternity action. Its essential facts are quite similar to those in the present case. The state and Bill's mother, as a complaining witness, sued Bill's putative father to establish paternity. The parties stipulated that the mother would take a polygraph test. If the examiners determined her answers were untruthful, the case would be dismissed with prejudice. On the other hand, if they determined her answers were truthful, the father would concede paternity and a support hearing would be held. 132 Ariz. at 519, 647 P.2d at 650. During the polygraph test, the only question posed to the mother was whether she had sexual intercourse with any man other than the putative father during the possible conception dates. The two examiners believed her negative response was untruthful. Thus, the state moved to dismiss the claim with prejudice, in accordance with the stipulation, and the trial judge granted the motion. When Bill subsequently brought her own paternity action, the putative father moved to dismiss, arguing res judicata and that the prior dismissal with prejudice barred the complaint. The trial judge agreed and dismissed. Id.
¶9 The Bill court acknowledged that the determinative question was whether mother and child had been in privity at the time of the previous paternity claim. Because the Arizona paternity statutes are derived from Minnesota's, the court found Minnesota's construction of its paternity statutes "particularly persuasive." Id. at 522, 647 P.2d at 653. The court relied on a Minnesota case stating "the proceedings are for the benefit of the mother as well as the child and the public." Id. at 523, 647 P.2d at 654 (quoting Minnesota v. Sax, 231 Minn. 1, 42 N.W.2d 680, 684 (1950)). The Bill court reasoned that the Arizona paternity statute 2 also served these combined and presumably identical interests by pursuing a single mutual objective--establishing paternity. Id. Thus, a child's interests are always represented whenever a paternity action is brought, regardless of who brings it. Id. The court therefore concluded that Bill had been in privity with her mother and the state so that Bill's subsequent paternity claim was barred by res judicata. Id. at 524, 647 P.2d at 655.
¶10 In the present case, Division Two reached the opposite conclusion, focusing on the issue of mother-child privity in a paternity suit. The Hall court noted that in Johnson v. Hunter, the Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed with Bill 's interpretation of Sax. 191 Ariz. at 107, 952 P.2d at 751. In Sax, the Minnesota court held merely that the mother was a party to a paternity proceeding and therefore entitled to appeal a support order. In Johnson, the court went on to discuss privity:
An Arizona court cited our decision in Sax due to the similarity between Arizona's and Minnesota's (1969) paternity statutes and held that a prior dismissal of a state's paternity action was res judicata as to the child. [Bill ], however, stressed the common economic interest of the state, mother and child, particularly the right to child support, rather than the other interests a child may have that are jeopardized in such a dismissal.... We cannot, however, so easily dismiss the significant interests at stake for a child in a paternity determination.... Depriving [a child] of the basic right to establish parental relations arguably would not comport with the constitutional protection granted illegitimate children.
447 N.W.2d 871, 875-76 (Minn.1989) (citations omitted). Thus, Johnson held that res judicata did not preclude the child's action when she was not a party to the previous action. 447 N.W.2d at 876-77.
¶11 We agree that Johnson weakened Bill 's authority by expressly disavowing Bill 's interpretation of Sax. Also, as Division Two noted, "[o]ther jurisdictions have held that as a general rule, privity does not arise from the parent-child relationship." Hall, 191 Ariz. at 106, 952 P.2d at 750, citing Ex parte Snow, 508 So.2d 266 (Ala.1987); Simcox v. Simcox, 175 Ill.App.3d 473, 124 Ill.Dec. 915, 529 N.E.2d 1032 (1988); Payne v. Cartee, 111 Ohio App.3d 580, 676 N.E.2d 946 (1996); Virginia ex rel. Gray v. Johnson, 7 Va.App. 614, 376 S.E.2d 787 (1989). Since the decision in Hall, more jurisdictions have expressly adopted this principle. See Phinisee, 582 N.W.2d at 854; S.O.V., 914 P.2d at 361-62 &...
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