Hall v. Louisville & N.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 23 November 1907
• Citation: 157 F. 464
• Parties: HALL v. LOUISVILLE & N.R. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

157 F. 464

HALL v. LOUISVILLE & N.R. CO.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. Florida.

November 23, 1907

Death 8

On the 13th day of December, 1906, the plaintiff, Mrs. J. L. Hall filed a suit in the circuit court of the First judicial circuit of the state of Florida against the Louisville &amp Nashville Railroad Company, claiming the sum of $40,000 damages for the death of her husband, J. L. Hall, by the negligence of the defendant railroad company; said Hall at the time of his death being in the employment of the defendant as locomotive engineer. The suit as filed in the circuit court of Florida was brought in the name of the plaintiff as 'widow of J. L. Hall, deceased. ' In due time this cause was removed by petition from the circuit court of Florida to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Florida. It is averred in plaintiff's original complaint that her husband, J. L hall, died on the 18th day of October, 1906, from injuries received while in the discharge of his duties as locomotive engineer on that same day. After the removal of the cause to this court, the defendant railroad company on the 5th day of March, 1907, filed a plea of the general issue to the original complaint. On the 26th day of October, 1907, the plaintiff asked leave to file in this court an amendment to her original declaration as follows: 'That wherever the words 'Mrs. J. L. Hall, widow of J. L. Hall, deceased,' appear in said declaration or any count thereof, omit same and insert 'Johnnie R. Hall, administratrix of the estate of J. L. Hall, deceased, duly appointed administratrix of the estate of J. L. Hall, deceased, by the county judge of Escambia county, Florida, on the 16th day of January, 1907, for the benefit of his widow, Johnnie R. Hall, and his children, Etta L. Hall, Tama Bell Hall and J. L. Hall, Jr.' The defendant objected to the allowance of this amendment, and, without waiving this objection, filed a plea of the statute of limitations of one year to the various counts as amended. To this plea the plaintiff filed a demurrer. In order to present all the questions raised by the record, it is agreed that the court may take up and consider the objections to the amendment, the plea of the statute of limitations and the demurrer thereto in the order of their filing.

R. R. Reese and J. P. Stokes, for plaintiff.

Blount & Blount & Carter, for defendant.

HUNDLEY District Judge (after stating the facts as above).

The first question to be considered in this case is whether or not the amendment proposed by the plaintiff is such an amendment as can be permitted. The effect of the amendment proposed is to change the relation in which the plaintiff sues from that of her individual capacity as widow to that of her representative capacity as administratrix. It is claimed by the plaintiff that this suit was brought under the act of Congress known as the 'Employer's Liability Act.' Act June 11, 1906, c. 3073, 34 Stat. 232 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 891). The defendant denies this, and claims that the suit was brought under the Florida state statute. The constitutionality of the act of Congress is not drawn in question by the pleadings in this case, nor is it questioned in the argument presented. In so far, therefore, as the issues in this case are concerned, that act will be considered as a constitutional and lawful enactment by Congress. It is plain that actions for damages for injuries to employes may be brought on account of such injuries to those engaged in intrastate, as well as interstate, commerce. If the employe bringing the suit was in the employment of a common carrier engaged entirely in intrastate commerce, the right of action must necessarily be created entirely under the state statute, and, if the employe was in the employment of a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce, the right of action is created under the federal statute, supra. Spain v. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. (C.C.) 151 F. 522; Hall v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. (C.C.) 149 F. 564. In so far, therefore, as the question of allowing the amendment is concerned, it is immaterial whether the action is one arising under the Florida statute or under the act of Congress. Such amendment is allowable under the liberal statutes of amendment, both state and federal. Gen. St. Fla. 1906, Sec. 1432; Rev. St. U.S. Sec. 954 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 697); Neal v. Spooner, 20 Fla. 38; Simon Hamburg v. Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co., 42 Fla. 86, 27 So. 872; McDonald v. State of Nebraska, 101 F. 171, 41 C.C.A. 278; Hodges et al. v. Kimball et al., 91 F. 845, 34 C.C.A. 103; Van Doren v. Penn. R. Co., 93 F. 260, 35 C.C.A. 282; St. L. & I.M.R. Co. v. Haist, 71 Ark. 258, 72 S.W. 893, 100 Am.St.Rep. 65; Hutchinson v. Tucker, 124 Mass. 240; Fitzhenry v. Consolidated Traction Co., 63 N.J.Law, 142, 42 A. 416.

We shall now consider the vital and controlling question in this case, which is the demurrer to the plea of the statute of limitations of one year, which plea was filed to the counts as amended. In fine, does the amendment relate back to the time of the bringing of the suit, so as to prevent the application of the statute to the case at bar? Such statutes are statutes of quiet, and are recognized by all courts in cases where they apply, as a valid, substantial and legal defense. The question of 'relation back' of amendments is a fiction of the law, and should never be allowed, when to do so would to the prejudice of a litigant deprive him of a substantial, legal right. The defendant, against whom any party has a right of action, has a right to presume that such party has abandoned that right in cases where he has failed to assert it within the time prescribed by law. The right of the plaintiff to recover in such actions as this was unknown to the common law. The right here asserted is entirely statutory. It becomes a matter of importance, therefore, to determine under which statute this suit was originally brought. To determine this fact, this court can only look to the plaintiff's own statement of her cause of action. Chappel v. Waterworth, 155 U.S. 102, 15 Sup.Ct. 34, 39 L.Ed. 85; Third St. R.R. Co. v. Lewis, 173 U.S. 457, 19 Sup.Ct. 451, 43 L.Ed. 766.

Wherever a right is conferred by a statute which is in derogation of the common law, such statute must be strictly construed. Under the state statute (Gen. St. Fla. 1906, Sec. 3146) the right to sue and recover in such a case as this is vested in the widow alone; there being a widow living. L. & N.R. Co. v. Jones, 45 Fla. 407, 34 So. 246. Her recovery in the action would be for her benefit alone. A recovery in her name alone, under the state statute, would not be a bar to another action against this defendant, growing out of the same wrongful act, in a suit under the federal statute. Under the federal statute (Employer's Liability Act, supra) the right of action is conferred upon the personal representative alone. The federal statute effects radical changes in the liability, as it exists at common law or under the Florida statute, of common carriers engaged in interstate commerce for injuries to their employes, in the disposition of the proceeds of the recovery, when the injury results in death, and in the effect of the right of recovery for such injuries, when the employe is guilty of negligence, which directly contributes to his injury. There being, therefore, such marked distinctions between the two statutes, the conclusion is inevitable that the action, if brought under any authority at all, must have been brought under the state statute. Especially must this be the case when we consider the fact that at the time the suit was brought there was no personal representative in existence in whose name this suit could have been maintained under the federal statute. The suit was filed in the state court on the 13th day of December, 1906, and the plaintiff was not appointed administratrix until the 16th day of January, 1907. The counsel for plaintiff cite the case of Van Doren v. Penn. R. Co., 93 F. 260, 35 C.C.A. 282, as sustaining their contention that in...