Hall v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co.

• Citation: 829 F. Supp. 1571
• Decision Date: 23 July 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 1:91-cv-1772-MHS.
• Parties: Ronald G. HALL, Plaintiff, v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

829 F. Supp. 1571

Ronald G. HALL, Plaintiff, v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 1:91-cv-1772-MHS.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

July 23, 1993.

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Gary Franklin Easom, Beckham & McAliley, Jacksonville, FL, for plaintiff.

Edgar A. Neely, Jr., William C. Thompson, Neely & Player, Atlanta, GA, for defendant.

ORDER

SHOOB, Senior District Judge.

On August 27, 1992, following a three-day trial before this Court, a jury awarded plaintiff $700,000 for injuries he sustained as the result of a train accident. Defendant contends that the trial contained a number of errors and asks the Court to enter judgment as a matter of law, grant a new trial, or order a remittitur.¹ The Court will address the issues raised by defendant in the two motions, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the motion for new trial, denies the motion for a remittitur, and denies the motion for judgment as a matter of law.

I. INTRODUCTION

On August 9, 1990, two trains owned and operated by defendant collided, killing three people and injuring others. Plaintiff, who was working on one of the trains, brought this action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60, and the Boiler Inspection Act ("BIA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 22-30, contending that he suffered post-traumatic stress disorder and a hip injury as a result of the collision. Plaintiff sought approximately $900,000 in damages for lost wages and pain and suffering. Defendant contended that plaintiff was contributorily negligent and that he could not link his injuries to the accident. Defendant also argued that plaintiff should not be allowed to recover for purely emotional injuries under FELA and that he could not prove his lost wages. Following the three-day trial, the jury found that defendant had been negligent under FELA but that defendant had no liability under the Boiler Inspection Act. The jury also found that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent and awarded plaintiff $700,000 in a general verdict.

II. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

Defendant moves the Court for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), contending that plaintiff failed to show that he was entitled to any damages under FELA. Defendant argues, first, that plaintiff failed to prove his hip injury was caused by the accident at issue and, second, that damages for post-traumatic stress disorder are not available under FELA. In the alternative, defendant argues that, as a matter of law, plaintiff is not entitled to damages for future lost wages. During the trial, defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law on these issues at the close of plaintiff's case and at the close of all the evidence. The Court denied both motions. As set forth below, the Court again denies the motion.

A. Standard for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Under Rule 50, a judgment as a matter of law² should be granted when "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury" to have found for the prevailing party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). In determining whether the evidence is "legally sufficient," the Court

should consider all of the evidence — not just that evidence which supports the nonmover's case — but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motions is proper.

Rabun v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 678 F.2d 1053, 1057 (11th Cir.1982) (quoting King v. Exxon Co., 618 F.2d 1111, 1116 (5th Cir. 1980)). Basically, the Court must consider the evidence "without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence...." Id. (quoting C. Wright & A. Miller, 9 Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2524, at 545-546 (1971)).

B. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

The primary question at issue on defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law is whether FELA permits recovery for injuries that defendant calls purely psychological or emotional. Defendant asserts that these injuries are not recoverable under FELA, and that, because plaintiff's injuries in this action are primarily psychological, the Court should enter judgment for defendant. As set forth below, however, the Court concludes that FELA permits recovery for plaintiff's psychological injuries.

FELA provides compensation for railroad employees who suffer injuries as a result of employer negligence. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988). FELA is a broad remedial statute, and the Supreme Court has liberally construed the statute in determining what injuries are compensable under FELA. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949). The Supreme Court has held that an employee can recover under FELA when the employer's negligence "played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought." Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 448, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957). The Court, however, has declined to decide whether purely emotional injuries are recoverable under FELA, see Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 567, 107 S.Ct. 1410, 1416, 94 L.Ed.2d 563 (1987), advising courts instead to "glean guidance from common-law developments." Id. at 568, 107 S.Ct. at 1417. The Court stated that "whether one can recover for emotional injury might rest on a variety of subtle and intricate distinctions related to the nature of the injury and the character of the tortious activity." Id. While many states recognize a tort for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, they "vary in the degree of objective symptomatology the victim must demonstrate." Id. at 569-70, 107 S.Ct. at 1418.

The Eleventh Circuit has not addressed this issue under FELA, and while other courts agree that claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress are cognizable under FELA, "they are badly splintered as to the elements necessary to bring such a claim." Gottshall v. Consol. Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 361 (3d Cir.1993).³ Many courts, however, have turned to the traditional common law rubric for guidance in addressing this question. See, e.g., id. at 362.; Ray v. Consol. Rail Corp., 938 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 914, 116 L.Ed.2d 813 (1992); Plaisance v. Texaco Inc., 937 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.1991), modified, 966 F.2d 166 (1992) (en banc). This Court next discusses the common law approaches to claims for emotional injuries.

Generally, the common law uses four standards for assessing claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress: (1) physical injury or impact rule; (2) zone of danger; (3) by-stander; and (4) full recovery. Plaisance, 937 F.2d at 1009. Traditionally, these rules were used to limit recovery for injuries "unconnected with actual or threatened impact ...," Buell, 480 U.S. at 569, n. 20, 107 S.Ct. at 1418, n. 20, and many states permit recovery on a showing that plaintiff suffered a physical injury or impact. A majority of jurisdictions now use the "zone of danger" rule, which permits recovery for emotional injuries resulting from witnessing physical harm to another or from fearing physical harm to oneself, provided that plaintiff was actually threatened by physical harm. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 361. Jurisdictions permitting recovery for bystanders generally require the plaintiff to be present at the accident and closely related to the victim. Id. The full recovery approach permits a general negligence cause of action for the infliction of emotional distress. Plaisance, 937 F.2d at 1010.

Here plaintiff's emotional injuries resulted from his experience during a train wreck. He was in the second engine of the train when it collided with another train. The impact of the collision knocked plaintiff over, and he heard loud noises and "a whole lot of ruckus ... just like ... the whole world was coming down." (Tr. at 195.) After the collision, plaintiff was trapped in the car. The front end of the engine was torn off; there were fires in and around the cars blocking plaintiff's exit. He heard the conductor, who was killed in the collision, crying for help, but could not reach him to save him. He heard other crew members crying and moaning. After plaintiff made his way out of the train, he saw injured employees wandering around the woods, bleeding and crying. Fires were burning on both sides of the tracks. One car exploded, knocking plaintiff down. Plaintiff, along with other injured crew members, went to the hospital, where he was treated for minor injuries. At trial, he contended that the horror of the train wreck and his fear for his own safety caused his emotional injury.⁴

Even under a restrictive application of the common law rules, plaintiff would be entitled to recover. Plaintiff was clearly in the zone of danger, and his testimony shows that he reasonably feared for his own safety at the time. Also, regardless of whether plaintiff was able to link his hip injury to accident,⁵ plaintiff suffered some physical impact and injury.⁶ The Court finds that given these facts, FELA permits recovery for plaintiff's emotional injury.

Defendant argues that most circuits considering this issue have "expressed a great reluctance to recognize FELA liability for claims of psychological injury." All but one of the five cases cited by defendant, however, involve claims of emotional injuries resulting from work place stress or harassment. Ray, 938 F.2d at 705 (finding no cause of action absent actual or threatened impact); Elliott v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 910 F.2d 1224, 1229 (4th Cir.1990) (no recovery for emotional distress absent a showing of outrageous conduct ... was responding to supervisors' order); Adams v. CSX Trans....