Hall v. Passaic Water Co.

• Decision Date: 20 November 1912
• Citation: 83 N.J.L. 771,85 A. 349
• Parties: HALL v. PASSAIC WATER CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

85 A. 349

83 N.J.L. 771

HALL

v. PASSAIC WATER CO.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Nov. 20, 1912.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to Supreme Court.

Action by Isaac A. Hall against the Passaic Water Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

John W. Harding, of Paterson, and James G. Blauvelt, of Passaic, for plaintiff in error.

William H. Corbin, of Jersey City, and Michael Dunn, of Paterson, for defendant in error.

TREACY, J. The defendant is a corporation of this state, engaged in the supplying of water to the city of Paterson, and to the inhabitants thereof. The plaintiff is an inhabitant of the city of Paterson, and was the owner of a factory building on Fulton street, in that city. He erected in said building two standpipes which ran from the top floor through the other floors to the ground, and connected with the pipes of the defendant. There were in the mill also other water pipes which supplied water for the ordinary uses connected with the business. The plaintiff complained that the defendant agreed, in consideration of the payment for water at a stipulated price by plaintiff, to deliver a supply of water to plaintiff's mill under a pressure of not less than 10 pounds to the square inch at each opening of the stand-pipes and the other water pipes; that a building across the street from plaintiff's mill took fire; that the flames spread to the plaintiff's mill, and through the failure of the defendant to keep the water at the pressure stated the mill and its contents were destroyed. The defendant pleaded the general issue and the statute of limitations. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff assigns error on this, and, while he has other assignments of error, this is the only one which he argues.

If the defendant made the contract alleged in the declaration, it would, of course, be bound to keep the supply of water in the plaintiff's mill at the stipulated pressure, notwithstanding that an unforeseen accident made it impossible to do so. Middlesex Water CO. v. Knappmann & Whiting Co., 64 N. J. Law, 240, 45 Atl. 692, 49 L. R. A. 572, 81 Am. St Rep. 467.

To prove his case, the plaintiff testified that when he determined to build his mill, he saw William Ryle, the superintendent of the defendant, informed him of his plans, and asked him if he would have sufficient water pressure for fire purposes, and that Ryle told him he could go ahead with his building, and that he would have sufficient supply for fire and other purposes. He testifies: "I then asked him [Ryle] what that pressure would be or was. He said the pressure was not less than 10 pounds, but he said: 'Mr. Hall, you will have more throughout your mill.' I then asked him what the charge would be for such service. He said the charge would be as charged to manufacturers for what they used and as used." To establish Ryle's authority to make such a contract, the plaintiff called as witnesses several property owners in Paterson, who testified that they had made arrangements for the supply of water to their premises by defendant with Ryle. But none of these witnesses proved that he or any other person had any agreement or arrangement similar to that claimed by the plaintiff. None of them had a contract guaranteeing a 10-pound pressure of water or any other pressure, and the only witness (Ryle) besides the plaintiff who claims to have spoken to Ryle about a supply to a standpipe in his mill says that all Ryle agreed to give was the best pressure that he could. "There was no reference as to the amount of pressure," he says, "but Mr. Ryle volunteered to make connection with the Essex street main, that was the pressure, the best he could do for that purpose." The testimony of these witnesses was altogether inadequate to establish knowledge on the part of the defendant of the making of the contract sued upon or to make out a course of conduct on the part of Ryle in the making of contracts of the character of that claimed by the plaintiff which would raise a presumption that the defendant authorized expressly or by acquiescence the making of such contract. The case of Middlesex Water Co. v. Knappmann Whiting Co., 64 N. J. Law, 240, 45 Atl. 692, 49 L. R. A. 572, 81 Am. St Rep. 467, does not apply. In that case there was a written contract to supply water sufficient for fire purposes. The water main broke and the Knappmann Whiting Company's mill took fire, and, owing to lack of water supply, was burned. The water company was properly held liable in that case. In that case the contract was admittedly and undeniably the contract of the water company to supply water for the extinguishing of fires. The water company brought suit upon the contract for money due to it for water supplied to the Knappmann Whiting Company, and the latter set up in recoupment the damages suffered by it through the destruction of its mill. The water company in defending against this claim contended that an unforeseen accident, the breaking of the main, prevented its compliance with its contract, and excused it. No question arose as to the authority of an agent to make the contract The question involved in the case sub judice is whether the defendant's superintendent had authority to make the...