Hall v. Pegram

• Citation: 85 Ala. 522,5 So. 209
• Parties: HALL v. PEGRAM.
• Decision Date: 08 January 1889
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

5 So. 209

85 Ala. 522

HALL v. PEGRAM.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 8, 1889

Appeal from chancery court, Mobile county; THOMAS W. COLEMAN Chancellor.

A bill was filed by R. G. Pegram, as executor of the will of John D Ragland, deceased, against Fred Hall, as administrator of the estate of the said Ragland, deceased, to have the final settlement of the said Hall's administration annulled and set aside, and have corrected certain errors of law and fact alleged to have been committed in the said final settlement of the said administration. The defendant demurred to the bill on the ground, among others, that there was an omission from the bill of essential parties to this case. The chancellor overruled the demurrer, and upon the final hearing on the pleadings and proof granted the relief prayed for in the bill. From the decree of the chancellor the defendant appealed.

G L. & H. T. Smith, for appellant.

Overall & Bestor, for appellee.

STONE C.J.

John D. Ragland, a resident of Virginia, died April 2, 1872, in Mobile, Ala., leaving a considerable estate, and debts in each state. He left a will, which was probated and established in each jurisdiction. The will disposed of the testator's entire estate, real and personal, and appointed R. G. Pegram, of Virginia, to be executor, who, in the year 1872, qualified, and took upon himself the trust. The will also vested in Pegram the title to all testator's real estate, and made him trustee thereof for the equal benefit of testator's only surviving heirs at law and devisees,-his three daughters, all residents of Virginia. Both the executor, Pegram, and the three daughters, have ever since continued to reside in Virginia. During the same year-1872-Fred Hall, a resident of Alabama, was by the probate court of Mobile county appointed administrator of the said Ragland's estate with the will annexed, and took upon himself the administration of said estate in Alabama. His administration was limited to personal assets in Alabama, and to the payment of Alabama debts; for the will vested the title of all the realty in Pegram as trustee. On the 10th of March, 1874, Fred Hall made a partial settlement of his administration, at which time there was ascertained to be in his hands $10,000 in excess of all the disbursements he had made as administrator. In this settlement commissions were allowed to him on all receipts and disbursements up to that stage of the administration. He made no other partial settlement. On the 28th day of August, 1886, Fred Hall made a final settlement of his administration of said estate, and at such settlement nothing was found against him. On the contrary, it was ascertained and decreed that his disbursements exceeded the assets he had received by the sum of $4,260, and it was decreed that the estate owed him that sum. He thereupon resigned the administration. His resignation was accepted by the court, and an order made discharging him from the trust.

The present bill was filed in November, 1886, by Pegram, the executor, and prays to have corrected certain errors of law and fact charged to have been committed in Hall's final settlement, to his own advantage, and to the prejudice of Ragland's estate. The equity of the bill depends on section 3837 of the Code of 1876, and its proper interpretation. The language of that section is as follows: "Where any error of law or fact has occurred in the settlement of any estate of a decedent to the injury of any party, without any fault or neglect on his part, such party may correct such error by bill in chancery, within two years after the final settlement thereof." This statute is found without change in each of the Codes of 1852, 1867, and 1876. A clause is added to it in the Code of 1886, but it does not affect this case. In the earlier constructions of this statute, this court was inclined to make it highly remedial and beneficial. Cowan v. Jones, 27 Ala. 317; Morrow v. Allison, 39 Ala. 70; Meadows v. Edwards, 46 Ala. 354; Monnin v. Beroujon, 51 Ala. 196. But this rule soon gave way to stricter requirements. In Gamble v. Jordan, 54 Ala. 432, a case under the statute we are considering, the principle decided is correctly expressed in the second head-note, as follows: "When the jurisdiction of the probate court has attached, its decree on final settlement of an administration cannot be vacated or annulled by a resort to equity, unless the complainant shows some special equitable ground of relief, whereby, by reason of accident, mistake, or fraud, unmixed with fraud on his part, he was prevented from interposing the matters relied on before decree in the probate court." In the same case it was said: "The jurisdiction of the court of probate was called into exercise when the administrator filed his accounts and vouchers for a final settlement, and a day was appointed for the settlement. *** The decree not being impeached for fraud, and no accident or mistake intervening, preventing the appellees from presenting to the court all the matters on which they now insist as grounds for relief, and all of which were involved in it, the decree is a bar." And in some of the cases which support this proposition notice of the day set for settlement was given only by publication, and this was held to include infants for whom guardians ad litem were appointed, as well as adults. Otis v. Dargan, 53 Ala. 178; Waring v. Lewis, Id. 615; Stabler v. Cook, 57 Ala. 22; Boswell v. Townsend, Id. 308; Jones v. Fellows, 58 Ala. 343; Bowden v. Perdue, 59 Ala. 409, 413; Lowe v. Guice, 69 Ala. 80; Hatcher v. Dillard, 70 Ala. 343; Lyne v. Wann, 72 Ala. 43; Foxworth v. White, Id. 224; Stoudenmire v. De Bardelaben, Id. 300; Waldrom v. Waldrom, 76 Ala. 285; Tutwiler v. Lane, 82 Ala. 456, 3 South. Rep. 104; Cawthorn v. Jones, 73 Ala. 82; Massey v. Modawell, Id. 421; Vincent v. Martin, 79 Ala. 540. Under our decisions, cited above, my opinion is that we have in effect declared that the statute we are considering has accomplished no result whatever. This I attempted to show in Bowden v. Perdue, 59 Ala. 409. The interpretation it has received at our hands gives to it the same scope and extent in correcting error in judgments as was done by the chancery court without the statute. French v. Garner, 7 Port. (Ala.) 549; 1 Brick. Dig. p. 666, § 376; 3 Brick. Dig. p. 347, § 230; Headley v. Bell, 84 Ala. 346, 4 South. Rep. 391. While, as shown in Bowden v. Perdue, I would prefer to give to the statute a more liberal, remedial interpretation, the construction has prevailed too long, and has been asserted too often, to justify a departure from it. We speak, of course, of the statute as it existed before it was amended by the Code of 1886, § 3536. To what extent that amendment will require changed interpretation it is not our intention to intimate any at this time. We have, as our rulings show, given full effect to the statutory requirement that any injury complained of, to be remediable under this statute, must have been suffered "without any fault or neglect" on the part of the party complaining. Yet there are cases in which relief has been granted. If the administrator has made misrepresentations, has misled or deceived his beneficiary, and thus thrown him off his guard, or has resorted to any artifice by which he has intentionally averted scrutiny of his account, and has thus obtained an undue advantage in his settlement, chancery will grant relief, if timely application be made. Chancery relieves against the most solemn judgments, if procured by fraud. Humphreys v. Burleson, 72 Ala. 1; Mock v. Steele, 34 Ala. 198; U. S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61.

A summary of the facts of this case is necessary to a proper understanding of the question we have in hand. During the season of 1871-72, the testator, Ragland, was engaged in purchasing horses and mules at Selma, and shipping them to Mobile by steam-boat. Selma is near the center of the state and Mobile on the southern border, distant, the one place from the other, 150 miles, or more; more than double that number of miles by water. This is common knowledge. The correspondence of the parties, which is in evidence, shows that Ragland's purchases in Selma were with a view to a sale in Mobile, that Hall was his agent at the latter place, and that the horses and mules purchased at Selma were shipped to Hall. Ragland drew on Hall to meet the purchases he made, and, apparently, to meet some other liabilities. Ragland's drafts on Hall during the season aggregated $12,000 or more, all of which were promptly paid by Hall. There was a correspondence between Pegram, the executor in Virginia, and Hall, the administrator in Alabama, commencing in 1872, and continuing up to a short time before Hall's final settlement, in 1886. From that correspondence we derive the following information: Ragland's estate owed debts to Virginia creditors in excess of personal assets, subject to Pegram's primary control. Pegram, executing the domiciliary administration, and exercising its rights, claimed that there was an excess of personal assets in Alabama beyond the claims of Alabama creditors, and hence he desired that Hall should turn over to him some part of the Alabama personal assets to meet the Virginia debts, that he, Pegram, might save from sale and sacrifice real estate in Virginia, which he alleged was very valuable. His requests and appeals in this behalf commenced in 1872, and were repeated in almost every letter, till near the close of the administration. As early as November 18, 1872, in a letter from Pegram to Hall, is this language: "Can you give me an idea when I may look for a remittance from you? You must not deem me importunate, for if you had any idea of the extent to which I am annoyed by constant inquiries from creditors, you would...